Edwards v. Maples

• Decision Date: 12 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 50534,50534,1
• Citation: 388 S.W.2d 850
• Parties: Georgia EDWARDS, Mary E. Hawkins, Birdie May Holmes, Viola May Miller, Respondents, v. Jasper MAPLES, Nadine Washington, Francis A. Gilbert and Marie Gilbert, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 850

388 S.W.2d 850

Georgia EDWARDS, Mary E. Hawkins, Birdie May Holmes, Viola May Miller, Respondents, v. Jasper MAPLES, Nadine Washington, Francis A. Gilbert and Marie Gilbert, Appellants.

No. 50534.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

April 12, 1965.

Henry BalkenBush, Linn, for respondents.

William R. Clark, Columbia, for appellants.

HENLEY, Judge.

Unusual in that it was tried before a jury, this suit in equity to set aside two deeds resulted in a decree for the plaintiffs from which defendants appeal.

As indicated above, title to real estate is involved; therefore, jurisdiction is in this court. Article V, Section 3, Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S.

The deeds in question are: a warranty deed dated October 13, 1956, filed for record and recorded on the same day, from Eva Maupin Jacobs, single, to Jasper M. Maples, one of the defendants, describing approximately two acres of unimproved land in Osage County; and, a deed dated December 26, 1959, from Jasper Maples to Francis and Marie Gilbert, two of the defendants, describing the same land. Mrs. Jacobs died in October, 1957, while residing in Jefferson City at the home of her niece, Nadine Washington, the fourth defendant.

Alleging that they are the heirs at law of the said deceased (who allegedly died intestate), plaintiffs state as grounds for setting aside the deed to Maples that the signature of Mrs. Jacobs on that deed is a forgery. The words of plaintiffs' petition are: '* * * [the] purported deed was executed by some person other than the deceased Eva Maupin Jacobs * * *; that the purported signature on aforesaid deed is not the signature of Eva Maupin Jacobs. * * *' Plaintiffs also allege that Mrs. Jacobs was senile, infirm, aged and mentally incompetent and incapable of understanding the nature, extent and value of her property; that Nadine Washington was the confidential companion, nurse and advisor of Mrs. Jacobs and that Mrs. Washington and Maples entered into a conspiracy to cheat and defraud Mrs. Jacobs out of her property. There is no allegation that Mrs. Jacobs was on the date in question incompetent to execute the deed to Maples or that Mrs. Washington and Maples did cheat and defraud her out of her property. As the only ground for setting aside the deed from Maples to the Gilberts plaintiffs state the conclusion '* * * that any reasonable inquiry on the part of [the Gilberts] would have informed them of the mental condition of [Mrs. Jacobs] at the time of the purported deed by her to [Maples].'

The decree recites that by agreement of the parties the question to be submitted to the jury was: 'Did, or did not the deceased Eva Jacobs known also as Eva Maupin Jacobs sign the deed in question[?].' The question is descriptive of plaintiffs' trial theory. An instruction was given in language not quite so clear and simple as the question, and the jury returned a verdict finding, '* * * that * * * Eva Jacobs * * * did not sign the deed * * *.' The decree cancelling both deeds was based on this finding by the jury and the further finding by the court that since Maples had not acquired title, his deed to the Gilberts did not convey title to this land. To say the least, there was a total failure of any allegation or proof that would warrant setting aside the deed from Maples to the Gilberts.

Equity cases are rarely tried to a jury. And in those rare instances where an issue is submitted to a jury the verdict is advisory only. The court may accept or reject the verdict and, if accepted, it is the court's own finding on the fact issue rather than that of the jury. On review of an equity case we consider the issues as having been determined by the court and are not bound by the finding of a jury. Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610, 615; Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S.W. 584, 590; Pixlee et al., v. Osborn, et al., 48 Mo. 313, 316; Johnston, et al., v. Bank of Poplar Bluff, 221 Mo.App. 127, 294 S.W. 111, 114.

The one point briefed and argued by defendants is: 'The trial court erred in finding for the [plaintiffs] as the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of forgery of the signature of the deceased, Eva Jacobs, at the time of the execution of the deed, October 13, 1956.'

'Upon appeal, we review the entire record de novo and reach our own conclusions as to the weight and value of the evidence, giving deference to the findings of the chancellor who saw and heard the witnesses. But the rule of deference does not relieve us of the duty to weigh the evidence, reach our own conclusions, and, if upon review of the whole record, we conclude that the evidence does not meet the standard required, we must so say.' Miller v. Minstermann, Mo., 266 S.W.2d 672, 679 and cases there cited. The standard of evidence required in a suit to set aside a deed is that it be clear, cogent and convincing for 'The cancellation of a deed is the exercise of the most extraordinary power of a court of equity, which ought not to be exercised except in a clear case.' Edinger v. Kratzer, Mo., 175 S.W.2d 807, 813; Lastofka, et al. v. Lastofka, 339 Mo. 770, 99 S.W.2d 46, 54; Bross v. Rogers, Mo., 187 S.W. 38.

Bearing in mind this standard of evidence in examining the record, we must also keep in mind that the burden is on the plaintiffs to establish that the signature on the deed from Mrs. Jacobs to Maples is not that of the grantor or that it was executed by some person other than her. Elliott v. Sheppard, 179 Mo. 382, 78 S.W. 627.

Plaintiffs' evidence to support their claim that the signature on this deed was not that of Mrs. Jacobs was confined to the testimony of Georgia Edwards. Mrs. Edwards, one of the plaintiffs, a sister of Mrs. Jacobs, testified that she received some letters from her sister in 1920, 'But I didn't keep those letters, but I know that ain't her handwriting. I know that much.' Immediately after that statement the witness was handed what was identified by counsel's question as 'a piece of paper' and asked whether 'that' was the signature of Mrs. Jacobs. Her answer was: 'That is not my sister's handwrite. I can remember that much to know that my sister could write better than that. A little. Not too much.' The record does not disclose whether this 'piece of paper' was the deed in question, but we will assume that it was. The witness was uncertain as to whether she had last seen her sister in the year 1956 or 1957.

The balance of plaintiffs' case in chief was made up of the testimony of two nieces of the deceased, one of whom was a plaintiff. The extent of their testimony was that Mrs. Jacobs was in poor health in 1956, and in their judgment she was not physically able to sign her name. O...