Edwards v. City of Quincy
| Decision Date | 30 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-83-0683,4-83-0683 |
| Citation | 124 Ill.App.3d 1004,464 N.E.2d 1125,80 Ill.Dec. 142 |
| Parties | , 80 Ill.Dec. 142 William R. EDWARDS and Verlee A. Edwards, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF QUINCY, a Municipal Corporation; David M. Wilson, Building Inspector for the City of Quincy, Illinois; Terry Grussenmeyer, William Weiman, Donald Duesterhaus, Eugene Mueller, Mark Nelson, Eugene Foster, Vern Hagstrom, Jack Madden, Donald Heckenkamp, Richard Peters, Kenneth Goehl, William Phillips, and Gary Kirlin, Aldermen of the City Council of the City of Quincy; Donald C. Adams, Corporation Counsel for the City of Quincy; James A. Rapp, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Quincy; and Alfred Dierkes, Thomas Davis, and E.E. Groves, members of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Quincy, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
David C. Little, Quincy, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Scholz, Staff & Palmer, Loos, Schnack & Siebers, Loren E. Schnack, Quincy, for defendants-appellees.
The plaintiffs, William and Verlee Edwards, sued the defendants, the City of Quincy and City officials, to recover damages for alleged statutory and constitutional violations. Acting on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court held the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel along with the operation of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 85, par. 1-101 et seq.) barred the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm. Because we decide that res judicata bars the plaintiffs' suit, we need not address the issue of whether the Act is also a bar.
On April 4, 1979, the plaintiffs agreed to purchase property in the City of Quincy. The building on the property was operated as a beauty parlor, a valid nonconforming use under the City's zoning ordinance. The plaintiffs conditioned their offer to purchase on their ability to use the property as a cocktail lounge and restaurant, also a nonconforming use. The plaintiffs contacted City officials, and after they concluded they could get a building permit to remodel, they purchased the property.
On June 19, 1979, the plaintiffs applied for their building permit. Instead of their permit, the plaintiffs received a letter advising them that their application had been rejected because their proposed use of the property violated the zoning ordinance. The plaintiffs appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals for the City of Quincy. Before the appeal was heard, the City council approved a resolution directing the building inspector to delay issuance of permits involving a shifting of nonconforming uses.
On August 2, 1979, the Board held a hearing. Judi Maas, secretary to the City's Planning Commission, testified the plaintiffs had inquired about the zoning ordinance. She had sent them a letter stating that as long as a building is not enlarged reconstructed, or structurally altered, it could be used for a different nonconforming use.
Dave Wilson, the City's building inspector, also testified. Wilson had always interpreted the ordinance to exclude only extensions, enlargements, or structural alterations on the outside of the building. He informed the plaintiffs of this interpretation. Wilson accepted the plaintiffs' money for a permit when the plaintiffs applied. He also signed the application stating that it was approved by the building inspector. Later, the corporation counsel, James Rapp, instructed Wilson to scratch out "approved" and put in "accepted."
William Edwards testified that besides checking with the building inspector and the Planning Commission, he also asked the mayor whether his nonconforming use was permissible. After the mayor stated it was, Edwards bought the property.
The Board also heard evidence on the remodeling the plaintiffs wanted to do. The plaintiffs intended to remodel only the interior of the building. Finally, the evidence showed the building had previously been operated as a beauty parlor and as a bakery, both nonconforming uses.
On August 15, 1979, the Board issued its opinion and denied the permit. On September 5, 1979, the City council amended its zoning ordinance to eliminate shifting of nonconforming uses which altered the character of a neighborhood. The City council approved the Board's decision on September 10, 1979.
On September 19, 1979, the plaintiff filed an administrative review suit. Count I alleged the Board's decision was arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional, contrary to law, and not supported by the evidence. The complaint asserted the Board's decision would result in unnecessary and undue hardship to the plaintiffs, and amounted to a taking of property without due process of law. Counts II and III made the same allegations against the City council and the City itself.
The plaintiffs later filed an amendment to their complaint. They alleged they were denied a fair and impartial hearing because only four of the seven members of the Board heard their appeal, and the Board failed to conduct an open meeting. The trial court granted a motion to strike the amendment because the issues it raised were not raised before the Board.
The trial court remanded the case to the Board to make specific findings of fact. The Board did so, but the court later rejected these findings. On July 25, 1980, the court reversed the Board's decision and ordered the City to issue the permit. The City appealed, and we reversed the trial court in Edwards v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1981), 95 Ill.App.3d 455, 50 Ill.Dec. 911, 420 N.E.2d 228, holding the plaintiffs were not entitled to their permit under the ordinance.
On November 19, 1982, the plaintiffs filed their present complaint seeking compensatory damages. They first allege City officials assured them they could get a permit and they bought in reliance on these assurances. They also contend the City had an established local governmental standard which entitled them to their permit. They maintain that Rapp illegally instructed Wilson to alter their permit application. The plaintiffs further assert the Board denied them due process because only four members heard their appeal, and the Board failed to conduct a fair and impartial hearing when deliberating on the case and later on remandment. They contend the City council illegally directed the building inspector to withhold permits. The plaintiffs conclude the defendants' actions deprived them of due process and equal protection and amounted to a taking of property without just compensation. They seek damages for reduction in market value and lost use of their property as well as other expenses relating to the establishment of the proposed business.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. On July 15, 1983, the trial court granted the motion. The court held the decision in Edwards barred the plaintiffs' present suit. The court also held the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act also barred this suit.
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits repetitive litigation to enhance judicial economy and to protect litigants from the burden of retrying an identical cause of action or issue with the same party or a privy. Under the doctrine, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits bars absolutely a subsequent action involving the same cause of action or issue between the same parties or their privies. Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432, 69 Ill.Dec. 399, 403, 447 N.E.2d 834, 838.
A party invoking res judicata must not only plead the former action as a bar, but must also prove the existence and character of the former judgment as well as its legal effect. (La Salle National Bank v. County of Du Page (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 562, 564, 32 Ill.Dec. 935, 937, 396 N.E.2d 48, 50.) The plaintiffs contend the defendants failed to properly plead and prove the judgment in Edwards as a bar because they never produced the record in Edwards. Instead, the defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of Edwards.
Under Supreme Court Rule 133(b), when pleading a judgment, a party need only state the date of its entry, describe its general nature, and allege generally that it was duly made. (87 Ill.2d R. 133(b).) This rule applies to judgments pleaded in motions to dismissed based upon res judicata. (Gudgel v. St. Louis Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 765, 274 N.E.2d 597.) The defendants properly pleaded the decision in Edwards. Once a party pleads the former judgment, Rule 133(b) allows the court to take judicial notice of it. (Wascher v. Lundeen (1969), 111 Ill.App.2d 452, 250 N.E.2d 318.) Therefore, production of the record is not required.
We outlined the scope of res judicata in Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 372, 375, 67 Ill.Dec. 166, 168, 444 N.E.2d 205, 208:
Under the estoppel by judgment branch, therefore, a final judgment bars a second suit where the parties and the cause of action are identical. Redfern, 111 Ill.App.3d 372, 376, 67 Ill.Dec. 166, 168, 444 N.E.2d 205, 208.
The plaintiffs assert the parties named in this suit are not identical to the parties in Edwards. While the plaintiffs are the same, the defendants named in Edwards were the City, the City...
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