Edwards v. Ford

• Decision Date: 06 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 42609,42609
• Citation: 279 So.2d 851
• Parties: Donald C. EDWARDS and Daisy I. Edwards, Petitioners, v. Edwin I. FORD et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 851

279 So.2d 851

Donald C. EDWARDS and Daisy I. Edwards, Petitioners, v. Edwin I. FORD et al., Respondents.

No. 42609.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 6, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1973.

Robert F. Nunez, St. Petersburg, for petitioners.

Malcolm V. McKay, of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf & Barkin, Tampa, and Harold S. Wilson, Clearwater, for respondents.

McCAIN, Justice.

By petition for certiorari we review an opinion by the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 263 So.2d 654 which is in conflict with Downing v. Vaine, Fla.App.1969, 228 So.2d 622, thereby vesting jurisdiction with us pursuant to Fla.Const., Article V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A. Oral argument has been dispensed with.

The facts are relatively simple. Respondents are a firm of attorneys practicing law in Florida. Petitioners at one time were their clients. It was out of the attorney-client relationship that the instant lawsuit arose. On November 6, 1962, petitioners and one Baseline Manufacturing Corporation entered into an 'Agreement for Purchase, LeaseBack and Repurchase' prepared for the parties by respondent Ford. In March, 1963, petitioners were advised by attorneys for Baseline that the agreement was probably usurious. At this point, petitioners allege, Wilson, another member of respondent firm, agreed to take whatever steps might be necessary to correct the injurious effect of the documents, free of charge. Certainly by October, 1963, petitioners knew and/or realized the usurious nature of their contracts. Next, Baseline brought suit against petitioners seeking to have the deed from Baseline to petitioners vacated, to have the deed declared a mortgage and to assess penalties for usury. Evantually, the ensuing litigation was terminated by a trial in which petitioners prevailed. An appeal followed but it was dismissed after a compromise settlement in 1967. (The same usury dispute was raised as a result of two other contracts written by Ford between petitioners and two other parties. Lawsuits followed in both cases. In one the contract was ultimately determined, by the DCA--2, to be usurious.) Petitioners alleged that due to compromise agreements in all cases necessitated by the lawsuits, they sustained a loss in all three cases.

Subsequently, attorney Wilson, on behalf of respondent law firm, submitted to petitioners a bill for the legal services rendered in defending the usury suits. When petitioners failed to pay, respondents, on March 4, 1968, filed suit against petitioners for attorneys fees. On June 5, 1968, petitioners answered, asserting numerous affirmative defenses relating to respondents' negligence in preparing the original contracts, and a counterclaim alleging malpractice on the part of respondent firm.

By order dated November 6, 1969, the trial judge dismissed the counterclaim for malpractice, stating:

'That the Statute of Limitations for an action against an attorney for malpractice Commences to run at the time the services are rendered by the attorney and that, therefore, defendants' counterclaim for money judgment in their favor against plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations.' (Emphasis supplied)

The DCA--2 affirmed per curiam without opinion, which in effect adopted the theory of the trial judge.

Therefore, we are concerned with whether the statute of limitations involving an action for malpractice against an attorney commences to run 'at the time the services are rendered.'

A more palatable solution to this vexatious issue comes to us through the very fine and analytical opinion written by Judge Wigginton of the First District Court of Appeal in Downing, supra, which reads in pertinent part, as follows:

'Defendant attorney at law has appealed a final judgment rendered against him in a malpractice action in which he was charged with negligence in the handling of a civil action for plaintiff. The trial resulted in a verdict by which the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the sum of $10,000.00. The principal point on appeal challenges the correctness of the trial court's ruling which denied defendant's motion for directed verdict based upon his defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

'The sole question for our determination is when did appellee's cause of action against appellant accrue under the facts and circumstances of this case. If, as contended by appellant, the cause of action accrued on the date appellee's action for malicious prosecution against the lumber company in the State of New York was barred by the statute of limitations on March 24, 1964, then the action sub judice was untimely filed and is therefore barred by the New York three-year statute of limitations. If, however, as contended by appellee, the cause of...