Edwards v. State

• Decision Date: 09 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 09A02-0009-CR-608.,09A02-0009-CR-608.
• Citation: 750 N.E.2d 377
• Parties: Michael S. EDWARDS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

750 N.E.2d 377

Michael S. EDWARDS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 09A02-0009-CR-608.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 9, 2001.

Jay T. Hirschauer, Cass County Public Defender, Logansport, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Joseph A. Samreta, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge.

Michael S. Edwards appeals the denial of his motions to suppress and dismiss. He raises five issues which we consolidate and restate as:

1) whether the judge pro tempore had the authority to conduct the suppression hearing;

2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; and

3) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

We affirm.

On January 29, 2000, Logansport Police Officers Fred Rogers and Robert Smith stopped a vehicle being driven 10 to 15 miles per hour over the speed limit on a snow-covered road. Officer Rogers approached the driver, and Officer Smith approached the passenger. When asked for identification, the driver of the vehicle produced a learner's permit with his picture and the name Michael Edwards. The passenger told Officer Smith that his name was Michael Edwards and showed the officer a pay stub with that name.

When Officer Smith returned to the vehicle to issue the driver a speeding citation, the two officers realized that both of the men in the stopped car had identified themselves as Michael Edwards and given the same date of birth. The officers confronted the two men and handcuffed them for officer safety. The passenger apologized for lying, explained that the pay stub belonged to the driver, and identified himself as Michael Smith. He later identified himself as both Nigel and Miguel Smith, gave the officers two different dates of birth, and told the officers that the driver's name was Michael Edwards. Both men appeared nervous.

Because neither of the men had a valid driver's license, and the officers were unable to ascertain the men's identities, both men were transported to the police station. The driver was transported in Officer Smith's vehicle. A search of the driver at the police station revealed .14 grams of crack cocaine in the man's left boot. A subsequent search of Officer Smith's vehicle revealed 24 individually wrapped pieces of rock cocaine totaling 3.10 grams.

While at the police station, the passenger told the officers that he had given his identification information to the driver so that the driver could go to the license branch and obtain an illegal identification card. The passenger was subsequently arrested.¹ Thereafter, the passenger told the officers that he had identification at his house. Three officers accompanied the passenger to his house and searched it with the passenger's consent. The passenger gave the officers a birth certificate with the name Michael Edwards. The passenger was returned to the police station where he was searched. Police officers found a baggie with seven rocks of crack cocaine weighing 1.12 grams hidden between the passenger's buttocks.

Two days later, officers learned through fingerprint analysis that the passenger's name was Michael Edwards. He was charged with possession of cocaine as a Class A felony.² The information alleged that Edwards possessed three or more grams of cocaine. Edwards filed a motion to suppress the cocaine which the trial court denied. He then filed a motion to set aside the order denying his motion. Specifically, he claimed that the judge pro tempore who ruled on his motion to suppress did not have the authority to conduct the hearing because the regular circuit county judge was in the courthouse that day. He also filed a motion to dismiss the charges because of insufficient evidence. The trial court denied both motions.

I.

The first issue is whether the judge pro tempore had the authority to conduct the suppression hearing. Edwards contends that he did not because the regular circuit court judge was in the courthouse the day of the hearing. In support of his argument, Edwards directs us to Survance v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1076 (Ind.1984), reh'g denied. However, pursuant to Survance, Edwards has waived appellate review of this issue because he failed to object at the hearing. See id. at 1082.

Waiver notwithstanding, Edwards's argument must fail. Survance does not stand for the proposition that a judge pro tempore lacks authority to conduct a hearing when the circuit court judge is in the courthouse. Rather, in Survance, our supreme court explained that a "judge pro tempore may not properly act as judge of the court in one room while the regular judge of that court is exercising jurisdiction in another room." Id.

Here, we agree with the State that there is no evidence that the circuit court judge was exercising jurisdiction in another room. We further agree with the State that the "mere fact that the elected judge may have been in the courthouse at some point that day does not affect the power of the judge pro tempore to act." Appellee's Brief, p. 11. We find no error here.³ See Survance, 465 N.E.2d at 1082

.

II.

The next issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Edwards's motion to suppress. Specifically, Edwards contends that the trial court should have granted the motion because his "warrantless arrest, detention and repeated searches violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution."⁴ We disagree. Review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.1997). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Generally, a search warrant is a condition precedent to a lawful search. Id. However, the warrant requirement is subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. Id.

For example, a police officer may stop a vehicle when he or she observes a traffic violation. Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Further, a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Kenner v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

Here, Officers Smith and Rogers stopped the vehicle in which Edwards was a passenger because it was being driven 10 to 15 miles per hour over the speed limit on a snow-covered street. When approached by Officers Smith and Rogers, the driver and the passenger both identified themselves as Michael Edwards and gave the same dates of birth. When confronted, the passenger apologized for his dishonesty and identified himself as Michael Smith, Miguel Smith and Nigel Smith. He also gave the officers two different dates of birth. These specific and articulable facts justified both the stop of the vehicle and the detention of its occupants for investigative purposes. See Kenner, 703 N.E.2d at 1126

.

Further, we agree with the State that "the manner in which Edwards acted also gave police probable cause to arrest him." Appellee's Brief, p. 6. Probable cause for arrest exists where at the time of arrest the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe a suspect has committed the criminal act in question. Santana v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1355, 1359-60 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Although probable cause does not exist when an officer initially stops a suspect to investigate, probable cause to arrest may develop during the investigation. Id. at 1360. Further, a warrantless arrest is permissible if a misdemeanor is committed in the officer's presence. Foster v. State, 633 N.E.2d 337, 346 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied; see also Ind.Code § 35-33-1-1.

Here, during the course of the investigatory stop, Edwards provided the officers with four different names and three different dates of birth. We agree with the trial court that these facts and circumstances would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that Edwards was giving false information to a police officer and committing an offense such as false informing, a misdemeanor.⁵ Further, we note that a police officer may execute a warrantless search of a person if the search is incident to a lawful arrest. Stevens v. State, 701 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Here, the officers found the cocaine during a search incident to Edwards's lawful arrest.⁶ We find no violation of Edwards's federal constitutional rights.

Separate and apart from the federal Fourth Amendment analysis, the Indiana Constitution provides an independent prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, Section 11. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1141, 1152 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1108, 119 S.Ct. 877, 142 L.Ed.2d 777. Such challenges are analyzed under an independent "reasonableness" standard. Id.

Here, the officers stopped a car that was speeding on a snow-covered street. Both the driver and the passenger gave the officers the same name and date of birth. Edwards subsequently apologized to the officers for his dishonesty and gave them three additional names and two additional dates of birth. Based upon the foregoing actions, the officers arrested Edwards and searched him pursuant to the arrest. We agree with the State that the search and seizure of Edwards was reasonable. See Ben-Yisrayl, 690 N.E.2d at 1152

.

III.

The third issue is whether the trial court...