Edwards v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 14 October 2016
• Docket Number: A16A0755
• Citation: 338 Ga.App. 876,792 S.E.2d 142
• Parties: Edwards v. Campbell.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

338 Ga.App. 876

792 S.E.2d 142

Edwards

v.Campbell.

A16A0755

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 14, 2016

Ben C. Brodhead III, Jennifer Stalvey Mundy, Broadhead Law, for Appellant.

Jody Charles Campbell, Peachtree Corners, for Appellee.

Dillard, Judge.

Seth Edwards appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to David Campbell in his negligence action, contending that Campbell provided negligent tire-installation training to Joel Lanham and employees of Campbell Tire Company ("CTC") when Campbell sold CTC to Lanham's company, Lanham Enterprises, LLC. Specifically, Edwards alleged that, based on this negligent training, CTC installed two new tires on his grandmother's car in such a way that rendered it dangerous and unstable, which, in turn, resulted in a car accident that seriously and permanently injured him. On appeal, Edwards argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Campbell on the basis that the negligent training was not the proximate cause of his injuries because (1) Edwards was not given full and fair notice and an opportunity to respond to the issue of proximate cause, and (2) alternatively, that the court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Edwards could not establish the proximate—cause element of his negligence claim. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Edwards, the nonmoving party,¹ the record shows that Campbell and his wife owned CTC for over 20 years, during which time they operated the business under the trade name "Campbell Tire Company." But on April 1, 2009, Campbell, in his capacity as president and a shareholder of CTC, executed an asset-purchase agreement, selling the business and all of its assets to Lanham Enterprises, LLC. As part of the sales contract, Campbell, in his personal capacity as a shareholder of CTC, agreed to provide 60 days of training to Lanham, who had no prior experience in the tire business.² And while the other CTC employees "had been there for a long time," Lanham's understanding was that everyone working there had been "primarily trained by ... Campbell." As to tire installation specifically, Campbell instructed Lanham that "two new tires should be placed on the front axle if only two tires are purchased for a four-tire vehicle." Lanham believed that this procedure was "pretty normal in the industry."

On April 14, 2011, Edwards's grandmother, who is not a party to this action, purchased two new tires from CTC and had them installed on her vehicle. According to Edwards, shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2011, he was driving his grandmother's car when he lost control of the vehicle and was injured in the resulting collision.³ Nearly two years later, in April 2013, Edwards filed a complaint against Campbell,⁴ alleging, in relevant part, that Campbell's failure to ensure that the service provided by CTC employees was consistent with accepted automotive and engineering principles and his failure to properly train Lanham and CTC employees on tire installation, in breach of his contract with Lanham Enterprises, rendered Edwards's vehicle "unreasonably dangerous and defective." Specifically, Edwards contended that the new tires his grandmother purchased were negligently installed on the car's front axle instead of on the rear axle, which exposed him to danger and resulted in the car accident.

Discovery ensued, and in January 2015, Campbell filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence showed that he did not owe a legal duty to Edwards as to his dealings with CTC, which occurred two years before the allegedly negligent tire installation. Ultimately, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Campbell's motion for summary judgment, finding that, although he owed a duty to train CTC employees correctly, two years passed between the alleged negligent training and the incident at issue, and as a matter of law, any proximate cause for Edwards's injuries would flow from Lanham and his employees, not Campbell. This appeal follows.

To begin with, we note that summary judgment is appropriate when "the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."⁵ And a defendant satisfies this burden when the court is shown that "the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the plaintiff's case."⁶ Finally, if the moving party meets this burden, "the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue."⁷ With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to Edwards's specific claims of error.

1. In two enumerations of error, Edwards argues that the trial court erred in basing its grant of summary judgment to Campbell on the lack of proximate cause because that issue was not raised in Campbell's initial summary-judgment motion and Edwards was not given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on it before the court entered its judgment. We disagree.

Edwards is indeed correct that a trial court must ensure that "the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment."⁸ In this regard, the crucial point is "to ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is sought has had a full and final opportunity to meet and attempt to controvert the assertions against him."⁹ But a plaintiff is not required to "respond to issues which are not raised in the motion for summary judgment or to present its entire case on all allegations in the complaint—even on issues not raised in the defendants' motion."¹⁰ Indeed, until the defendant pierces the allegations of the complaint on a particular issue, the plaintiff is "neither required to respond to the motion on that issue, nor ... to produce evidence in support of his complaint on that issue."¹¹

As previously noted, Edwards contends that the trial court granted summary judgment based on the lack of proximate cause without giving him fair notice and an opportunity to respond to that issue prior to the entry of summary judgment; but this claim is belied by the record. As noted by Edwards, Campbell's initial motion for summary judgment was based solely on the argument that he could not be liable for any negligent training because he owed no legal duty of care to Edwards.¹² Specifically, Campbell argued that he owed no legal duty to Edwards because the injury occurred after he sold the business, over which Campbell did not retain any ownership, control, or responsibility. In response, Edwards argued that, under the 2009 sales contract, Campbell "undertook the duty to provide training" to Lanham in a "non-negligent manner."

Then, Campbell filed a reply brief, contending that, in responding to his motion for summary judgment, Edwards attempted to "recast" his claims against Campbell as "direct negligence claims."¹³ And in addressing those claims, Campbell expressly argued, inter alia , that, even if Edwards could show that he misinformed Lanham as to the proper method for installing tires in 2009, Edwards could not establish that this purportedly negligent conduct was the proximate cause of his injuries. In support, Campbell relied on Lanham's deposition testimony that, since being trained by Campbell in 2009, he has continued to conduct independent research regarding the "debate within the industry regarding tire placement," and that, if he learned that Campbell's training was incorrect, he would change his tire-installation policy to comply with the law. Indeed, according to Campbell, this "independent investigation, research, and business decision made by Lanham" rendered any deficiency in Campbell's training "too remote to be the proximate cause of [Edwards's] injuries...."

Although Edwards did not file a written response to Campbell's proximate-cause argument, Campbell raised the issue again during the summary-judgment hearing. Specifically, Campbell reiterated his argument that Lanham's independent research and decision not to change the tire-installation policy "sever[ed] any causal nexus that could have possibly been created by the negligent training...." And in doing so, Campbell specifically reminded the trial court and Edwards that Edwards had not yet responded to this causation argument. Nevertheless, instead of responding to Campbell's proximate-cause argument, Edwards addressed unrelated issues that he contended were still subject to further discovery and not ripe for review. In sum, because Campbell briefed the issue of proximate cause before the hearing, presented oral argument on the issue, and specifically highlighted Edwards's failure to respond to it at the summary-judgment hearing, Edwards's claim that he was not given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the issue of proximate cause prior to the entry of summary judgment is unavailing.¹⁴

2. Turning now to the merits of Edwards's negligence claim, he argues that the trial court erroneously entered a "facially invalid order," which found that the passage of two years alone—between Campbell's negligent training and Edwards's accident—"equal[ed] a break in proximate cause." Again, we disagree.

To prevail on a cause of action for negligence, Edwards is required to prove the following essential elements: "a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct; breach of the duty; a legally sufficient causal connection (proximate cause) between conduct breaching the duty and the resulting injury, and damage flowing from the breach."¹⁵ And before any negligence, even if proven,¹⁶ can be actionable, that negligence "must be the proximate cause of the injuries sued upon."¹⁷

Indeed, the requirement of proximate cause "constitutes a limit on legal liability; it is a policy decision that, for a variety of reasons, e.g.,...