Edwards v. Randle

• Decision Date: 19 December 1896
• Parties: EDWARDS v. RANDLE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

38 S.W. 343

EDWARDS v. RANDLE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

December 19, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Clark county; Rufus D. Hearn, Judge.

Action by John B. Randle against John Edwards. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

John E. Bradley, for appellant.

BUNN, C. J.

The appellee, Randle, sued the appellant, Edwards, in the Clark circuit court, for the sum of $200, money paid him on a contract of purchase and sale. Judgment for plaintiff for said sum and interest, and defendant appealed.

It is shown in evidence that on or about the 1st day of December, 1892, the appellant, who was then postmaster at Gurdon, bargained and sold to appellee, to be delivered on the 1st of January following, for the said sum of $200, his postoffice cabinet, fixtures, and the counters and shelving, agreeing at the time, as a part of the transaction, to resign his office and recommend appellee as his successor, which he then and there did; also, to appoint Ben Cable his deputy, and to permit appellee to receive all the fees and emoluments of the office, as he says, from the time of appellee's appointment until his installation in office, but, as appellee says, from January 1st until he should become postmaster. The $200 was paid when the bargain was made. On the 1st of January aforesaid, appellee demanded a delivery of the articles sold, and in a few days afterwards the demand was renewed, and both times refused to be complied with by appellant, for the reason, as he states, that he was not permitted to remove the postoffice from his to appellee's store without authority from the postoffice department, and that the delivery sought and demanded by appellee was in fact and in truth a demand to make such removal. Upon the refusal of appellant to comply with the demands of appellee, he then demanded a rescission of the contract of sale, on which also being refused by appellant, he instituted this suit for the recovery of the money he had paid as stated, and lawful interest thereon. The defendant answered, averring that he had fully complied with his contract as far as it was possible for him to do, and was still ready and willing to do whatever he had contracted to do, if he could do so. There is something of a controversy as to when Cable should be appointed deputy, and when appellee should begin to enjoy the fees and emoluments of the office; also, as to whether the counters and shelves were part of the consideration of the purchase, or a mere gift. Otherwise, there is no substantial controversy as to the facts.

The transaction, taken all together, plainly shows that the sale and purchase of the office of postmaster was the main thing, and the cabinet furniture, fixtures, counters, and shelves, were mere conveniences, of little or no value to any one except he were postmaster. In fact, this is in effect admitted. Whether Cable should have been appointed deputy at once by appellant, or not until appellee's appointment should be assured, we cannot say, and that really depends upon another fact, — that is, when the appellee should begin to enjoy the fees, for the appointment of Cable seems to have had some connection with that. It is reasonable to suppose that the fees should begin to be paid to appellee whenever his appointment should be assured, and not before, as stated by appellant. Be this as it may, the contract seems to have been an executed one, so far as concerns anything the parties could do in the premises. Enough is shown, at all events, to convince the reasonable mind that the desire to rescind on the part of the appellee did not...