Eichenberger v. Woodlands Assisted Living Residence, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 04 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14AP–272.,14AP–272.
• Citation: 25 N.E.3d 355
• Parties: Raymond L. EICHENBERGER, Plaintiff–Appellant/[Cross–Appellee], v. WOODLANDS ASSISTED LIVING RESIDENCE, L.L.C. et al., Defendants–Appellees/ [Cross–Appellants].
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

25 N.E.3d 355

Raymond L. EICHENBERGER, Plaintiff–Appellant/[Cross–Appellee]

v.WOODLANDS ASSISTED LIVING RESIDENCE, L.L.C. et al., Defendants–Appellees/ [Cross–Appellants].

No. 14AP–272.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Dec. 4, 2014.

Raymond L. Eichenberger, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Richard N. Selby, II, Painesville, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Opinion

CONNOR, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Raymond L. Eichenberger, personal representative of Jane E. Eichenberger, deceased, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in favor of defendants-appellees, Woodlands Assisted Living Residence, LLC (“Woodlands”), 7123 Industrial Park Blvd., Inc., Carol Ruff and Laura Baugus (collectively “appellees”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

A. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This is the second time we have reviewed a judgment of the trial court disposing of appellant's claims prior to trial. In Eichenberger v. Woodlands Assisted Living Residence, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 12AP–987, 2013-Ohio-4057, 2013 WL 5308288 (“Eichenberger I ”), we set forth the procedural history and the factual background of the case as follows:

On June 8, 2010, appellant filed a complaint alleging he had been “duly appointed by the Franklin County Probate Court as the Executor of the Estate of the late Jane E. Eichenberger” (“decedent”). (June 8, 2010 Complaint, 2.) According to the complaint, decedent was a resident of Woodlands, and on June 12, 2008, appellees “negligently failed to exercise control over” and “negligently failed to provide for” the decedent based upon her falling from a wheelchair being operated and controlled by appellees. (June 8, 2010 Complaint, 2–3.)

* * *

[O]n April 7, 2011, appellant sought leave to amend the complaint in order to substitute appellee Baugus for defendant Jane Doe 1.

* * *

By entry dated June 15, 2011, the trial court granted appellant's April 7, 2011 motion to amend the complaint, and the amended complaint filed on April 7 was deemed filed instanter. Subsequently, on June 24, 2011, appellant, apparently without leave of court, filed an amended complaint that appears to be identical to those amended complaints previously filed.

On June 29, 2011, appellees filed a * * * motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6). Appellees argued (1) dismissal of the first claim was proper because it was a medical claim required to be filed within one year and with an affidavit of merit, (2) the entire complaint was required to be dismissed for lack of standing, and (3) Baugus was entitled to dismissal because appellant did not perfect service on her within one year.

* * *

On June 11, 2012, after considering evidence beyond the allegations of the complaint, the trial court granted appellees' June 29, 2011 motion to dismiss the complaint. * * * Although the exact basis of its decision is somewhat unclear, the trial court appears to have granted the motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), after having determined that appellant lacked standing at the time he commenced this litigation and that the filing of a complaint after he became executor did not relate back to the original complaint.

(Fn. omitted.) Id. at ¶ 2–9.

{¶ 3} On appeal, we determined that the issue raised by appellees' motion to dismiss was one of capacity to sue rather than standing. Eichenberger I at ¶ 15. Accordingly, we found that the trial court erred when it dismissed appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) “[b]ecause capacity to sue does not challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Washington Mut. Bank. v. Beatley, 10th Dist. No. 06AP–1189, 2008-Ohio-1679, 2008 WL 928424, ¶ 11 ; Vedder v. Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, 2002 WL 31320350, ¶ 15. We also determined that the trial court improperly “relied on matters outside appellant's complaint to resolve appellees' motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court relied on a purported docket sheet from the Franklin County Probate Court filed in support of appellees' motion to dismiss as well as the parties' arguments contained therein.” Id. at ¶ 18. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶ 4} Following remand, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that: 1) the complaint alleges a “medical claim” governed by the one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.113 ; and 2) that appellant lacked the legal capacity to commence an action on behalf of decedent's estate and that appellant's refiled complaint did not relate back to the date of the original filing for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant responded that the claim alleged in the complaint sounds in ordinary negligence and that such claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations pertaining to an action for bodily injury. R.C. 2305.10. Appellant further argued that even though he did not have legal capacity to commence an action on behalf of the estate when he filed the original complaint on June 8, 2010, he subsequently obtained an appointment as executor from the probate court on May 9, 2011, and filed an amended complaint curing the defect on June 24, 2011. According to appellant, the amendment relates back to the date of the original complaint for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations.

{¶ 5} In a decision dated March 14, 2014, the trial court determined that the complaint alleges a claim sounding in negligence only, and that such a claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations for actions based on bodily injury. R.C. 2305.10. The trial court, however, went on to conclude that appellant's amended complaint filed on June 24, 2011, did not relate back to the date of appellant's original filing date and that the statute of limitations barred appellant's cause of action “in light of [appellant's] lack of capacity to sue.” (Trial Court Decision, 10.)

{¶ 6} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on April 3, 2014. Appellees filed a cross-appeal on April 10, 2014.

B. Assignments of Error

{¶ 7} Appellant assigns the following as error:

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN THE LITIGATION, THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO STANDING TO FILE THE LITIGATION, AND THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BRING THE LITIGATION IN THAT PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN THE TRUSTEE OF THE DECEDENT'S TRUST SINCE 2002. THE TRUST WAS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEDENT LATER ADMITTED TO PROBATE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY.

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE CASE HAD NOT BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST DEFENDANT LAURA BAUGUS BY OBTAINING SERVICE AGAINST THAT DEFENDANT, OR SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SERVICE WAS LEGALLY OBTAINED THEREAFTER.

{¶ 8} For their cross-appeal, appellees/cross-appellants assign the following as error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S CLAIM WAS NOT A MEDICAL CLAIM GOVERNED BY OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2305.113 SUBJECT TO A ONE (1) YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

C. Standard of Review

{¶ 9} Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in that party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C) ; State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997).

{¶ 10} Appellate review of summary judgment motions is de novo. Corna/Kokosing Constr. Co. v. South–Western City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 02AP–624, 2002-Ohio-7028, 2002 WL 31838956, ¶ 10, citing Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 148 Ohio App.3d 440, 2002-Ohio-3328, 773 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.). Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist.1997). “ ‘When reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, the court of appeals conducts an independent review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court.’ ” Shaw v. Thomas, 10th Dist. No. 99AP–1291, 2000 WL 1639624 (Nov. 2, 2000), quoting Mergenthal v. Star Banc Corp., 122 Ohio App.3d 100, 103, 701 N.E.2d 383 (12th Dist.1997). We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant at the trial court are found to support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Id., citing Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41–42, 654 N.E.2d 1327 (9th Dist.1995).

D. Legal Analysis

{¶ 11} In order to resolve the issues raised by appellant's assignments of error, we must first determine the statute of limitations applicable to appellant's claim. Accordingly, we will first consider the issue raised by appellees' cross-appeal.

1. Applicable Statute of Limitations

{¶ 12} Appellees contend that appellant's claim for relief based upon the bodily injury sustained by decedent sounds in medical malpractice and, as such, the one-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.113(A), governs the claim. The trial court determined that the complaint did not allege a medical claim. We agree with the trial court.

{¶ 13} There is no question that appellant's claim for relief accrued on June 12, 2008, and that appe...