Eiberger v. West, s. 37086
Decision Date | 07 July 1981 |
Docket Number | 37087,Nos. 37086,s. 37086 |
Citation | 281 S.E.2d 148,247 Ga. 767 |
Parties | EIBERGER v. WEST. WEST v. EIBERGER. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Sidney Haskins, Atlanta, for Mrs. L. S. West.
David S. Rand, Atlanta, for Horst A. Eiberger.
In 1973, appellee sold appellant certain real estate for $70,000.00. Appellant executed a promissory note payable to appellee in the amount of $60,000.00 The note was secured by a deed to secure debt.
On July 30, 1979, appellant ceased payment under the note, after he had paid 23 installments totaling $60,375.00.
Appellee filed this action, alleging that "if the promissory note ... is usurious," it was the result of "mistake of fact material to the contract in that neither party realized or intended for the note to bear usurious interest ..." The complaint prays for "relief in equity" and reformation of the contract "so as to provide for the payment and receipt of the 71/2 per cent simple interest on the principal unpaid balance" as well as attorney fees and expenses of litigation. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim in which he prayed, inter alia, that the promissory note "be declared satisfied" and that the note "be declared usurious."
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court found that the note charged an excessive rate of interest, but noted that this was not apparent on the face of the instrument. The court also found that the terms of the note had been offered by the buyer and that they were accepted by the seller without any knowledge on her part that the terms were improper. Finally, the court found that "Eiberger intentionally devised this scheme to obtain the property for $70,000 ... without paying any interest, while causing Mrs. L. S. West to believe that she would receive legal interest and principal totaling $115,000" and that "Eiberger fraudulently acted to perpetrate this scheme to avoid payment of interest and is estopped to assert the defense of usury." Based upon these findings, the court ruled as follows: We affirm on the main appeal, and reverse on the cross-appeal.
1. On the main appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and in denying his motion.
to take advantage of his own wrong. (Cits.)" Hall v. Montaleone, 38 Ill.App.3d 591, 593, 348 N.E.2d 196 (1976). "(T)he majority of jurisdictions hold that estoppel can lie to bar the defense of usury ..." (Heubusch v. Boone, 213 Va. 414, 421, 192 S.E.2d 783 (1972); Massie v. Rubin, 270 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1959)), and Georgia has followed the majority rule. See Holt v. Rickett, 143 Ga.App. 337, 340, 238 S.E.2d 706 (1977), in which the Court of Appeals held the doctrine of estoppel applicable where "the note requiring usury was prepared by the borrower and presented to the unwary lender."
The instant case is before this court by virtue of summary judgment. Thus, in order for estoppel to govern this case, it must exist as a matter of law. "(W)here the facts relied on to establish the estoppel do not unequivocally show an estoppel in pais, the jury, and not the judge, should determine whether the facts constitute such an estoppel." Tune v. Beeland, 131 Ga. 528(3), 62 S.E. 976 (1908). Vines v. Citizens Trust Bank, 146 Ga.App. 845, 848, 247 S.E.2d 528 (1978).
The trial court's finding of estoppel is based on fraud. See American Century Mtg. Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Civ.App.1975); Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal.App.3d 779, 100 Cal.Rptr. 462 (1972); Jue v. Bass, 299 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962). Although we recognize that there is evidence of actual fraud in the record, we cannot say that the evidence demands a finding of actual fraud. See Crowder v. Electro-Kinetics Corp., 228 Ga. 610, 614, 187 S.E.2d 249 (1972). On motion for summary judgment, Davis v. Dickson, 232 Ga. 338, 339, 206 S.E.2d 473 (1974).
Nonetheless, we affirm the trial court's judgment. The following facts are uncontroverted: The property was first offered by appellee for $125,000.00. Appellant expressed an interest in the property, but "said that he could not pay what she was asking." Appellant then made a counter-proposal to appellee's real estate agent, stating "I will give you a proposition I would like for you to make to Mrs. West." The "proposition" was, in essence, the contract which appellant now asserts is usurious. Appellant is a businessman who, by his own admission, has been "involved in a number of real estate transactions." In contrast, appellee's only job has been as an assistant in her father's business. Her experience in real estate transactions is exceedingly limited, and she clearly had no knowledge that the real estate contract presented by appellee contained a usurious effective interest rate. See Graham v. Lynch, 206 Ga. 301, 57 S.E.2d 86 (1950). Appellant was represented by legal counsel, who conducted the closing. Appellee was not represented by counsel either prior to or at the closing.
"(S)ummary judgment may be granted on evidence that would compel the direction of a verdict; and should be denied when a directed verdict would be improper." 6 Moore's Federal Practice, P 56.15(4), p. 56-522. In our view the evidence demands a finding that appellant and his attorney had supervised and controlled the transaction and that appellee had placed her trust in them. Cf. White v. Seitzman, 230 Cal.App.2d 756, 761, 41 Cal.Rptr. 359 (1964). Appellant may not now take advantage of the state of affairs for which he is responsible. See Holt v. Rickett, supra; Rogus v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 4 Ill.App.3d 557, 281 N.E.2d 346 (1972). ...
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