Edwards v. Madigan
Decision Date | 15 July 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 16595.,16595. |
Citation | 281 F.2d 73 |
Parties | Edward EDWARDS, Appellant, v. Paul J. MADIGAN, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Molinari, Casalnuovo & Berger, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Lynn J. Gillard, U. S. Atty., John Kaplan, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before JERTBERG, MERRILL and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.
Edward Edwards by separate courts-martial was tried for and convicted of four distinct offenses committed while incarcerated and serving military sentences at certain military penal institutions. A sentence was imposed upon each conviction. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court alleging that all four sentences were required to be served concurrently under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Chapter 47, Title 10 U.S.C.A., Armed Forces), and since the longest of the four sentences had been completed, he was entitled to his release. The court issued an order to show cause and held a hearing which resulted in an order denying the petition.1 Upon request of the petitioner, the lower court permitted the appeal in forma pauperis. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253.
The facts regarding these four sentences, so far as pertinent, reveal that on two occasions, August 14, 1951 and October 1, 1951, appellant was sentenced by courts-martial to serve one and three years confinement, respectively, for assault committed while incarcerated at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Camp Cook, California. Both sentences were subsequently directed to be served at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On September 3, 1952 appellant was convicted by court-martial of mutiny and destruction of government property at Fort Leavenworth; he was sentenced to ten years confinement, which was later reduced to seven years after a clemency hearing. On February 26, 1953, while still incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth, he was again convicted of assault and sentenced to eight months confinement.
Appellant was transferred to the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia on September 11, 1953 and later transferred to the United States Penitentiary at Alcatraz on April 14, 1954. On the date of the hearing of his petition in the court below, May 7, 1959, appellant had lost 673 days of good time, and his then terminal date, with maximum allowable good time, was October 9, 1961.2
Appellant contends, however, that this computation is based on the erroneous assumption that all sentences are to be served consecutively or independently, when in fact Congress has provided for concurrent sentences under Article 57(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C.A.§ 857(b). Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Code in 1951 Congress had not enacted any legislation dealing with the procedures to be followed with respect to multiple military sentences. Appellant nevertheless argues that Congress has effected a "statutory change" by the following enactment of Article 57(b):
"Any period of confinement included in a sentence of a court-martial shall begin to run from the date the sentence is adjudged by the court-martial, but periods during which the sentence to confinement is suspended shall be excluded in computing the service of the term of confinement."
Appellant's construction of this section is based on the premise that military law has long recognized consecutive sentences, as witnessed by the language of Paragraph 401 of the Manual for Courts Martial, 1917:
"When soldiers awaiting the result of trial or undergoing sentence commit offenses for which they are tried, the second sentence will be executed upon the expiration of the first * * *."
The same basic provision is contained in paragraph 401 of the Manual for Courts Martial, 1921. Appellant urges that since the language of these manuals is not found in the above-quoted provisions of Article 57(b), Congress must have intended to ignore the long established consecutive sentence procedure in favor of concurrent sentences, so that a second sentence would now commence on "the date the sentence is adjudged" and while the first is still being served.
The Secretary of the Army has adopted a contrary position in implementing the statute by Army Regulation 633-30, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Appellant's ultimate contention, therefore, is that the above regulation is in fatal conflict with the provisions of Article 57(b) and is therefore invalid.
We cannot agree with the appellant's basic premise that Congress intended to and did provide for concurrent sentences by enacting Article 57(b).
It is true that in civil law separate sentences are generally presumed to run concurrently. McNealy v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 1938, 100 F.2d 280; United States v. Chiarella, 2 Cir., 1954, 214 F.2d 838; Annotation, 18 A.L.R.2d 511. However, military tribunals enforce and apply a completely separate and distinct system of law:
Burns v. Wilson, 1953, 346 U.S. 137, 139, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L.Ed. 1508; See also, Dynes v. Hoover, 1857, 61 U.S. 65, 15 L.Ed. 838; Carter v. McClaughry, 1902, 183 U.S. 365, 22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L. Ed. 236; Annotation, 15 A.L.R.2d 387.
From the earliest days of military law a court-martial sentence has consistently and invariably been considered an entirety, no matter how many charges or specifications are involved, encompassing within its terms the total punishment for all offenses upon which the defendant was adjudged guilty. Carter v. McClaughry, supra; United States v. Keith, 4 C.M.R. 34, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 442; 1 Winthrop (2nd Ed.) 614. The opportunity for confusion and possible error resulting from multiple sentencing after a single trial involving several offenses, e. g., whether the several sentences were intended to run concurrently or consecutively, is simply not afforded in military tribunals where only one integral sentence is meted out.
It is clear from what has been said, then, that the concurrent sentence is unknown to military law in the situation where several offenses are punished by a single sentence. Mosher v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 1941, 123 F.2d 401; United States v. Keith, supra. Nor has the concurrent sentence principle been applied where a defendant was convicted and sentenced for one military offense while serving another; each sentence was still required to be served independently, with the second beginning only after the first was completed, i. e., consecutively. Mosher v. Hudspeth, supra; O'Malley v. Hiatt, D.C.Pa.1947; 74 F.Supp. 44; Para. 401, Manuals for Courts Martial, 1917 and 1921.
It is difficult to see how these well established and traditional sentencing procedures could be so emphatically changed by the language of Article 57(b). We are not faced here with a "statutory change," as appellant contends, for the consecutive sentencing procedure contained in the Manuals for Courts Martial was created by administrative regulation rather than by statute; we are faced with the question of whether Congress intended by Article 57(b) to ignore consecutive, in favor of concurrent, sentencing.
The plain language of the statute, quoted above, would appear to require that a sentence must commence immediately after its adjudication, unless suspended. The rather sparse legislative history indicates only the following: "This article is new * * * Subdivision (b) requires a sentence of confinement to begin to run on the date that it is adjudged even though the accused is not actually in confinement, unless the sentence is suspended." 2 U.S.Code Cong. Service, 81st Cong.1950, p. 2249, S.R. 486, June 10, 1949, H.R. 491, April 28, 1949, to accompany H.R. 4080.
In construing the same language in a substantially identical case, the Fifth Circuit stated:
McDonald v. Lee, 5 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 619, 623.3 We agree that in reading Article 57(b) nothing more can be gleaned than is succinctly stated therein, and we...
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