Edwards v. Edwards, 33156

• Decision Date: 25 August 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33156,33156
• Citation: 47 Wn.2d 224,287 P.2d 139
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Merle Katherine EDWARDS, Respondent, v. George Eugene EDWARDS, Appellant.

Page 224

47 Wn.2d 224

287 P.2d 139

Merle Katherine EDWARDS, Respondent, v. George Eugene EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 33156.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Aug. 25, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1955.

Orvin H. Messegee, Seattle, for appellant.

Acheson & Smith, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

The parties to this action entered into a meretricious relationship in 1943, at which time respondent, plaintiff in the lower court, moved into an apartment owned by appellant. They subsequently obtained divorces from their then spouses, and in 1947 they secured a marriage license, which was not used until November 17, 1952, after respondent had instituted a suit to obtain a division of the property that had been accumulated during the years the parties had lived together. To effect a reconciliation, appellant agreed to and did marry the respondent. Six months later, in May, 1953, respondent filed suit for divorce, which action was never prosecuted, the parties having again become reconciled. On August 19, 1953, she filed her complaint in this action, seeking a divorce, alimony, and one half of the property of the parties. Appellant cross-complained, praying that the decree of divorce and all of the property be awarded to him. On June 25, 1954, a decree was entered in favor of the respondent, awarding to her approximately 30 per cent of the property and dismissing the cross-complaint.

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in its finding that he had been guilty of cruel treatment after the abandonment of the first divorce action, contending that there was no evidence of any acts of cruelty after the reconciliation. While the record reveals no acts of physical cruelty occurring after the reconciliation, respondent testified that appellant continued to address her in abusive terms and accused her of infidelity. There is evidence of both physical and mental cruelty prior to that time.

According to the appellant's argument, respondent was not entitled to obtain a divorce based upon grounds which had been destroyed when the marital relationship was resumed. The applicable rule is that, if a wife against whom acts of cruelty have been committed by her husband resumes or continues marital life with him, it is upon the implied condition that his misconduct will not be repeated, and where the condition is broken, there is a revival of the former offenses. Rentel v. Rentel, 39 Wash.2d 729, 238 P.2d 389, and cases cited therein. While condonation will not be considered removed by proof of slight delinquency, it is not necessary that the reviving acts of misconduct in and of themselves be such as to constitute independent grounds for divorce. Murray v. Murray, 38 Wash.2d 269, 229 P.2d 309.

The finding of fact to which error is assigned is inaccurate insofar as it states that all of the acts of cruelty were committed after the first divorce action was abandoned; however, the error is harmless. The trial court termed the language used by appellant, in addressing respondent, 'vile and indecent.' Under the rule stated above, his persistent use of such language, 'sometimes even in the presence of strangers,' was sufficient to revive the grounds existing before respondent's condonation; and the court did not err in granting her a divorce.

Both parties complain of the property division made by the court, the appellant maintaining that the portion awarded to the respondent is evcessive, and the respondent, in her cross-appeal, contending that it is inadequate.

Under RCW 26.08.110, the trial court has wide latitude and discretionary powers in the disposition of the property of the parties, whether community or separate, and only a...