Effler v. State

• Decision Date: 22 January 1913
• Citation: 85 A. 731,27 Del. 62
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: SAMUEL EFFLER, alias CHARLES HEFFLER, defendant below, plaintiff in error, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, plaintiff below, defendant in error

85 A. 731

27 Del. 62

SAMUEL EFFLER, alias CHARLES HEFFLER, defendant below, plaintiff in error, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, plaintiff below, defendant in error

Supreme Court of Delaware

January 22, 1913

Supreme Court, January Term, 1913.

WRIT OF ERROR (No. 2, June Term, 1911) to the Court of General Sessions in and for New Castle County, (No. 32, January Term 1910, below).

Prosecution upon an indictment charging Samuel Effler, alias Charles Heffler, with conspiring, with others, to steal $ 3,600 from Louis Reches. Verdict of guilty (2 Boyce 92, 78 A. 441), and defendant brings error. Reversed. The facts appear in the opinion.

Judgment reversed.

Reuben Satterthwaite, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

Andrew C. Gray, Attorney General, and Josiah O. Wolcott, Deputy Attorney General, for defendant in error.

CURTIS Chancellor, and CONRAD and RICE, Associate Judges, sitting.

OPINION

RICE, J.

Samuel Effler, alias Charles Heffler, the plaintiff in error, upon his trial, was found guilty on an indictment charging him with conspiring, with other persons unknown, to steal thirty-six hundred dollars from Louis Reches.

The assignments of error are ten in number and cover alleged errors on two points, viz.: (1) That the court erred in admitting the testimony of a witness, Benjamin Silberman, concerning a similar transaction; (2) that the court erred in not directing the jury to find a verdict of "not guilty", on the ground that the misdemeanor charged in the indictment merged in the felony proved by the state.

Testimony, as disclosed by the record, was introduced to prove: That in Wilmington in March, 1909, Louis Reches, the prosecuting witness, upon the solicitation of one Needles and the defendant, Samuel Effler, entered into an agreement with them to purchase a dry goods business in Philadelphia from a man known as Galor, who he some months later identified as one Goldstein in prison at Rochester, N. Y. Reches was to participate in the purchase to the extent of thirty-six hundred dollars cash and Needles and Effler to the extent of five thousand dollars cash. The three went to Philadelphia to complete the purchase, where, at the suggestion of the other two, Reches went with them to see a friend on Tasker Street, to inquire about the stock of goods they had agreed to purchase. While at this house Effler took out his money and commenced to count it, when two men, claiming to be detectives, came in and stated that it was counterfeit money. They took the money of witness and mixed it with Effler's. The men then pretended to place Needles and Effler under arrest and Effler directed witness to step outside a minute, which he did. Upon his return he found the room empty of people.

Benjamin Silberman, under objection, testified in effect: That in June, 1909, at his place of business in Philadelphia he purchased several diamonds of a man giving the name of Goldstein, afterwards identified in prison at Rochester as one Tiddlebaum, being the same person that Reches identified under the name of Galor or Goldstein. Later the witness at the solicitation of Goldstein agreed with one Charles Heffler (identified by the witness as the defendant) to buy fifteen thousand dollars worth of diamonds from Goldstein, the witness to put five thousand dollars and Heffler ten thousand dollars in the transaction. After several postponements in making the purchase, witness went with Heffler to a house in Pierce Street, Philadelphia, taking with him five thousand dollars in cash. At the house they went into a room where was Goldstein and another man known as Fireman, whose description corresponded with the description of Needles. On the table in the room were pieces of tissue paper wrapped as if they contained diamonds, which remained unopened. Upon request witness took out his money and gave it to Heffler, who placed it with his own money on the table, whereupon seven or eight men broke into the room and pretended to arrest all. One of the supposed detectives placed the money and tissue paper packages into a satchel, and two of them went out with Fireman, two with Goldstein, and two with Heffler, and two with the witness, who was released when they reached the street.

When the court below admitted as relevant and competent the testimony of the witness Silberman they stated that it was admitted for the purpose only of showing intent, design or plan of the defendant in the case on trial and so charged the jury.

It is a general rule of criminal evidence that on the trial of a person charged with a crime, proof of a distinct, independent offense cannot be admitted into evidence.

This rule is recognized in the courts of this state as elsewhere, and that there are certain exceptions to this rule is likewise recognized. State v. Tindal, 5 Harr. 488; State v. Freedman, 3 Penne. 403, 53 A. 356.

The following reference to the exceptions is made in Underhill on Criminal Evidence, par. 87:

"To this general rule there are several distinct exceptions which have been permitted from absolute necessity to aid in the detection and punishment of crime. These exceptions ought to be carefully limited and guarded by the courts and their number should not be increased. But it must be admitted that the modern tendency on the part of the courts is to be liberal in the admission of evidence of collateral crimes. The exceptions to the general rule arise either from the necessity of the case, as, for example, where two or more crimes constitute parts of one transaction, so that to prove either necessitates proof of the other, or when the intent is to be proved from circumstances, or in the third place where the identity of the accused is expressly in issue, that is to say, where the evidence conclusively shows a crime was committed by some one, but there is a sharp conflict as to the person who committed it."

It was upon the above exceptions that the court admitted the evidence of Silberman.

Decisions on the general rule are more frequent than upon the exceptions, and it will be observed in the preceding paragraph that the exceptions are permitted from absolute necessity to aid in the detection and punishment of crime and they should be carefully limited and guarded by the courts.

Decisions upon the exceptions to the rule are neither uniform nor reconcilable, either generally or in the different states, and any attempt to classify them would be to give the reasons assigned by the different judges in admitting or rejecting the particular testimony then under consideration.

Testimony of other similar offenses has been admitted in this state, as elsewhere, to show guilty knowledge or intent where there is or may be from the evidence an inference of mistake, accident, want of guilty knowledge, lawful purpose or innocent intent.

In the case of State v. Brown, 85 A. 797, where the accused was on trial for abortion and the state offered testimony of a similar offense by the accused, to prove intent, the court in admitting the testimony said: "But, wherever the intent with which an alleged offense was committed is a material element of the charge, and such intent becomes an issue at the trial, proof of other similar offenses, within certain reasonable limits, is admissible, as tending to throw light upon the intention of the accused in doing the act complained of."

In Meyer v. State, 59 N.J.L. 310, 36 A. 483, the Supreme Court held it error to admit proof of a similar offense to prove intent and said; "To the general rule that upon the trial of a person for one offense proof of his guilt of other offenses is irrelevant, there are, it is true, some exceptions in which the defendant's guilt of the extraneous crime tends to prove against him some particular element of the crime for which he is being tried. Scienter may thus be proved, so, in appropriate cases, may opportunity, motive, preparation, concealment or escape. Where, however, the proof can go no further than to show a propensity to commit the offense in question it is not relevant."

In Luckey v. Roberts, 25 Conn. 486, the court in admitting evidence of a similar transaction used very general language, but it had particular application to the facts then on review, and upon an examination of the case it would seem that it was admitted to show guilty knowledge.

Chief Justice Paxson in the case of Com. v. Saulsbury, Appellant, 152 Pa. 554, 25 A. 610, said:

"Upon the trial in the court below the learned judge admitted the evidence of Zeloster Ross, under objection by the defendant, to prove that one William Serf was arrested, and in the custody of Jerome Saulsbury, the defendant, and that the witness and Simon Wagner paid money to secure his release. The admission of this evidence forms the subject of the first specification of error.

"We think the evidence should have been excluded. The indictment charged that the defendant had extorted money from John Bunke, Zeloster Ross and Simon Wagner, while they were under arrest, under a warrant issued by Esquire Nelson. There was no charge of having extorted money from Mr. Serf, and it was error to permit evidence in regard to him to go to the jury."

On this point Judge Werner in delivering the majority opinion in the case of People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193, after mentioning various offenses in which proof of similar offenses is admitted to...