Edwards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25248.,25248.
• Citation: 138 S.W.2d 651
• Parties: EDWARDS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

138 S.W.2d 651

EDWARDS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 25248.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 2, 1940.

Rehearing Denied April 16, 1940.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Eugene J. Sartorius, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Action on a life insurance policy by Rose Edwards, also known as Rose Bruner, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

McLemore & Witherspoon, of St. Louis, for appellant.

Fordyce, White, Mayne, Williams & Hartman and R. E. LaDriere, all of St. Louis, for respondent.

McCULLEN, Judge.

This suit was brought by appellant, as plaintiff, against respondent, as defendant, to recover on a policy of life insurance issued upon the life of Harvey Bruner, deceased. The cause was tried before the court, a jury having been waived, and was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, resulting in a finding and judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appealed to this court.

Plaintiff's amended petition alleged that the policy was issued by defendant in October, 1914, at Joplin, Missouri, on the life of plaintiff's husband; that the insured died at Denver, Colorado, in February, 1923; that knowledge of the existence of the policy reached plaintiff about April 1, 1935, and she thereupon made demand for payment but defendant vexatiously refused to pay.

Defendant's answer was a general denial coupled with the allegation that defendant in good faith paid the proceeds of the policy to one Sallie Ewing under the provision of the policy referred to as the "facility of payment clause." Said clause is set forth in full later in this opinion. Defendant also pleaded the ten year statute of limitations, alleging that plaintiff's suit was not brought within ten years of the accrual of her alleged cause of action.

The stipulation of facts upon which the cause was tried states that the deceased, Harvey Bruner, and plaintiff Rose Bruner, his wife, during 1914 applied for insurance with defendant, each making the policy payable to the other; that the policy sued on herein, being No. 50526373, in the amount of $174, was issued on October 19, 1914, to cover the life of Harvey Bruner; that said policy contained a facility of payment clause providing that "The company may grant any nonforfeiture privilege provided herein, or in case of prior death of the insured, the company may pay the amount due under this policy to either the beneficiary named below; or to the executor or administrator, husband or wife, or any relative by blood or connection by marriage, of the insured, or to any other person appearing to said company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expenses on behalf of the insured, or for his or her burial; and the production of a receipt signed by either of said persons shall be conclusive evidence that all claims under this policy have been satisfied."

The stipulation of facts states that after the facility of payment clause the following appears in the policy: "The name of beneficiary or relation to the insured—Rose Bruner, wife"; that before the delivery of the policy to the insured, the insured and plaintiff left Joplin, Missouri, and went to Oklahoma, and in their absence both the policy on plaintiff and the one on the deceased were delivered to Sallie Ewing with whom they were living when they were in Joplin; that said Sallie Ewing paid all the premiums on both said policies amounting to approximately $200, except the initial premium which was paid by Harvey Bruner; that in the year 1930 Sallie Ewing made claim under both of said policies (which she produced, together with the premium receipt book) because of the alleged disappearance of Harvey Bruner and Rose Bruner; that thereafter it developed that Harvey Bruner had died on June 26, 1923, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and plaintiff was informed of said death the day after its occurrence; that the funeral bill was not paid by either plaintiff or Sallie Ewing but by Mrs. Odessa Smith Pennington, a sister of the deceased; that thereafter defendant herein, on December 20, 1930, paid to Sallie Ewing the amount of $277.49, which was the full death benefit due under said policy upon the life of the said Harvey Bruner; that said amount was paid to said Sallie Ewing in her individual capacity under the terms of the facility of payment clause, not to her as executrix or administratrix; that plaintiff did not know of the existence of any policy of insurance providing for benefits in case of the death of the said Harvey Bruner until on or about May 1, 1934; that shortly thereafter she made demand for payment of said benefits under said policy, but that defendant had already paid same to the said Sallie Ewing; that before defendant paid the proceeds of said policy on December 20, 1930, to Sallie Ewing, an investigation had been made showing that the plaintiff and the deceased had been separated before he died, and that she had remarried twice but her whereabouts were not learned.

The agreed statement of facts states that a photographic copy of the front of the check for $277.49 paid to Sallie Ewing, and the back thereof showing full release, is attached to the stipulation; that perforation on the check shows it was paid December 27, 1930, by the Chase National Bank of New York City.

The abstract of the record shows that the trial court made and filed what is designated as "Special Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law." However, there is nothing in the record to show that any of the parties requested the court to make a finding of facts as provided in Section 952, R.S.Mo.1929, Mo.St.Ann. § 952, p. 1225. It has been held that, in a suit at law tried before the court without the aid of a jury, there can be no finding of facts of which the appellate court will take cognizance except that it be in writing and be made at the request of one of the parties. Phillips v. Alford, Mo.App., 90 S.W. 2d 1060, 1067. See, also...