Egan v. City of Chicago.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1879
• Citation: 5 Ill.App. 70,5 Bradw. 70
• Parties: JAMES J. EGANv.CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

5 Ill.App. 70

5 Bradw. 70

JAMES J. EGAN

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.

October Term, 1879.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed January 7, 1880.

Mr. PLINY B. SMITH, for appellant; argued that no objection can be taken as to the manner of appointment of the commission; it may be done by ordinance, resolution or vote, and a contract made by persons thus appointed will bind the corporation, and cited Dillon on Mun. Cor. § 374; Alton v. Mulledy, 21 Ill. 76; Rev. Stat, 1874, Chap. 24, § 64.

On the question of corporate purpose, the determination of the legislative body of the city is conclusive unless it contravenes some constitutional provision or some plain requirement of good government: Dillon on Mun. Cor. § 58; Cooley on Con. Lim. 488; Greely v. The People, 60 Ill. 19; C. D. & V. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268; Daniels v. Hilgard, 77 Ill. 640; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; State v. Swearington, 12 Geo. 23.

As to police power of city council: Rev. Stat. 1874, 221; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cem. Co. 71 Ill. 191.

As to what is included in the term “corporate purposes”: Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Henderson v. Lagow, 42 Ill. 360; State v. Sullivan, 43 Ill. 412; C. D. & V. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; Hensley Township v. The People, 84 Ill. 544; Q. M. & P. R. R. Co. v. Morris, 84 Ill. 410; Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 128; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 67.

Mr. JULIUS S. GRINNELL, for appellee; that the federal government has exclusive control over the premises, and they are not subject to control or regulation by the city, cited Federal Constitution, Art. 1, § 8; 1 Kent's Com. *429; Commonwealth v. Young, Brightly, 302; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; United States v. Turney, 1 Bond. 571; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; United States v. Ames, 1 W. & M. 76; United States v. Davis, 5 Mason, 356.

The act of the common council was not within the scope of its corporate powers, and was ultra vires: Brice on Ultra Vires, 43; Dillon on Mun. Cor. § 55; Cooley on Con. Lim. 235; City of Alton v. Ætna Ins. Co. 82 Ill. 45; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Chicago v. Turner, 80 Ill. 419.

Courts adopt a strict construction of corporate powers: Mintum v. Larne, 23 How. 435.

The officers of a corporation cannot bind it by contract beyond the scope of its corporate powers: Miller v. Goodwin, 70 Ill. 659; City of Alton v. Ætna Ins. Co. 82 Ill. 45.

Every one who deals with a municipal corporation must see that it has the power to make such contracts: Law v. Turner, 87 Ill. 385; Burr v. City of Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; Dillon on Mun. Cor. 382.

WILSON, J.

This is a suit brought by appellant Egan against the City of Chicago, to recover the value of his services and labor in examining the foundation walls of the Federal building in process of erection by the U. S. Government, in the city of Chicago, the services having been performed by order of the mayor, pursuant to a resolution of the City Council.

The declaration alleges in substance that on the 19th day of June, 1875, the United States owned, possessed and controlled, in the city of Chicago a block or piece of land bounded by Clark, Adams, Dearborn and Jackson streets, the title to which was acquired by the United States by virtue of an act of the legislature of the State of Illinois; that there was then in process of erection on the land by the United States Government, and to be devoted to the public use of the citizens of the city of Chicago, and others having business with the United States and in the Federal Courts; that the building was to be of great magnitude and its walls of great thickness and weight; that it was of public rumor that the foundations of the building were unsafe and insufficient for its support; that thereupon, the City Council passed a resolution empowering and directing the mayor to appoint a commission of architects to examine the foundations of the building, and to report to the council in writing whether, in their opinion, the building could be safely completed on said foundations; that appellee was one of several architects appointed by the mayor pursuant to the resolution of the council; that under said appointment appellant performed services in examining the foundations of the building, and that the commission duly made a report in writing to the City Council, in accordance with the terms of the resolution authorizing their appointment. The declaration also alleges that prior to the appointment of the commission an appropriation had been made by the City Council to defray the expenses incurred, and that plaintiff's services were reasonably worth $500.

A general demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the court, and the plaintiff electing to stand by his declaration, judgment was rendered for the defendant, to which ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer and entering judgment for defendant, the plaintiff excepted.

The plaintiff brings the case to this court by appeal, and assigns for error-- First, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the declaration. Second, the court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

The allegations in the declaration being admitted by the demurrer to be true, we have only to consider whether they show a right of action in the plaintiff.

It is insisted by the defendant that the resolution of the City Council undertook to authorize an act that was not within the scope of a corporate purpose; that the subject thereof was beyond the power or control of the corporate authorities, and was ultra vires and void. And in support of this position it is urged that inasmuch as the United States had duly acquired title to the block of land in question for the purpose of erecting a government building thereon to be used for court rooms, post office, custom house and other Federal offices required for the public service, their possession and control of the premises was exclusive both of State and municipal authorities; that the city could not interfere with the building either in respect to the manner of its construction, the thickness of its walls, or the sufficiency of its foundations; and that if the commission of architects had condemned the latter as unsafe and dangerous, the city authorities were powerless to remedy the evil.

It is undoubtedly true that the United States, upon acquiring...