Efird v. Riley

• Decision Date: 01 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1:04CV397.,1:04CV397.
• Citation: 342 F.Supp.2d 413
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Rebekah EFIRD, Plaintiff, v. D. Brad RILEY, Sheriff of Cabarrus County and Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

342 F.Supp.2d 413

Rebekah EFIRD, Plaintiff, v. D. Brad RILEY, Sheriff of Cabarrus County and Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

No. 1:04CV397.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

November 1, 2004.

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Tamara W. Brooks, Widis & Brooks, PLLC, Charlotte, NC, for Plaintiff.

John Brem Smith, McNair Law Firm, Charlotte, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

DIXON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Rebekah Efird, a former deputy sheriff of Cabarrus County, has sued Defendants, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); and state law claims for negligent supervision/retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [docket no. 7], and Defendants' motion has been referred to the undersigned. The parties have filed responsive pleadings and this matter is ripe for disposition. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.

FACTS

Plaintiff Rebekah Efird worked as a deputy sheriff in the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department from June 11, 2001, until she was fired on March 7, 2003. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually harassed by her male co-workers while working at the sheriff's department and that the department fired her in retaliation for complaining about the harassment. On July 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. On March 31, 2004, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Plaintiff. On May 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed her original complaint, in which she named "Cabarrus County" and the "Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department" as Defendants. On June 15, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, dropping Cabarrus County as a Defendant and adding "D. Brad Riley, Sheriff of Cabarrus County," as a Defendant. On June 21, 2004, Defendants Riley and the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that (1) the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity and therefore cannot be sued; (2) Plaintiff has sued Sheriff Riley in his individual capacity only and dismissal is proper as to him; (3) the amended complaint is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has not named Sheriff Riley's surety as a Defendant; (4) Sheriff Riley is barred from suit under sovereign immunity; and (5) each of Plaintiff's causes of action fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

DISCUSSION

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it must be recalled that the purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the action. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir.1991); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 811, 813 (M.D.N.C.1995). At this stage of the litigation, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, are liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor. McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 95 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir.1996).

Dismissal under 12(b)(6) is generally regarded as appropriate only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); McNair, 95 F.3d at 328 (noting that the proper question is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states any valid claim for relief); Food Lion, 887 F.Supp. at 813. Stated differently, the issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on his claim, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984).

Generally, the court looks only to the complaint itself to ascertain the propriety of a motion to dismiss. See George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir.1980). A plaintiff need not plead detailed evidentiary facts, and a complaint is sufficient if it will give a defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir.1978). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set forth a claim.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department as a Defendant

Defendants first contend that the court should dismiss the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department as a Defendant because it is not a legal entity and cannot be sued. I agree. State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the capacity to be sued in federal court. Avery v. Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 113-14 (4th Cir.1981). There is no North Carolina statute authorizing suit against a county's sheriff's department. Indeed, by statute a sheriff has "the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103. Thus, the sheriff, rather than the department or associated county, may be held liable for employment law violations within the department. The court will therefore grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the Cabarrus County Sheriff's Department as a Defendant. See Nichols v. Forsyth County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 1:99CV105, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6456, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 2000) (dismissing the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department because it is not an entity capable of being sued).

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Sheriff Riley on the Ground that He Has Not Been Sued in His Official Capacity

Defendants next contend that the claims against Sheriff Riley must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to sue Sheriff Riley in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cabarrus County. Defendants contend that the complaint is, instead, against Sheriff Riley in his individual capacity only. Defendants do not clearly articulate in their brief why, even assuming that Sheriff Riley is being sued in his individual capacity only, Plaintiff fails to state claims against Sheriff Riley as to each cause of action. It appears, at the least, that Defendants are arguing that (1) Title VII only allows suit against an employer, not against individual employees of the employer; (2) the Sheriff of Cabarrus County was Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of Title VII; (3) Plaintiff has failed to sue the Sheriff of Cabarrus County on the Title VII claim because Plaintiff has sued Riley in his individual capacity only and not in his official capacity as sheriff; and (4) Plaintiff's Title VII claim must, therefore, be dismissed. For the following reasons, the court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a Title VII claim against Riley individually, that Plaintiff has properly named the "Sheriff of Cabarrus County" as Plaintiff's employer in the amended complaint, and that Defendants' argument has no merit.

Here, Defendant Sheriff Riley presents the above argument as an individual/official capacity issue. The issue is more accurately framed in terms of whether Plaintiff has properly named the "Sheriff of Cabarrus County" as Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. It is clear to this court that she has. In North Carolina, the duly elected sheriff of a county under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-1 has "the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-103. Thus, in North Carolina, each county's sheriff is an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII and must be named as a defendant in a Title VII suit. Here, Plaintiff has clearly named "D. Brad Riley, Sheriff of Cabarrus County" as a Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff refers throughout the amended complaint to the Sheriff's Department and Sheriff Riley collectively as "Defendants" and as Plaintiff's "employers." Amended Compl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 10, 12, 16-18, 21, 22, 24-27, 29, 33, 36, 38. For instance, in support of the Title VII claim, Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that "Defendants were employers within the meaning of Title VII ..., having fifteen (15) or more employees...." Amended Compl. ¶ 8. This court has found numerous Title VII cases within this circuit in which an individual defendant has been sued as the "Sheriff of [a named] County" and where the courts have consistently assumed that the office of sheriff was properly named as the plaintiffs' employer within the meaning of Title VII. See Boatwright v. Good, No. 02CV209-C, 2003 WL 22231194, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2003) (in a Title VII action, where the caption named "Daniel J. Good, As Sheriff of Rutherford County" as the defendant, assuming without discussion that the sheriff was properly sued as plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of Title VII); Vazquez v. Bedsole, 888 F.Supp. 727, 732 (E.D.N.C.1995) (in an action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and discrimination under the ADA and Title VII, where the caption stated that the sheriff was being sued "individually, and as Sheriff of Cumberland County," assuming without discussion that the office of sheriff was properly sued as plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of Title VII and the ADA); Hogan v. McCrary, No. 4:90CV326, 1993 WL 405478, at *1 (M.D.N.C. May 27, 1993) (in a Title VII action, where the caption stated that the sheriff was being sued "Individually, and...