Ehrhardt v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 20 September 1905
• Citation: 40 Wash. 221,82 P. 296
• Parties: EHRHARDT v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

82 P. 296

40 Wash. 221

EHRHARDT v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 20, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Arthur E. Griffin, Judge.

Action by Otto Ehrhardt against the city of Seattle. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Wm Parmerlee and Scott Calhoun, for appellant.

Wm Martin, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

On the 10th of September, 1902, respondent was injured by being thrown from his wagon while driving along a public street in the city of Seattle. On the 11th day of October following he filed with the clerk and presented to the city council his verified claim for damages. Thereupon he commenced his action against the city to collect his damages for which his claim was filed. The trial was by the court, and resulted in a judgment for the respondent. From this judgment this appeal is taken.

The principal error alleged, and the only one it is necessary for us to discuss, by reason of the conclusion reached on such alleged error, is that more than 30 days elapsed after the injury before the claim was presented to the city of Seattle. One of the findings of the court was that for more than 30 days after he was injured the plaintiff suffered great pain and was disabled from attending to or transacting any business, and was confined to his bed the greater portion of said time, and that within a reasonable time after his said injury he presented his claim to the city of Seattle, and attempted to present it on the 10th day of October, 1902, but was prevented by reason of the offices of said city being closed at between the hours of 5 and 6 o'clock p. m.; and the said city and its officers had full knowledge prior thereto of the said injuries sustained by the plaintiff. We are forced to conclude, from a reading of the record, that this finding was not entirely justified; that while the plaintiff suffered great pain a portion of the time during the 30 days immediately succeeding the accident, and may have suffered some pain all the time, he was not disabled from attending to or transacting any business. The record shows that he did attend to other business; that he gave instructions in relation to the care of his team; that 16 days after he was injured, and frequently thereafter, he called upon the doctors, whose offices were seven or eight blocks from where he lived; that he would take a car to Second and James street, then walk to the office...