Edwards v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 27 April 2000
• Docket Number: VP-A,No. 98-30972,98-30972
• Citation: 209 F.3d 772
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) ANTHONY A. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHNSON, Mr., Education Specialist at Federal Detention Center Oakdale; HAM, Mr., District Hearing Officer at Federal Detention Center Oakdale; AUCOIN, Mr.,Unit Counselor at Federal Detention Center Oakdale, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 772

209 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2000)

ANTHONY A. EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHNSON, Mr., Education Specialist at Federal Detention Center Oakdale; HAM, Mr., District Hearing Officer at Federal Detention Center Oakdale; AUCOIN, Mr., VP-A Unit Counselor at Federal Detention Center Oakdale, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-30972

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

April 27, 2000

REVISED, APRIL 28, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles

Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Anthony A. Edwards, an Immigration and Naturalization Service detainee awaiting deportation, appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims which challenged disciplinary hearing procedures and his punishment for violation of detention center policy. Edwards is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis. For the following reasons we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anthony A. Edwards ("Edwards") is a citizen of the Caribbean nation of St. Vincent. In January 1997 he was convicted in federal court of unauthorized use of an access device in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1029 (a) (1). That same month Edwards was brought to the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana ("FDC Oakdale") to await deportation. On August 8, 1997 Edwards was in the FDC Oakdale law library when a group of five or six visitors entered with Mr. Johnson ("Johnson"), an education specialist at FDC Oakdale. Edwards asked Johnson why the detainees could not give the visitors "their side of the story." Johnson explained that when the visitors returned he could tell them whatever he wanted. Edwards gave a note to one of the visitors which stated "Welcome to Louisiana, home of the INS Terrorist-Styled Concentration Camp where all constitutional rights are dispensed solely on the basis of national origin." Edwards also spoke to the group of visitors telling them that "what you see before you is not always the truth, just as there are two sides to every coin so too there are two sides to every story!" Following the incident, Edwards was charged with unauthorized contact with members of the general public, and placed in administrative detention pending the investigation of the charges.

On August 9, 1997 Edwards was given a written report containing the charges against him. Edwards submitted a list of potential witnesses and soon after was told that the charges against him were being forwarded to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO"). On August 11, 1997 Edwards was given a list of inmate rights at the disciplinary hearing and told that his hearing would be held August 19, 1997. Edwards requested that Mr. Aucoin ("Aucoin"), a unit counselor at FDC Oakdale, represent him at the disciplinary hearing. Aucoin advised Edwards to prepare a written account of his version of the incident. At the hearing DHO David Ham ("Ham") presided. Three other detainees testified at the hearing as witnesses for Edwards. Two of the detainees testified that they did not hear Mr. Johnson speak to Edwards at all. One detainee testified that he heard Mr. Johnson give Edwards permission to speak to the visitors, but that he did not hear Edwards ask for permission to give out the flier, and he did not hear Mr. Johnson grant Edwards permission to distribute the flier. Aucoin read the written statement which Edwards had prepared. DHO Ham found that Edwards had committed the act as charged by giving a note to a visitor without permission, and that as an act falling in the moderate category of prohibited acts Edwards should be sanctioned with fifteen days of disciplinary segregation. Ham also advised Edwards of his right to appeal the finding within twenty days.

In October 1997, Edwards appearing pro se and in forma pauperis filed the present action against DHO Ham, Johnson, and Aucoin (collectively "defendants" or "officials"). First, Edwards alleged that his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment had been violated during his hearing because he was given inadequate representation by Aucoin. Edwards further alleged that Ham had refused to fairly weigh his version of the events. Edwards also claimed that he was being denied access to the press in violation of the First Amendment. Edwards argued that his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were violated because he was the equivalent of a pretrial detainee and thus should not be held in solitary confinement. Edwards requested $3 million in monetary damages and an injunction to correct the "unjust principles and practices" at FDC Oakdale.

The case was referred to a magistrate judge. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) respectively, which the magistrate judge recommended granting. The magistrate judge concluded that all claims against the defendants in their official capacities were barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that any claims against the officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 could not be recognized because the defendants are not state officers. ¹ Edwards also contends on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for relief from involuntary servitude. Edwards contends that requiring a pretrial detainee to perform work assignments is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. In January 1998, Edwards filed a motion styled "Motion for Court Order to Permit the Plaintiff Full, Fair and Proper Access to the Courts...". This motion requested more access to the law library and for Edwards to be relieved from his assigned work duties. The magistrate judge considered this motion as a motion for a temporary restraining order, and denied it as such. Edwards did not appeal this order to the district court; therefore this court does not have jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge's order by addressing Edwards' involuntary servitude claim. See Colburn v. Bunge Towing Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 1989). The magistrate judge also found that Edwards' due process rights as to the hearing procedure and his First Amendment rights to access to the press, had not been violated. Finally, the magistrate judge denied Edwards' request for injunctive relief due to Edwards' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and on the additional basis that Edwards was no longer housed at FDC Oakdale, and thus his claims for injunctive relief were moot. Following an independent review of the record and a de novo determination of the issues the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Edwards argues that the district court erred in denying him injunctive relief on the basis that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Edwards further contends that the district court erred in not recognizing that his due process rights were violated during the hearing procedure, and were further violated by the imposition of punishment for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Finally, Edwards contends that the district court erred by failing to find that solitary confinement in administrative segregation is cruel and unusual punishment for a pretrial detainee.

A district court's dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim under 12 (b)(1) and 12(b)(6) respectively, is reviewed de novo. Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1996). The denial of injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Peaches Entertainment v. Entertainment Repertoire, 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995).

I.Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Edwards' original complaint requested $3 million in monetary damages and "court order(s) for correction of unjust principles and practices as th[e] court deems to be both just and proper." This request for injunctive relief was intended to correct the policies and practices of FDC Oakdale. Edwards was transferred out of FDC Oakdale in 1998. Therefore, any claims for injunctive relief to correct procedures and practices at that facility are moot. See Hernandez v. W.L. Garrison, 916 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1990); Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 911 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1993).

We therefore construe the remaining claims as a request for exclusively monetary relief. This court has not directly addressed the question of whether a pretrial detainee seeking monetary relief must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court for damages. This court's previous rulings regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies have interpreted provisions of 42 U.S.C. 1997e, and that statute's amendments as codified in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-103 803, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). See e.g., Arvie v. Stalder, 53 F.3d 702, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that although 1997e did not require it, federal prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before challenging conditions of their confinement); Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir.1998). However, we have held that the PLRA does not apply to alien detainees. Ojo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 106 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, our previous decisions regarding federal prisoners and exhaustion of administrative remedies are not directly applicable in the present case.

The Supreme Court has offered guidance on the general purposes of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. In McCarthy v. Madison, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 1086, 117 L.Ed. 2d 291 (1992) ², the Court found that where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs. The Court stated, "in determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts must balance the interests of the individual in...