Edwards v. Brown
| Citation | 5 S.W. 87 |
| Parties | EDWARDS and others v. BROWN. |
| Decision Date | 25 June 1887 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
B. D. Tarleton, for appellant. Ivy & Ivy, Croft & Blanding, F. G. Morris and Richd. Morgan, Jr., for the motion.
An able and elaborate argument has been filed in behalf of the motion for a rehearing in this case. The questions involved are important; and we deem it proper, therefore, to discuss briefly the points we are asked to reconsider.
It is insisted, in the first place, that the court is in error in treating the title of Mrs. Brown to one-half of the community land held in the name of her divorced husband as equitable and not a legal estate. In support of this, we are cited to the third section of the act of 1848, (Pasch. Dig. art. 4642,) which reads as follows: "All property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage, except that which is acquired in the manner specified in the second section of this act, shall be deemed the common property of the husband and wife, and during coverture may be disposed of by the husband only," etc. This statute defines what shall be the community property, but does not, as we think, touch the question before us. In passing that act, the legislature did not have under consideration the form of the conveyance, and upon that subject no provision is there made. If it had provided that all property conveyed either to the husband or wife during the marriage should belong to the common estate, this would have placed the legal title in both. But no such language is used. Such in fact is not the meaning of the section, as is shown by the decisions of our courts; for it is uniformly held that property so conveyed may be shown to be the separate property of either spouse, by satisfactory proof that it was paid for by his or her separate funds or estate. Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 112; King v. Gilleland, Id. 271; Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6; Huston v. Curl, 8 Tex. 239; Stoker v. Bailey, 62 Tex. 299; Cleveland v. Cole, 65 Tex. 402; Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314; Dunham v. Chatham, 21 Tex. 231. The rule of decision laid down in the cases cited and universally adopted in our state is inconsistent with the idea that the words "acquired by either husband or wife" are to be construed as having the same meaning as the words "conveyed to either husband or wife." It seems to us, therefore, that in framing this statute the legislature had in view the consideration by which the property should be acquired, and did not intend to provide that conveyance made either to the husband or wife singly during marriage shall pass the legal title of the estate to both. Such a construction is not consistent with the act of February 5, 1840, which directed the mode by which lands should be conveyed in this state, and the effect of which was to place the legal title in all property conveyed according to its provisions in the grantee named in the conveyance. It is inconsistent, also, with our registration laws, which require conveyances to be recorded, with the object of exposing the chain of the legal title to the inspection of purchasers, and of thereby protecting them against secret claims.
The Civil Code of Louisiana goes further than our statute, and, among other things, provides that all property acquired by purchase during the marriage, "even although the purchase be only in the name of one of the two, and not of both," shall be community property, (Civil Code La. art. 2371;) and under this the courts of that state hold that property paid for by the separate funds of either the husband or wife is common property, whether conveyed to one or both, unless it be shown that, at the time of the conveyance, it was the intention to make it the separate property of the one whose funds were used in the purchase. Provost v. Delahoussaye, 5 La. Ann. 610; Young v. Young, Id. 611; Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 296; Davidson v. Stuart, 10 La. 148. It appears that, by reason of the use of the words we have quoted, a different construction is placed upon that article of the Louisiana Code from that given to our statute by our courts.
We conclude that the object of our law-makers, in enacting the statute we have had under consideration, was to provide that all property acquired during the marriage by the labor of either the husband or wife, or the joint labor of both, as well as the increase and proceeds of such property, would belong beneficially to both, to whomsoever the legal title should be conveyed; and that they did not mean that the legal title should be in both the husband and wife when the property was not conveyed to both in accordance with the provisions of our statute regulating conveyances.
But it is also urged that our ruling upon this question is in conflict with the former decisions of this court. Let us then briefly review the cases which are relied upon to support the contrary doctrine.
The point decided in Yancy v. Batte, 48 Tex. 46, and Johnson v. Harrison, Id. 257, is that a purchaser of community property from the husband after the death of the wife, in order to defeat the claim of the heirs of the wife to one-half of the property, must show that the land was sold for the purpose of paying debts, if he rely on that defense; and that the burden was not upon the heirs to show that there were no debts. It is evident that this does not involve the question of the legal title of the wife. The rule would be the same whether it should be held that the legal title was both in the husband and wife, or in the husband alone for the benefit of both. The husband would have no right to sell the wife's equitable title except to pay debts. To make this clear, let us suppose that some third party holds the naked legal title to land in trust for the benefit of the husband and wife as of their community estate. The husband could sell his interest; but, after the death of the wife, could he sell her interest except to pay community...
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