Egan v. Egan
| Decision Date | 05 October 2015 |
| Citation | 125 A.3d 792,2015 PA Super 213 |
| Parties | Edward T. EGAN, Appellant v. Rachel McGraw EGAN, Appellee. Edward T. Egan, Appellant v. Rachel McGraw Egan, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
125 A.3d 792
2015 PA Super 213
Edward T. EGAN, Appellant
v.
Rachel McGraw EGAN, Appellee.
Edward T. Egan, Appellant
v.
Rachel McGraw Egan, Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued June 3, 2015.
Filed Oct. 5, 2015.
Peter E. Moore, Blue Bell, for appellant.
Jessica A. Pritchard, Doylestown, for appellee.
OpinionOPINION BY OLSON, J.:
Edward T. Egan (“Husband”) appeals from an order entered on October 23, 2014. In this case of first impression, we consider whether a stipulation to modify a previous court order setting alimony payments is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(c), which prohibits judicial modification of an agreement regarding alimony, or by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e), which permits a trial court to modify alimony orders. After careful consideration, we hold that section 3105(c) governs where the parties reach a stipulation that modifies a prior order directing the payment of alimony. In this case, the parties did just that. Therefore, the stipulation they reached is governed by section 3105(c) and is not subject to judicial modification. As we also conclude Husband is not entitled to relief on his remaining claims, we affirm.
The factual background and procedural history of this case are as follows. Husband and Rachel McGraw Egan (“Wife”) are the parents of three adult children, aged 28, 25, and 22. On May 1, 2002, after a three-day bench trial, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland (“the circuit court”) entered a judgment terminating the marriage of Husband and Wife. The judgment of divorce required Husband to pay $4,000.00 per month in child support, $4,000.00 per month in alimony for a period of one year, and $3,000.00 per month in alimony thereafter. On January 21, 2004, Husband filed a praecipe to register the circuit court's judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (“the trial court”).
On April 12, 2005, Husband and Wife entered into a stipulation regarding child support and alimony. Per that stipulation, the parties agreed to transfer the circuit court's alimony and child support order to the trial court. The parties further agreed that, in order to extinguish outstanding child support and alimony arrearages, Wife would accept a one-time payment of $7,000.00 from Husband. The parties also agreed that Husband would pay $1.00 per month in alimony through June 2012. Thereafter, Husband agreed to pay $3,000.00 per month in alimony until Husband's death, Wife's death, Wife's cohabitation, or Wife's remarriage. The stipulation also provided that Husband would pay $4,500.00 in child support through June 2012. If, however, Husband sought to decrease his child support obligation prior to July 2012, his alimony obligation would increase by the same amount and Husband would be required to reimburse Wife for her increased tax burden. In this event, the parties' stipulation expressly provided that Husband's increased alimony obligation would not be subject to judicial modification. On April 19, 2005, the trial court adopted the stipulation as an order of court “until further [o]rder of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.” Order, 4/18/15.
On February 1, 2013, Husband filed a petition seeking modification of his alimony obligation. On March 7, 2013, Wife
filed an answer and counterclaim. In her counterclaim, Wife sought enforcement of the April 19, 2005 court order. She further requested the trial court find Husband in contempt for violating the April 19, 2005 court order. Finally, Wife sought counsel fees relating to her defense against Husband's petition. On December 17, 2013, the trial court found that the April 19, 2005 order was not subject to modification under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(c) in the absence of a specific provision allowing judicial amendment. It, therefore, denied Husband's petition and scheduled a hearing on Wife's counterclaim. Husband appealed the December 17, 2013 order and this Court quashed the appeal as taken from a non-final order. Egan v. Egan, 158 EDA 2014 (Pa.Super. Feb.21, 2014) (per curiam ).
On August 22, 2014, a hearing on Wife's counterclaim was held. On October 23, 2014, the trial court found in favor of Wife on her counterclaim for enforcement and found Husband in contempt of the April 19, 2005 court order. The trial court ordered Husband to pay $61,654.00 in back child support and alimony. It further ordered attachment of Husband's wages in order to pay the $3,000.00 in monthly alimony required by the April 19, 2005 order. The trial court, however, declined to award Wife counsel fees. This timely appeal followed.
Husband presents five issues for our review:
1. Where an indefinite alimony order which is not the result of an agreement between the parties is entered by a trial court and subsequently modified by stipulation, is the order entered on that stipulation subject to further [c]ourt modification pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e) absent language in the stipulation permitting modification?
2. Where a stipulation for indefinite alimony modifies [a] prior court order[ for] alimony but does not contain language permitting further modification, does that indefinite alimony become permanent alimony not subject to further modification based on changed circumstances?
3. Does a stipulation between the parties providing for indefinite alimony which modified prior [c]ourt ordered alimony constitute a contract not subject to modification pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(c) absent modification language in the stipulation?
4. Should [Husband] have been found to be in contempt of an alimony order despite having presented evidence of his inability to comply with the order and despite having made significant and substantial efforts to comply with the order?
5. Should [Husband] be required to pay an excessive amount of alimony based on a stipulation thereby depriving [Husband] of a reasonable standard of living?
Husband's Brief at 6.
In his first three issues, Husband argues that the April 19, 2005 order is subject to modification pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e). The trial court found that the April 19, 2005 order was not subject to modification pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105(c). Wife defends this determination. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law and, as such, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Gallo v. Conemaugh Health Sys., Inc., 114 A.3d 855, 863 (Pa.Super.2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“When interpreting a statute, we are guided by the Statutory Construction Act,” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq.
W.C.F. v. M.G., 115 A.3d 323, 333 n. 1 (Pa.Super.2015). “[O]ur paramount interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review.” Commonwealth v. Schultz, 116 A.3d 1116, 1120 (Pa.Super.2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, the best indication of the General Assembly's intent may be found in the plain language of the statute. In this regard, it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.” Commonwealth v. Devries, 112 A.3d 663, 670 (Pa.Super.2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Statutory provisions relating to the same subject must be read in pari materia.” Pilchesky v. Lackawanna Cnty., 624 Pa. 633, 88 A.3d 954, 965 (2014), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932. Furthermore,
w]henever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933.
We thus turn to the statutory language at issue in this case. Section 3105 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Enforcement.—A party to an agreement regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the court under this part, whether or not the agreement has been merged or incorporated into the decree, may utilize a remedy or sanction set forth in this part to enforce the agreement to the same extent as though the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided to the contrary in the agreement.
* * *
(c) Certain provisions not subject to modification.—In the absence of a specific provision to the contrary appearing in the agreement, a provision regarding the disposition of existing property rights and interests between the parties, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or expenses shall not be subject to modification by the court.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105. Section 3701(e) provides that:
(e) Modification and termination.—An order entered pursuant to this section [, relating to alimony,] is subject to further order of the court upon changed circumstances of either...
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