Edwards v. State
| Decision Date | 28 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 783S253,783S253 |
| Citation | 479 N.E.2d 541 |
| Parties | James R. EDWARDS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Kenneth M. Stroud, Sp. Asst., Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of burglary, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.), two counts of confinement, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-3(a)(1) (Burns 1985 Repl.), two counts of attempted rape, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.) and Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.) and from a habitual offender determination. The case was tried before a jury. Defendant-appellant was sentenced to a prison term of one hundred and forty years.
Appellant raises five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors exposed to pretrial publicity; (2) whether appellant was punished twice for the same offense by sentencing him for both nonconsensual confinement and attempted rape; (3) whether the trial court erred by ruling that appellant could not challenge the constitutional invalidity of a predicate felony conviction in the habitual offender proceeding; (4) whether the trial court erred in the habitual offender sentence by failing to specify which of the underlying felony sentences was being enhanced; (5) whether the failure to arraign appellant on the habitual offender information constituted reversible error.
These are the facts which tend to support the determination of guilt. On November 4, 1982, one of the victims awakened to find appellant standing at the foot of her bed. When she screamed, appellant held a knife against her, told her that he wanted sex and began to struggle with her. This victim tried, unsuccessfully, to keep the blankets on top of her since she was naked. Appellant removed the covers, locked his knees around her neck and ran his hand over her genitals. While appellant held onto his victim by a headlock, he dragged her into the second victim's bedroom.
In the second victim's bedroom, appellant wrestled with both victims, lay on top of each of them and tied their wrists together with a rope. Appellant started kissing the victims passionately and stated that "he was going to F ... [them] both." Appellant told the second victim to undo her robe. While he was trying to kiss the first victim, he also started to run his hands over her chest. While on top of the victims, appellant began to unbuckle the belt on his pants.
Meanwhile, neighbors had phoned the police. When the police knocked at the front door, appellant told the victims to inquire who was there. When this inquiry went unanswered, appellant put each victim in a headlock underneath his arms, while the victim's hands were still tied, and then he led the victims toward the door. They were in the hallway when the response, "police," was made. The police then knocked the door open. When the police broke into the apartment they found appellant holding both victims in headlocks, one under each arm.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors who were exposed to allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity.
On January 6, 1983, appellant filed for a change of venue from Monroe County because of alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity. The trial court denied this application on January 19, 1983, but stated that an impartial jury would be assembled by appropriate voir dire. Appellant later filed a motion for individual voir dire which was also denied by the trial court because appellant failed to show the court that he was unable to have a fair trial with an impartial jury. Included within appellant's motion for individual voir dire were copies of five newspaper articles written about this case after appellant's arrest. The articles included a brief statement of the facts of the crime, appellant's criminal history (i.e., arrests for several felonies and a prior rape conviction), the five felonies presently charged, former incarceration at Pendleton State Reformatory and procedural information.
Appellant contends that the articles were prejudicial because the nature of the information provided therein was inflammatory and not admissible at trial. Once it becomes established that prospective jurors have been exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity, appellant maintains that the Lindsey procedures mandate that the exposed jurors be individually interrogated by the trial court outside the presence of the remaining prospective jurors. Lindsey v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 351, 295 N.E.2d 819. The Lindsey procedures, however, were established to protect an impaneled jury from prejudicial publicity which occurred during the course of a trial. Under the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary to extend the Lindsey procedural protections to the voir dire proceedings of a prospective jury.
The record shows that during the voir dire proceedings the trial judge asked the prospective jurors collectively whether they had read or heard anything about this case. Five prospective jurors had read newspaper accounts regarding this case, one of whom eventually was assigned to the jury.
In response to questions posed during the voir dire proceedings, these prospective jurors had not formed or expressed an opinion regarding appellant's guilt or innocence. In addition, responses indicated that the prospective jurors would be able to make a determination based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the voir dire proceedings elicited general, rather than particular, statements from these prospective jurors regarding the contents of the newspaper articles. These general statements did not relate to any substantive facts or evidentiary matters that would have prejudiced other prospective jurors who were present. Stroud v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 992. In addition, the trial judge admonished the prospective jurors regarding any publicity that might occur during the trial.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for both confinement and attempted rape. He maintains that he is being punished twice for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy prohibition. He contends that his conduct which confined the victims was the means of accomplishing his goal of forcible rape. Therefore, appellant argues that confinement does not require proof of an additional fact which is not required by attempted rape and, hence, they are the same offense. Essentially, appellant argues that nonasportational confinement is necessarily involved in attempted rape where the rape occurs in the same place as the abduction.
Defendants may not be twice sentenced for the same offense in a single proceeding. Elmore v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893. Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the essential inquiry is whether the offenses are the same for the purposes of double jeopardy. This inquiry focuses on the elements of the two crimes: "If each requires proof that the other does not, the Blockburger test would be satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes." Elmore, 382 N.E.2d at 895. A proper double jeopardy analysis focuses on whether the offenses to be prosecuted and punished are the same and not whether the offenses spring from the same act or operative circumstances.
In accordance with the identity of offense test, we hold that this nonconsensual confinement and attempted rape are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, the imposition of separate sentences was not error.
The criminal consensual confinement charged requires the following statutory elements, in accordance with Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-3(a)(1) (Burns 1985 Repl.):
(1) knowingly or intentionally
(2) confining another person
(3) without his consent
(4) while armed with a deadly weapon.
The elements of the attempted rape charged, in accordance with Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.) and Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.) are:
(1) a substantial step toward
(2) knowingly or intentionally
(3) having sexual intercourse
(4) with a member of the opposite sex
(5) by force or threat of force
(6) while armed with a deadly weapon.
Confinement is defined as substantial interference with the liberty of a person. Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-3-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.). In accordance with the relevant statutes, criminal confinement requires proof of nonconsensual substantial interference with a person's liberty whereas attempted rape requires proof of a substantial step toward having forced sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex. Therefore, each offense has statutory elements which the other does not and thus they are separate offenses.
Moreover, while the evidence produced at trial to prove these two separate offenses may have overlapped, there was evidence specifically addressed to each of these offenses individually. The criminal confinement of these two victims was shown by evidence that appellant was armed with a knife, held one victim by a kneelock and then later held both victims by a headlock. Evidence that appellant stated his intention to have sexual intercourse with the victims, and evidence that he took several acts toward that objective, including beginning to unbuckle the belt of his pants while on top of the victims, passionately kissing the victims, lying on top of the victims, and running his hands over one victim's chest and genitals, was produced at trial to prove appellant took a substantial step toward raping these two women. The evidence shows that appellant not only substantially interfered with the liberty...
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