Edwards v. Seaboard & R. R. Co.

• Citation: 28 S.E. 137,121 N.C. 490
• Parties: EDWARDS v. SEABOARD & R. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 02 November 1897
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

28 S.E. 137

121 N.C. 490

EDWARDS v. SEABOARD & R. R. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 2, 1897

Appeal from superior court, Wake county; Adams, Judge.

Action by William J. Edwards against the Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad Company and others. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

A letter stated: "You have been appointed general storekeeper for the system, to take effect July 15. Your salary will be $1,800 a year." The person appointed entered on his duties, and received $150 per month for 18 months, when he was discharged. Held, that this was not an employment by the year.

L. R Watts, MacRae & Day, and J. B. Batchelor, for appellants.

R. O Burton, for appellee.

FAIRCLOTH C.J.

"July 10, 1894. W. J. Edwards, Esq., Raleigh, N. C.--Dear Sir: I beg to advise that you have been appointed general storekeeper for the system, to take effect July 15. Your salary will be eighteen hundred dollars a year. You will be in charge," etc. "[Signed] John H. Winder Gen'l Manager." The plaintiff accepted the appointment, and went into the discharge of his duties, and was paid $150 each month until January 1, 1896, when he was discharged from the service of the defendant. Plaintiff sues for balance of salary until July 15, 1896, alleging that he was employed by the year at $1,800 for that period of time and that he was wrongfully discharged, and the court below so held. We are called upon to determine the meaning of the instrument quoted above, according to its proper terms, and to do so it is important to find the intent of the parties as expressed by the language employed by themselves. In a written contract the terms are fixed, and the meaning of those terms is a question of law, for the court alone, and in parol contracts the rule is the same where the terms are precise and explicit. Massey v. Belisle, 2 Ired. 170; Simpson v. Pegram, 112 N.C. 541, 17 S.E. 430. An entire contract is one in which the consideration is entire on both sides. "Whenever there is a contract to pay a gross sum for a certain definite consideration, the contract is entire, and not apportionable, either in law or in equity." Story, Cont. § 22. The contract before us is not specific as to the term of service,--certainly not so expressed in the writing. The plaintiff does not so insist, but says a reasonable construction thereof leads to the conclusion that the parties intended a one-year term of...