Edwards v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., MORRISON-KNUDSEN

• Decision Date: 07 March 1963
• Docket Number: MORRISON-KNUDSEN,No. 36086,36086
• Parties: Jack EDWARDS, Appellant, v.COMPANY, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 593

61 Wn.2d 593

379 P.2d 735

Jack EDWARDS, Appellant, v. MORRISON-KNUDSEN COMPANY, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Respondent.

No. 36086.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

March 7, 1963.

Sweeney & Hunter, David C. Hunter, Seattle, for appellant.

Allen, DeGarmo & Leedy, Gerald DeGarmo, Seattle, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment entered in his action to recover salary and lodging allowances arising from the alleged breach of an employment contract.

In August, 1955, plaintiff received the following letter from defendant:

'MORRISON-KNUDSEN COMPANY, INC.

'Contractors and Engineers

'Principal Office

'319 Broadway, Boise, Idaho

'M-K Contract 1787

'AF 33-600-29717

'Mr. Jack Edwards

'6704 Weedin Place

'Seattle, Washington

'Address reply to Pouch 7

Anchorage, Alaska

'August 22, 1955

'Dear Sir:

'We are starting a very large and extensive project in the Territory of Alaska and we wonder if you would be interested in taking the position of Structural Steel Superintendent.

'We will be in need of your services commencing about September 15, 1955. You will select your own foreman and hire as many local men as possible and still retain an efficient organization. You can bring a few key men from the States as foreman although we do have several here who have previously worked for the Company. These men have not been hired as yet and will be subject to your approval.

'Your salary will be $1,250.00 per month. Room and board will be furnished on the job-sites, where you will be spending the bulk of your time. Transportation will be furnished to and from Anchorage, Alaska and to and from job-sites. This project will last about two years and possibly longer.

'We would appreciate hearing from you at the earliest possible date.

'Very truly yours.

'MORRISON-KNUDSEN COMPANY, INC.

'Don W. Hitchcock [s]

'Don W. Hitchcock,

'General Construction Supt.

'Contract 1787

'P.S. Mr. 'Butch' Perron has recommended you.'

By return mail, plaintiff unequivocally accepted the proffered employment with defendant.

On October 4, 1955, plaintiff reported to Anchorage, Alaska, and continued in the employment of defendant, on contract No. 1787, until November 10, 1956, when he was terminated, without cause, the termination notice stating 'LAID OFF--REDUCTION IN FORCE.' The following spring, defendant employed another as structural steel superintendent until August 17, 1957, when the steel work was completed.

Plaintiff, by three causes of action, seeks recovery of (a) salary from November 10, 1956, to August 17, 1957; (b) board and lodging allowance between October 4, 1955, and August 17, 1957; and (c) one month's unpaid salary (December, 1955) when he was incapacitated due to on-the-job injuries. Plaintiff premises his claims upon his contentions that: (1) The employment was for a fixed term--the duration of the steel work on contract No. 1787; (2) but for defendant's actions, he would have spent the 'bulk' of his time on job sites; and (3) custom and practice prescribes payment of salary for short periods of incapacity.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends: (1) There was no fixed term contract; (2) if there existed an employment contract, such is unenforceable because of indefiniteness; and (3) plaintiff's endorsement on salary checks subsequent to December, 1955, constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The trail court found, inter alia: Plaintiff's unconditional acceptance of the employment offered by defendant's letter of August 22, 1955; plaintiff's termination; termination of substantially all construction superintendents due to winter shut down; custom and practice in Alaska regarding winter construction shut downs between November and April; readiness of plaintiff to resume his employment with defendant; defendant's employment of another and conclusion of steel work on contract No. 1787 on August 17, 1957; plaintiff's management of his own time and whereabouts during his employment--that is, whether he was or was not on job sites; plaintiff's injury and hospitalization in December, 1955, and the acceptance and endorsement of subsequent salary checks.

From such findins, the trial court concluded:

(1) 'That the letter of August 22, 1955, (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) did constitute an offer of employment to Plaintiff on the part of Defendant and although it was unconditionally accepted by Plaintiff, as it was, was not a contract of employment for the life of Contract 1787 so as to cut off and terminate the common law right of an employer to hire and fire at will.'

(2) 'That even if a contract of employment had been created between Plaintiff and Defendant by Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and the Plaintiff's unconditional acceptance thereof, the Plaintiff released the Defendant from all possible liability for salary during the period from December 2, 1955 to January 3, 1956, by signing of the endorsement upon the checks issued by Defendant to Plaintiff following his injury on November 30, 1955.'

(3) 'That Plaintiff has no claim against Defendant under the facts of this case as covered by the Findings of Fact herein upon any of the causes of action as asserted by the Amended Complaint and there should be entered herein a Judgment of Dismissal of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and of each and every action set forth therein with prejudice and with costs to be taxed in favor of the Defendant against the Plaintiff as provided by law.'

Plaintiff assigns error to conclusions of law Nos. 1 and 2; to the trial court's findings of fact relating to termination of other superintendents, and to an Alaskan custom of ceasing construction work between November and April of each year; to the refusal of the trial court to enter certain of plaintiff's proposed findings; and to the admission of certain evidence.

We agree with the trial court's conclusion of law, based upon the findings of fact, that the correspondence between the parties gave rise to a contract of employment.

The basic question involved, insofar as concerns plaintiff's claim for salary following November 10, 1956, is whether the employment contract was for a definite term--that is, for the duration of the steel work on contract No. 1787--or simply a contract of employment for an indefinite term--terminable at will.

Plaintiff contends that the terminology of defendant's offer, taken with the character, nature, and circumstances of the employment, including the salary scale, distance factors, travel and lodging allowances, living conditions, supervisory responsibility, and the economic factors of supervisory personnel turnover, compels the legal conclusion that the employment was intended by both parties, and particularly accepted by plaintiff, as being for the term of the project, or until completion of the steel work.

Defendant, on the other hand, asserts the employment arrangement was too indefinite as to duration to be other than an employment terminable at will.

The pertinent rule, applicable to the circumstances here presented, would appear to be succinctly summarized in 35 Am.Jur., Master & Servant, 456 § 19, as follows:

'A contract of employment which by its express terms is for a definite time or to last until a definite day presents, of course, no problem concerning its duration and termination. The employer has the implied right to discharge the employee for cause, but otherwise the employment cannot be terminated of right during the term of its existence as expressed in the contract. * * *

'Where no definite term of employment is expressed, there is no inflexible rule governing the duration of the relationship. In such cases, the duration of the employment must be determined by circumstances in each particular case. It is dependent upon the understanding and intent of the parties, to be ascertained from their written or oral negotiations, the usages of business, the situation and object of the parties, the nature of the employment, and all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Regardless, therefore, of the absence of any express stipulation regarding the term of employment, a dispute as to the duration of a contract of employment is to be settled with reference to the terms of the contract, the nature of the services which were agreed to be performed, and the attending circumstances which evidence the intention of the parties, and this is true where the contract is in writing, as well as where it is oral; in either case, the court takes into consideration the situation of the parties, and the objects they had in view. In case the contract has been made with reference to a general custom or business usage which enters into and becomes a part of the agreement, the contract is not, of course, indefinite as to its duration if such custom or usage fixes the term of the employment.'

See, also, Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co., 46 Wash.2d 408, 281 P.2d 832; Rohda v. Boen, 45 Wash.2d 553, 276 P.2d 586; Restatement (2d), Agency, 339, § 442(b); 161 A.L.R. 706, 713; 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 8 b, p. 75.

We held in Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co., supra, and on the subsequent appeal of the same case, 50 Wash.2d 191, 310 P.2d 259, that a question of fact was presented in determining whether a contract of employment, in a particular case, was for a fixed term or of indefinite duration.

The facts and circumstances presented in the instant case lend themselves to conflicting inferences upon the intended duration of the employment. The trial court did not make an ultimate finding of fact upon this issue. In fairness to the trial court, neither party proposed such a finding.

Resort to the trial court's oral decision does not clarify the factual pattern upon which the trial court decided this phase of the case. The findings of fact as entered neither support nor contradict the trial court's conclusion of law in this respect. The function of ultimate fact finding is exclusively vested in...