Edwards v. Block

• Decision Date: 21 January 1885
• Citation: 73 Ga. 450
• Parties: EDWARDS v. BLOCK.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

73 Ga. 450

EDWARDS v. BLOCK.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

January 21, 1885

September Term, 1884.

1. The verdict was supported, if not demanded, by the evidence.

2. If the owner of a bakery employed a baker for a year, with the condition that the employment was to terminate at the death of the employer, or if his bakery should be destroyed by fire; and if the bakery was destroyed by fire, and thereafter the owner told the baker that he wished him to stay, and to wait a day or two until he could " get straight," and he would find the baker something to do, or make agreeable arrangements with him; and if, in pursuance of such declarations, he sought to get employment for the baker with other persons, and relying on these acts and declarations the baker refused offers of employment from other parties outside of the city, and remained there in good faith for several weeks waiting for the fulfilment of these declarations, and at the end of five weeks his former employer refused to carry out such declarations or to pay him anything:

Held, that such declarations were merely gratuitous and in no sense related to the contract which had been terminated by the fire. They neither amounted to a waiver of the terms of that contract nor to a new contract.

( a. ) Had such declarations amounted to a new contract, they were not declared on as such.

3. If there was any error in the charge on the subject of the measure of damages, it did not hurt the plaintiff, as the jury found for the defendant on the plea that the contract had been terminated by the destruction of the bakery by fire.

Contracts. Waiver. Master and Servant. Pleadings. Before Judge HAMMOND. Fulton Superior Court. March Term, 1884.

Edwards brought suit against Block to recover $1,300.00, less a credit of $50.00, on a contract for services as a baker. The declaration alleged, in brief, as follows: Defendant employed plaintiff for a year, beginning January 6, 1882, and ending January 6, 1883, at $25.00 per week. Plaintiff was induced to leave his home in New York and to come to Atlanta to accept this employment, and continued to labor for defendant until January 21, 1882, when the building in which he was employed was destroyed by fire. Defendant paid him up to the date of the fire, and at the same time told him that he would need his services as soon as he could " get things straightened out" from the fire, and requested him to hold himself in readiness to resume his work as soon as defendant could prepare therefor, which would be in a very short time. Relying on this, and with the knowledge and consent and at the instance and request of the defendant, the plaintiff refused to correspond with Messrs. Braun &amp Company and others as to terms on which he would enter their employment; and he sought employment in Atlanta at a less sum than plaintiff was paying him, it being understood that whatever sum he could earn weekly by such temporary employment should be deducted from the amount for which defendant was liable under the contract. On February 26 defendant refused to comply with the contract and discharged plaintiff.

There was a second count in the declaration, based on an open account for an amount alleged to be due by defendant to plaintiff for services as baker.

Defendant pleaded the general issue and a special plea that, by the terms of the contract between him and the plaintiff, the employment of the latter was to cease in the event of the death of defendant or the burning of the house in which he was doing business; that this house was burned on January 21, 1882, and the contract was terminated.

The evidence was conflicting. The plaintiff testified to the contract, as declared on by him, the fire and the payment of his wages up to that time. As to subsequent conversations, he testified as follows: After the fire, he received letters and a telegram offering him situations. He went to the defendant and told him that he thought he was in a position to relieve him of his obligation, if the latter was willing; defendant said he wished him to stay. Plaintiff sympathized with defendant, and told him that he was willing to share his losses by accepting a reduction of wages until defendant's place was rebuilt; defendant told him to wait a day or two until the former could " get straight," and then he would find plaintiff something to do or make some agreeable arrangement with him, and asked if plaintiff was willing to work for one Jack as a baker; plaintiff replied that he was, and defendant said he would apply to Jack. Plaintiff did not seek for employment in Atlanta, but, with the knowledge of defendant, applied to some friends outside of the city to find employment until defendant should resume the business of cracker-baking. Five weeks after the fire, the plaintiff went to the defendant and told him that he was tired of the uncertainty, and requested defendant to pay him up to that date and discharge him. Defendant said he had already discharged himself after the date of the fire, and claimed that such a fire would release him...