Egan v. Planning Bd. of Stamford

• Decision Date: 10 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 32371.,32371.
• Citation: 136 Conn.App. 643,47 A.3d 402
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Elizabeth EGAN et al. v. PLANNING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

136 Conn.App. 643
47 A.3d 402

Elizabeth EGAN et al.
v.
PLANNING BOARD OF the CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

No. 32371.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 17, 2012.
Decided July 10, 2012.

[47 A.3d 404]

John W. Mullin, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

Daniel A. Benjamin, with whom were Ronald M. Gold and, on the brief, Derek Mello, Stamford, for the cross appellant (defendant Michael Innaurato).

John R. Harness, for the appellees (named plaintiff et al.).

DIPENTIMA, C.J., and ALVORD and WEST, Js.

WEST, J.

[136 Conn.App. 645]The defendants, the planning board of the city of Stamford and subdivision applicant Michael Innaurato,¹ appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the aggrieved plaintiffs' appeal ² from the [136 Conn.App. 646]planning board's approval of Innaurato's subdivision application. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the planning board when the court interpreted (1) a conservation easement to be inconsistent with the zoning requirement that an accessway lot ³ provide an “unobstructed legal accessway” to the street and (2) a lot frontage regulation to require frontage to be measured along a street “which affords the principal means of access” to the lot. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. On February 13, 2008, Innaurato filed an application to subdivide his 6.39 acre lot located on Ingleside Drive in Stamford. The lot borders Spring Hill Lane East (private lane), a private road, to the north, over which the lot does not have any access rights. Approximately 40 percent of the western side of the lot is occupied by a pond and wetlands. The lot is zoned RA–2 for single-family dwellings, requiring a minimum lot size of approximately two acres and minimum frontage of 200 feet. The subdivision plan submitted by Innaurato divided the lot into three lots, B–1, B–2, and B–3. All three lots are approximately two acres each. On lots B–1 and B–2, Innaurato proposed to build six-bedroom, single-family dwellings. Lot B–1 abuts the private lane to the north for a total length of approximately 288 feet and Ingleside Drive to the east, for a total length of 87 feet. Access to lot B1 is through a driveway off of Ingleside Drive. There are no access rights to the private lane from lot B–1. Lot B–2 is an interior “accessway” lot and abuts lot B1 to the north and B–3 to the south. Lot B–2 does not abut [136 Conn.App. 647]a street except for a twenty-five foot wide accessway abutting Ingleside Drive. The accessway to lot B–2 has a

[47 A.3d 405]

steep slope and is heavily wooded. Vehicular access to lot B–2 is provided through a common driveway through lot B–1.⁴ Lot B–3 contains an existing dwelling and other buildings.

The planning board held a public hearing on the subdivision application on May 27 and June 17, 2008. At the conclusion of the June 17 hearing, the board approved the application subject to fourteen conditions. Conditions one and two required that Innaurato dedicate an “Open Space Preserve/Conservation Area” over 2.8 acres of the entire subdivided property and file a standard “[c]onservation [e]asement [a]greement” over those designated areas. Those conditions require that the area designated as a conservation easement must be “maintained in a natural state except as may be authorized by the Environmental Protection Board (EPB)....” ⁵ The accessway portion of lot B–2 was included as one of those areas subject to conditions one and two.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that the board's grant of Innaurato's subdivision application violated the zoning regulations in the following ways: (1) lot B–2, as an accessway lot, is not served [136 Conn.App. 648]by an unobstructed legal accessway as required in the zoning regulations and (2) lot B–1 does not meet the minimum frontage requirements of the zoning regulations.⁶ The court, in its memorandum of decision, sustained the plaintiffs' appeal, finding that in both instances, there was no substantial evidence to support the planning board's interpretation of the zoning regulations. The planning board and Innaurato appealed from the trial court's judgment after this court granted their petitions for certification.

We now identify the applicable standard of review. “Our Supreme Court has stated that [u]nder our well established standard of review, [w]e have recognized that [a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... We have determined, therefore, that ... deference ... to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation.... Heim v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 289 Conn. 709, 714–15, 960 A.2d 1018 (2008); Borrelli v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn.App. 266, 270, 941 A.2d 966 (2008);

[47 A.3d 406]

Munroe v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 75 Conn.App. 796, 803, 818 A.2d 72 (2003) ( [i]t is our job, as an appellate court, to construe the relevant zoning regulation because ... the outcome ... eventually will depend on a legal interpretation of the regulation [136 Conn.App. 649]by an appellate court).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goulet v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 117 Conn.App. 333, 337, 978 A.2d 1160, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 909, 982 A.2d 1082 (2009).

“Because the interpretation of the regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary.... Additionally, zoning regulations are local legislative enactments ... and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes.... Moreover, regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the principle that a reasonable and rational result was intended.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language [or ... the relevant zoning regulation] as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 97 Conn.App. 17, 21–22, 902 A.2d 706, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 545 (2006); see also Alvord Investment, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 416, 920 A.2d 1000 (2007); R. Fuller, 9A Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (3d Ed. 2007) § 33:7, p. 261.

“A zoning ordinance is a local legislative enactment, and in its interpretation the question is the intention of the legislative body as found from the words employed in the ordinance.... The words employed are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning.... The language of the ordinance is construed so that no clause or provision is considered superfluous, void or insignificant.... The regulations must be construed as a whole and in such a way as to reconcile all their provisions as far as possible.... [R]egulations are to be construed as a whole since particular words or sections of the regulations, considered separately, may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a standard [136 Conn.App. 650]sufficient to sustain them.... Fedus v. Zoning & Planning Commission, 112 Conn.App. 844, 849–50, 964 A.2d 549, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 905, 973 A.2d 103, 104 (2009); see 9A R. Fuller, supra, § 34:6, pp. 299–303.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mountain Brook Assn., Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 133 Conn.App. 359, 368–69, 37 A.3d 748 (2012). At the same time, our review of the factual findings of the planning board is guided by the substantial evidence standard of review. See Quality Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 55 Conn.App. 533, 540, 738 A.2d 1157 (1999).

I

We first consider the issue of whether the placement of a conservation easement, among other restrictions, on the accessway of an accessway lot violates the Stamford zoning regulations. On the basis of the facts and record in this case, we disagree with the planning board's interpretation and conclude that its determination that lot B–2 complied with the zoning regulations lacks substantial evidence in the record.

We now set forth the relevant language from the zoning regulation. Section 3(A)(56) of the zoning regulations defines an accessway lot as “a lot which has less than the required minimum frontage but which complies with the provisions of [§ 7(O) of the zoning regulations].” Stamford Zoning Regs., § 3(A)(56). Section 7(O) provides in relevant part that “[a]ccessway lots ... shall be permitted ...

[47 A.3d 407]

provided that each such accessway lot has access to a street by means of an unobstructed legal accessway held in the same ownership as the accessway lot....” ⁷ (Emphasis [136 Conn.App. 651]added.) Id., § 7(O). The court concluded that the conservation easement was inconsistent with the requirement of an “unobstructed legal accessway.” In essence, the court found that restrictions on the accessway obstructed legal access to lot B–2. We agree.

The defendants make several arguments. First, the defendants argue that the planning board has engaged in a time-tested practice of interpreting “unobstructed legal accessway” in § 7(O) of the zoning regulations to restrict only physical obstacles along with a time-tested practice of preserving natural resources through the use of common driveways in compliance with the subdivision regulations. The defendants also argue that the conditions placed over the accessway do not obstruct legal access to the lot because actual access to lot B–2 is provided by the common driveway.

A

First, we must...