Edwards v. State, 975

• Decision Date: 18 November 1980
• Docket Number: No. 975,975
• Citation: 274 Ind. 387,412 N.E.2d 223
• Parties: Eddie Lee EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 225.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 223

412 N.E.2d 223

274 Ind. 387

Eddie Lee EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 975 S 225.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 18, 1980.

Stephan J. Lustina, Merrillville for appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for second degree murder. Appellant Edwards received a sentence of life imprisonment. Among the issues raised in this appeal, he contends that the trial court committed error when it admitted appellant's confession into evidence at trial. Appellant unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the confession by way of a motion to suppress and by a subsequent in-trial objection on the basis that the advisement of rights given appellant by the police who interrogated him did not comply with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and that there had been no valid waiver of rights. The motion was heard prior to trial by a judge who was not the one who ultimately tried the case. At the hearing the judge held to the erroneous view that the burden was upon appellant to sustain his allegations, since a defense motion was being heard. After hearing the testimony of a psychiatrist and the interrogating officer, the court took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Much of the same evidence was developed at trial, and the judge trying the case overruled the in-trial objection to the admission of the confession.

The testimony developed that on October 5, 1973, at about 7:00 a. m., one Joan McCabe was attacked in Hammond, Indiana, and died there in an alley of severe wounds. The presence of the body of the victim was first reported to the local police department by a woman who lived in a nearby house. She had stated that a man had drawn her attention and told her of it. He had said that he was late for work, asked her to report it to the police and left his name and address with her. Appellant was this man. At the time he was a mental patient on leave from a state hospital and employed by the city.

At approximately 10:00 a. m., the police contacted appellant at his work and at their request appellant reported to the police station after work at 4:30 p. m. He was handed a document entitled: "Voluntary Appearance; Advice of Rights" which contained a complete and accurate advisement of rights according to the prescription in Miranda, a recital that appellant was appearing voluntarily and was not under arrest, and a waiver statement. Appellant executed the waiver and gave a written statement describing how he had simply come upon the body while walking to work. During this interview appellant told the police that he had been in a psychiatric hospital. He also responded that he would be at a bowling alley that night should they wish to contact him. He then left the police station.

The police then investigated appellant's background and determined that he had been committed to the hospital because of something nebulous to do with a girl. Their suspicions heightened, the officers went to the bowling alley at about 9:00 p. m., confronted appellant and asked him to accompany them. He did so, and while in a police car outside the place, he was given an oral advisement of rights. The sum total of evidence describing this advisement was the testimony of the officer that he "advised him orally of his rights." On the way to the station, they stopped off at appellant's apartment and he got them the clothes he had been wearing that day. They continued on to the station, engaging only in "small talk". The police did not interrogate him until later when he and they were ensconced in the police station. The interrogating officer testified that at the commencement of the interrogation appellant was again "very well advised" of his rights. He added "I told him, 'Eddie you don't have to talk if you don't want to. We are not going to hurt you. I am not going to beat you." This is the sum total of evidence describing the advisement of rights at the station house. The formal stage of the interrogation then commenced. Up to this point in the events of the evening, no express waiver of rights was given by appellant. Nevertheless, the formal stage of the interrogation was commenced.

As appellant prepared to answer their questions, a woman appeared in the door of the interrogation room and said in a voice loud enough for appellant to hear: "Yes, that's the man." Thereupon appellant admitted his guilt for the first time and was subsequently presented and did sign a written waiver of rights containing a complete advisement of rights. His admission was then put on paper. The officer testified that this woman was in fact a clerk at the police station who had appeared there and uttered those words by pre-arrangement with the interrogators as a ploy. She was not an actual witness, but played the role of an eyewitness engaged in identifying appellant. In regard to the timing of this woman's statement, the following testimony was given:

"Q. And that was the statement that was made before he made any kind of oral statement or written statement?

A. Yes, sir. That was just prior to him making the oral statement. About at nine-thirty."

There are two problems with this case. The first is that the prosecution did not present any evidence of the actual content of the oral advisements given by the officer, but chose to rely instead upon the officer's general answers which variously described the advisement as having been for example "in accordance with the Miranda decision."

The question for our decision is whether this evidence is sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's burden to demonstrate a proper advisement before interrogation. The second problem is whether, in light of the false identification of appellant by the policewoman, the State has demonstrated a valid waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

The information which must be given to a suspect prior to custodial interrogation is expressly set out in the Miranda opinion:

"At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.

"The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it.

"(W)e hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation....

"(I)t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

"The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." 384 U.S. at 467-68, 469, 471, 473, 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-1627, 1629.

When, as in the case at bar, the issue of the admissibility of the statements of the accused is raised, a heavy burden falls upon the State to demonstrate the required warnings and waivers:

"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.... This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights ... and we reassert these standards as applied to in custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is right on its shoulders." (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.

This Court in Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790, in furtherance of the protection to be accorded the Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights of the accused in the interrogation context has established the standard to be applied to this burden of the State to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Craig v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 661; Ortiz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188; Hooker v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 387 N.E.2d 1354. Applying this standard to the evidence presented which tends to support compliance with Miranda, we find that it could not suffice to convince a reasonable trier of fact that the oral advisements were in accordance with the express requirements set down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda. With regard to the first and complete advisement at the police station before the first statement was given, we know that the officer read that advisement from a written form, whereas all we know about the second was that it was orally given. That complete advisement came five hours earlier when appellant was under little suspicion, whereas at the time of the second one, five hours later, he was clearly suspect. There is simply no way to infer the completeness and accuracy of the oral advisement at the bowling alley from the complete advisement five hours earlier.

The general statement by the interrogator in his testimony that he fully advised appellant of his Miranda rights does little to fulfill the State's heavy burden. During past years this Court has often litigated the question of the sufficiency of Miranda advisements. Never has this Court affirmed the admissibility of a confession upon so little evidence of the specific content of an advisement of rights. Furthermore, the testimony by the interrogator that he told appellant tha...