Egaas v. Columbia County
Decision Date | 21 December 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 26745,26745 |
Citation | 673 P.2d 1372,66 Or.App. 196 |
Parties | Stanley J. EGAAS, Respondent, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Oregon, Appellant. ; CA A26703. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Diane Spies, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was Spies and Rune, P.C., Portland.
Steven E. Benson, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before RICHARDSON, P.J., JOSEPH, C.J., and VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
In 1913, the Circuit Court for Columbia County entered a judgment condemning a parcel of land 60 feet wide for a railroad right-of-way. Plaintiff is the contract purchaser of the servient property across which that extends. He brought suit to quiet title to the right-of-way. The trial court ruled in his favor, and defendant county appeals.
The railroad owned the right-of-way from 1913 until it was purchased by a timber company, which quitclaimed its interest to defendant for one dollar in 1939. The servient property has been conveyed several times since then. From 1941, all the conveyances excepted or were made subject to the right-of-way, 1 but it has not been used for railroad purposes since 1937. Plaintiff contends that the 1913 condemnation proceeding gave rise only to an easement and that that terminated in 1938 when the railroad tracks were removed and the right-of-way was no longer necessary for railroad purposes. Defendant contends that the condemnation conveyed title in fee simple and that it holds that fee by virtue of the 1939 quitclaim deed.
The statutes in effect in 1913 are found in Lord's Oregon Laws:
§ 6839. Any corporation mentioned in § 6838 [ ] may appropriate so much of said land as may be necessary for the line of such railway * * * and in case of railway, sufficient quantity of such land, in addition to that above specified in this section, for the necessary side tracks, spur tracks, and laterals reasonably necessary for manufacturing establishments, also for depot and water stations, cuttings, and embankments, and for the proper construction, security, and convenient operation of its roads; and such railway company shall have the right to cut down any standing timber in danger of falling upon its road, making compensation thereof as provided in this act, for lands taken for the use of the corporation, and shall have the right, and may appropriate the right, to conduct water thereto by aqueducts; and any such railway corporation may cross, intersect, join and unite its railway with any other railway at any point in its route, and upon the grounds of such other railway corporation, and make the necessary turnouts, sidings, switches, and other conveniences in furtherance of the object of its connection and may appropriate to make such crossings; the railway which is or may be intersected by new railways, may unite with the owners of such new railways in forming such intersection and connection, and grant the facilities aforesaid * * *."
§ 6859. Whenever any corporation authorized as in the provisions of this act, to appropriate lands, right-of-way, right to cut timber, or to cross or connect with another railway or other right or easement in lands, is unable to agree with the owner thereof as to the compensation to be paid therefore, or if such owner be absent from the state, such corporation may maintain an action in the circuit court of the proper county, against such owner, for the purpose of having such lands, right to cut timber, or to cross, or to connect with another railway, or other right or easement appropriated to its use, and for determining the compensation to be paid to such owner therefor. * * *."
§ 6862. The complaint shall describe the land, right or easements sought to be appropriated with convenient certainty * * *."
§ 6866. Upon the payment into court of the damages assessed by the jury, the court shall give judgment appropriating the lands, property, rights, easements, crossing, or connection in question, as the case may be, to the corporation, and thereafter the same shall be the property of such corporation."
Those statutes granted broad powers of eminent domain to private railway corporations, which could appropriate strips of land subject only to the limitation that the appropriation be "necessary." The statutory references to land, property, rights, right-of-way and easements do not appear to limit the nature of the interest a railroad could appropriate in particular situations, but rather to enumerate its options. We conclude, therefore, that the statutes authorized a railroad to take whatever interest, fee or easement, in the appropriated land that was necessary to accomplish its purposes.
The 1913 condemnation judgment reads in relevant part:
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