Ehret v. Congoleum Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. B141773.,B141773. |
| Citation | 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 370,87 Cal.App.4th 202 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Kathleen Anne EHRET et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CONGOLEUM CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant. |
Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, L. Rachel Lerman Helyar, Encino; McHale & Conner, Michael J. McHale and Bruce Janger, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Davis & Thomas, Joseph Daniel Davis; and Charlotte E. Costan, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
This is the second time this wrongful death case has been before us. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether postjudgment interest should run from the date of entry of the judgment on the original jury verdict, or from the judgment entered following our remittitur on the first appeal. We conclude that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the trial court correctly ruled that postjudgment interest runs from the original judgment, and affirm.
Robert Ehret was a journeyman floor covering contractor who was diagnosed with terminal pericardial mesothelioma. He sued several flooring manufacturers and distributors, including Congoleum Corporation, alleging that his illness was caused by asbestos in various flooring products he installed 20 to 30 years earlier. All the manufacturers other than Congoleum settled for a total of $2,565,000. One distributor, L.D. Brinkman & Co (Brinkman), also went to trial. (Ehret v. Congoleum Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 (Ehret I).)
Mr. Ehret died during the trial. The case continued as a wrongful death action brought by his widow and three other heirs. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against Congoleum and Brinkman. The jury assigned 25 percent fault to Congoleum and 12.5 percent fault to each of 6 former defendants. The jury also found that Brinkman's predecessor in interest had distributed the asbestos flooring products of Congoleum and two other manufacturers. The jury's award to plaintiffs totaled $3,322,551: $622,551 for medical and burial expenses and loss of earnings; $2,550,000 for loss of consortium to Mr. Ehret's widow; and $50,000 for loss of care, comfort and society to each of Mr. Ehret's three other heirs. (Ehret I, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363.)
Judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's special verdict. Congoleum filed post-trial motions, including one to reduce its liability for noneconomic damages under Civil Code section 1431.2 (commonly known as Proposition 51); one for a setoff for the settlements by the other defendants; and one for new trial, based on excessive damages. Brinkman sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the jury's apportionment of 12.5 percent of the damages to two defendants whose products had been distributed by Brinkman's predecessor in interest was not supported by substantial evidence. Brinkman had been held vicariously liable for the distribution of products manufactured by those two defendants. (Ehret I, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363.)
The trial court granted Brinkman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it found insufficient evidence that other manufacturers' products had contributed to Mr. Ehret's injuries. Based on this ruling, the trial court eliminated the apportionment of fault to manufacturers other than Congoleum. (Ehret I, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363.) The trial court also declined to apportion noneconomic damages under Civil Code section 1431.2 and held that the settlements with other defendants should be apportioned between Mr. Ehret's personal injury claims and the wrongful death claims, so that the portion attributable to pain and suffering was not set off against the jury award. The court ascribed 75 percent of the settlements to pain and suffering, and ordered that 25 percent of the settlements be subtracted from the jury verdict, for a total verdict against Congoleum and Brinkman of $2,681,301. On July 29, 1997, the court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this amount. (Id. at pp. 1315-1316, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363.) Congoleum appealed the judgment.
In the unpublished portion of our opinion in Ehret I, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 1308, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, we agreed with Congoleum's argument that the jury's finding of fault as to other manufacturers is supported by substantial evidence, and overturned the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that ground. We also found substantial evidence to support the jury's assignment of a greater percentage of fault to Congoleum, and reinstated the jury's apportionment of fault to manufacturers other than Congoleum.
In the published portion of our opinion in Ehret I, we ruled that Proposition 51 (Civ.Code, § 1431.2) applied, reversed the trial court's allocation of the other defendants' settlements between noneconomic and economic damages, and applied the formula set out in Espinoza v. Machonga (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 268, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 498, using the original jury award. (Ehret I, 73 Cal.App.4th p. 1323, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 363.) We remanded the case to the trial court to enter judgment against Congoleum in the amount of $817,896 and awarded Congoleum its costs on appeal. (Ibid.) Our remittitur returning jurisdiction to the trial court issued on October 8,1999.
Congoleum filed a memorandum of costs on appeal in the amount of $46,035.16, which would reduce the amount owed by Congoleum to $784,217.61 plus postjudgment interest. In the course of settlement negotiations between Congoleum and plaintiffs, a dispute arose about the date on which postjudgment interest began to run. Congoleum offered to settle by paying $800,000 for both the principal and interest due on the judgment. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs would not claim postjudgment interest beyond November 12, 1999, when the tender of $800,000 was received. For purposes of appeal, Congoleum has accepted the plaintiff's calculation of the daily rate of postjudgment interest at $214.85.
The plaintiffs accepted the tender of the $800,000, but refused to enter a satisfaction of judgment because, they argued, they were entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the original June 27, 1997 judgment through November 12, 1999. Congoleum took the position that postjudgment interest began to accrue only with the issuance of our remittitur in Ehret I.
Congoleum moved the trial court to compel entry of a full satisfaction of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050 (). Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the ground that Congoleum owed interest from the original June 27,1997 judgment.
The trial court entered judgment in accordance with our remittitur on January 12, 2000, and transferred the case to another judge for ruling on Congoleum's motion. The trial court ultimately ordered Congoleum to pay postjudgment interest from the June 27, 1997 judgment on the jury verdict. Congoleum appeals from that order.
We are asked to interpret two statutory provisions related to the accrual of postjudgment interest. Congoleum argues that section 685.020 provides that postjudgment interest is to run from the entry of judgment following remittitur on the previous appeal. Plaintiffs argue that section 685.020, subdivision (a) continued existing practice which awarded interest from the judgment entered on the verdict. As we explain, we conclude that plaintiffs have the better argument.
In 1982, the Legislature enacted the Enforcement of Judgments Law. (Stats.1982, ch. 1364; § 680.010.) The 1982 legislation was (Recommendation on 1982 Creditor's Remedies Legislation (Sept.1982) 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) page 1003 (Commission Report).) The Supreme Court (In re Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 241, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.)
The Tentative Recommendation proposing The Enforcement of Judgments Law, 15 California Law Revision Commission Reports (1980) pages 2215-2216, recommended the adoption of a new section 685.020: The Commission's comment to subdivision (a) provided: (Tentative Recommendation, pp. 2215-2216, italics added.)
When the Legislature adopted the Enforcement of Judgments Law in 1982, it adopted subdivision (b) of the proposed section 685.020, but did not adopt subdivision (a) of the section as proposed by the Law Revision Commission. (Com. Rep, 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 1229.) In 1983, the Legislature enacted chapter 155 as an urgency measure: (Stats.1983, ch. 155, § 31, p. 566.)
In chapter 155, the Legislature adopted the proposed subdivision (a) to section 685.020: "Except as provided in subdivision (b), interest commences to accrue on a money judgment on...
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