Edwards v. Gaston
Decision Date | 30 January 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 5475,5475 |
Citation | 252 P.2d 786,75 Ariz. 131 |
Parties | EDWARDS v. GASTON. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Herbert Mallamo, of Phoenix (Leslie Parry, Phoenix, of counsel), for appellant.
Moore & Romley, Chas. L. Hardy, and William P. Mahoney, Jr., of Phoenix, for appellee.
Action was brought in the trial court by the plaintiff-appellant herein against the defendant-appellee for damages to her car, sustained in a collision at 20th Street and Roosevelt Street in Phoenix, Arizona on October 4, 1949. This appellant was not the driver of the car nor was she in the car at the time of the collision. The car was borrowed of this appellant by her mother who was going on an independent errand.
The car of appellant was going west on Roosevelt. The car of appellee was going south on 20th Street. Drivers on Roosevelt had the right of way over 20th Street drivers, and on 20th Street there was a warning sign some 75 feet to the north of the entrance of Roosevelt, the warning being that a stop signal was ahead, and there was a stop signal at the intersection of Roosevelt Street.
After a trial by jury the verdict and judgment was for the appellee and appellant now appeals from the judgment and from the denial of the motion for new trial.
Appellant's car, being driven westward, entered the intersection of Roosevelt & 20th Streets before appellee's car entered the intersection. There were no stop signals or signs for drivers on Roosevelt at this place and appellant's car was at a point about two-thirds of the way through the intersection when it was struck by appellee's car. The driver of appellant's car saw the appellee approaching Roosevelt from the north on 20th Street, and it was her belief, as the evidence shows, that that car would stop as directed by the stop signal and that she would have no trouble going through the intersection. Appellant's car was a 1948 Dodge sedan and was purchased by her in June, 1949. Its value before the accident in question was $1500; and after the accident its salvaged value was between $300 and $325. The car was repaired at a cost of $781.89.
In considering appellant's assignments of error we will take I and IIA together since they both set forth the contention that there was no evidence presented in the lower court to warrant that court in instructing the jury as to contributory negligence on the part of the driver of appellant's car. We shall quote from portions of the transcript wherein the driver of appellant's car was being cross-examined and which we consider pertinent in answering the assignments:
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Unquestionably the evidence would have warranted the jury in finding that the defendant-appellee was negligent, and whether the court properly by instruction submitted the question of contributory negligence to the jury is dependent on whether the evidence would have warranted the jury in also finding that the driver of appellant's car was negligent. This court has heretofore announced the rule that one traveling upon a favored highway and approaching an intersection may be negligent if, when approaching such intersection, he observes another driver approaching the intersection on an intersecting highway with the duty imposed upon him to stop, and from such observation has knowledge that the car entering the favored highway is not going to act within the law and stop as required, and after having such knowledge continues on, he would be guilty of negligence. Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.2d 201.
We are of the opinion that under the evidence in this case the jury could have legally inferred that the driver of appellant's car had knowledge that the defendant-appellee was not going to observe the stop sign, and proceeded notwithstanding such knowledge, and under such circumstances had the right to find her guilty of contributory negligence.
Assignment IIB of appellant's brief also declares that the trial court erred in giving any instructions on contributory negligence, and in support of this contention cites the proposition of law that the contributory negligence of a bailee is not imputed to the bailor where the bailor is suing a third person for damage to...
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