Edwards v. State, 08-97-00518-CR

• Decision Date: 18 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 08-97-00518-CR,08-97-00518-CR
• Citation: 993 S.W.2d 171
• Parties: (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999) JEFFREY EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 171

993 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999)

JEFFREY EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

No. 08-97-00518-CR

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

March 18, 1999

Rehearing Overruled June 23, 1999.

Appeal from 120th District Court of El Paso County, Texas (TC# 960D10912) [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Panel No. 1 LARSEN, McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for four counts of indecency with a child. The appellant, Jeffrey Edwards, entered an open guilty plea to the trial court, and the court sentenced him to five years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice--Institutional Division. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS

On September 10, 1997, Edwards pleaded guilty to four counts of indecency with a child. The trial court admonished Edwards regarding the range of punishment and Edwards' right to a jury trial. In response to the court's questioning, Edwards stated that he understood these issues. Edwards further responded that he understood there was no punishment recommendation from the State, and that the trial court could sentence him to any punishment within the punishment range. Edwards affirmed that no one had forced him into entering his plea, nor had anyone promised him anything to cause him to enter the plea. He professed that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation and that he felt his counsel had adequately investigated and prepared his case. Moreover, Edwards confirmed that he had read and signed the plea papers in the case which, among other things, stated that there was no punishment recommendation and that no punishment recommendation was binding upon the court. Edwards also signed written admonishments which confirmed that he understood there was no plea bargain recommendation, that he had not been threatened or promised anything to get him to make a guilty plea, and that he was mentally competent and knew what he was doing by entering a plea.

During the State's punishment presentation, Paul Strelzin, principal of the high school the victim attended and where Edwards worked as a trainer, testified that Edwards had voluntarily given him a handwritten statement detailing one of the offenses. Strelzin related that Edwards was crying and "extremely emotional" after giving him the statement. Strelzin was "incredulous" over the incident because he had never had a problem with Edwards before. According to Strelzin, Edwards had been "an outstanding trainer [w]ell qualified, capable of handling his job."

Edwards also addressed the court during punishment. He apologized to the court, the victim, and the victim's family. Stating, "I don't know why I did that. I will never do it again," Edwards asked for the forgiveness of both the court and the victim's family.

After receiving a five year sentence, however, Edwards filed a motion for new trial contending that he was not competent at the time of his plea, that he pleaded guilty only because of inaccurate advice and improper pressure from his trial counsel, and that his trial counsel had otherwise rendered ineffective assistance. At the hearing on Edwards' motion, psychologist Dr. Karen Gold testified about her post-guilty plea evaluation of Edwards and her conclusions regarding Edwards' mental competence. Dr. Gold concluded that Edwards suffered from a variety of psychological disorders, most importantly a "Cluster C personality disorder." According to Dr. Gold, Edwards' personality disorder caused him to take responsibility for things that have gone wrong when confronted, even if he had nothing to do with the problem. Moreover, Dr. Gold opined that Edwards is incapable of thinking independently, has difficulty handling himself with authority figures, and will avoid any kind of hostility. Edwards' disorder was so severe, according to Dr. Gold's evaluation, that Edwards would even jump off an overpass on to Interstate 10 "if you applied enough pressure and insisted that he do it . . . ." In Dr. Gold's estimation, Edwards would "instantly capitulate" to an attorney's advice to plead guilty if the attorney pressured him. Edwards' father and girlfriend also testified at the hearing and both agreed that Edwards had difficulty standing up for himself and would often acquiesce to avoid confrontation. Edwards' father further testified that when he visited with Edwards approximately a week before Edwards' guilty plea, Edwards was "strung out" and so nervous and scared that he was unable to hold a conversation.

Edwards testified that despite his repeated protestations of innocence, his trial counsel had insisted that he plead guilty. Edwards' trial counsel allegedly assured him that the judge and the district attorney had agreed to set his punishment at five years deferred adjudication probation in return for his guilty plea. Additionally, Edwards and his girlfriend testified that trial counsel refused to take Edwards' calls and even threatened Edwards with jail time if Edwards persisted in calling. Finally, Edwards claimed that he made the written statement to Strelzin under duress from an assistant principal who told him exactly what to write.

The trial court denied Edwards' request for a new trial and Edwards appeals from that decision and from his original guilty plea with ten issues.

INVOLUNTARY PLEA

In his first six issues, Edwards contends that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a new trial based on the involuntariness of his plea. He makes three arguments in support of these contentions: (1) he was incompetent at the time of his plea; (2) he was threatened by his trial counsel to plead guilty; and (3) he was induced to plead guilty by improper promises from his trial counsel. We will analyze Edwards' first six issues in terms of the three arguments he makes in support of them.

1. Competence

A defendant may challenge his competency to stand trial in a motion for new trial.¹ When raising the competency issue in this manner, a defendant may present evidence regarding his competency developed after conviction as Edwards has done in this case.² Because the motion for new trial hearing occurs after sentencing and not "during trial,³ the trial court applies the traditional standard used to determine whether to grant a motion for new trial. In other words, the trial court considers all the evidence presented, judges the credibility of the witnesses, and resolves conflicts in the evidence.⁴

In evaluating Edwards' claim that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for new trial, we consider all of the competency evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing and reverse the trial court only if it abused its discretion.⁵ We apply this standard because, at this stage of the proceeding, the trial court was determining whether Edwards' incompetency impugned the integrity of its judgment during trial.⁶ The trial court, having observed Edwards both at trial and at the motion for new trial hearing, is in the best position to make this determination.⁷

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have either: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.⁸ Edwards' evidence in this case did not establish either of these factors. Rather, it established that Edwards would not get into a confrontation and would back down under pressure. Specifically, Edwards' claim is that given his particular personality disorder, he was unable to overcome the pressure brought to bear by his attorney's insistence that he plead guilty. Thus, the evidence does not indicate that Edwards' disorder rendered him unable to consult with an attorney with a reasonable degree of understanding nor does it establish that Edwards did not have the ability to understand the proceedings against him.

Even if Edwards' evidence did tend to establish legal incompetence, the trial court was entitled to balance that evidence against the record from Edwards' guilty plea, including the trial court's own observations of Edwards at the time of the plea.⁹ Evidence tending to negate Edwards' theory was presented at the punishment stage. The trial court had before it Strelzin's testimony that Edwards had admitted the offense at a time prior to Edwards' contact with the allegedly overbearing attorney. Additionally, the record from the guilty plea and the punishment hearing in this case shows that Edwards coherently answered questions presented by the trial court. He gave a lucid apology to the court and to the victim's family. This evidence tends to establish that Edwards understood the proceedings and the nature of the allegations against him. Both the trial court and Edwards' attorney specifically stated that they found Edwards to be competent. Given the evidence available from both the motion for new trial hearing and the original guilty plea, we find that the trial court was within its discretion to deny Edwards a new trial based upon incompetence.

2. Threats and Promises

Edwards' next two arguments center on alleged threats and promises made by his trial counsel to induce his guilty plea. Specifically, Edwards contends that his trial counsel assured him that the judge and the district attorney had agreed to allow him to serve a deferred adjudication probation in return for his guilty plea. Moreover, Edwards claims that his trial counsel told him to plead guilty "or else." The law regarding guilty pleas is firmly established. A guilty plea must be freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made on the part of the defendant.¹⁰ This requirement assures that each defendant who pleads guilty to a criminal offense does so with a full understanding of the charges and the...