Eidson v. Croutch, A16A0198
Decision Date | 23 June 2016 |
Docket Number | A16A0198 |
Citation | 788 S.E.2d 129,337 Ga.App. 542 |
Parties | Eidson v. Croutch et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Wayne Stephen Tartline, Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin, Atlanta, for Appellant.
Andrew Lee Hagenbush, Morgan & Morgan, for Appellees.
, Judge.
Robert Eidson filed an application for discretionary appeal seeking review of the trial court's order granting attorney fees to Robyn Croutch under OCGA § 9–15–14 (a)
,1 which this Court granted. For the reasons set forth below, we find that we do not have jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted.
In November 2014, Robyn Croutch, individually and as next friend of her minor daughter, filed suit against Eidson in the State Court of Gwinnett County, asserting claims arising from a motor vehicle accident. In March 2015, after learning that Eidson did not reside in Gwinnett County as previously believed, Croutch amended her complaint to reflect his actual residence and filed a motion to transfer venue to the State Court of DeKalb County, the location of the accident. Shortly thereafter, Eidson filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Croutch failed to serve the complaint within the time allowed by OCGA § 9–11–4 (c)
. In addition to opposing the motion to dismiss, Croutch filed a motion for attorney fees. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order awarding $5,405 in attorney fees to Croutch (the “Order”) and, in a separate order entered the same day, granted Croutch's motion to transfer the case to DeKalb County.
Eidson timely filed an application for discretionary review of the Order. Croutch moved to dismiss the application, asserting that because the underlying action remains pending in DeKalb County, the Order is interlocutory and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain Eidson's appeal where he did not comply with the requirements of OCGA § 5–6–34 (b)
. In response to the motion to dismiss, Eidson concedes that, although he followed the requirements of OCGA § 5–6–35 (a) (10) in seeking discretionary review of the Order, he did not comply with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5–6–34 (b).2
The Order is clearly interlocutory. It is undisputed that the negligence action remains pending below, and the Order does not otherwise fall under any of the twelve categories of judgments enumerated in OCGA § 5–6–34 (a)
that are subject to a direct appeal. And it is well settled that where an appeal is both discretionary and interlocutory, the discretionary appeal statute does not excuse a party from complying with the additional interlocutory requirements of OCGA § 5–6–34 (b). See Bailey v. Bailey , 266 Ga. 832, 833, 471 S.E.2d 213 (1996) (); Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus , 305 Ga.App. 450, 454, 699 S.E.2d 600 (2010) () .
The failure to follow the interlocutory appeal requirements, when applicable, generally deprives this Court of jurisdiction. As we have explained, the (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Settendown Public Utility, LLC v. Waterscape Utility, LLC , 324 Ga.App. 652, 653, 751 S.E.2d 463 (2013)
. Thus, “[w]hen the order appealed from is an interlocutory order, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction unless the procedure of OCGA § 5–6–34 (b) for interlocutory appeal is followed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
But that does not end the inquiry in this case. In granting Eidson's application for discretionary review, this Court directed the parties to address whether this Court otherwise has jurisdiction to review the case as a direct appeal because the transfer order acted as a final judgment making the attorney fees order appealable pursuant to OCGA § 5–6–34 (d)
.3 After thorough consideration of the record and the relevant law, we find that we do not. Because the case remains pending below, although in a different court from the one that issued the transfer order, there was no final judgment as defined in OCGA § 5–6–34 (a) (1)
. See, e.g., Griffith v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry , 175 Ga.App. 533, 533, 333 S.E.2d 647 (1985) () ; Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, LLC , 306 Ga.App. 160, 161, 701 S.E.2d 599 (2010) (). And because the nature of this case remained unchanged following the transfer for venue, it does not fall within the narrow exception carved out by our Supreme Court when a trial court transfers a criminal matter from juvenile to superior court. See, e.g., Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children Services v. Perkins , 244 Ga. 237, 239, 259 S.E.2d 427 (1978) ( ); Rivers v. State , 229 Ga.App. 12, 13, 493 S.E.2d 2 (1997)
. Cf. In the Interest of W. L. , 335 Ga.App. 561, 563, 782 S.E.2d 464 (2016) ( ). Here, the transfer order is not final because it is simply a continuation of the same proceeding against Eidson, and thus the attorney fees order was not immediately appealable.
We further decline Eidson's request to extend the collateral order doctrine to include orders granting attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14
. “The collateral order doctrine permits appeals from a small category of decisions that are (i) conclusive, (ii) that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (iii) that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Expedia , 305 Ga.App. at 452 (1), 699 S.E.2d 600. Pretermitting whether the first and second criteria could be met, an order granting attorney fees does not meet the third criterion as it is subject to appellate review after entry of final judgment. See Dept. of Transp. v. Hardaway Co. , 216 Ga.App. 262, 262, 454 S.E.2d 167 (1995)
(, overruled on other grounds, )Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman , 226 Ga.App. 77, 485 S.E.2d 525 (1997) ; Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron , 799 F.3d 327, 335 (II) (B) (5th Cir. 2015) ( ).
Although Eidson argues that an order granting attorney fees may involve a distinct and separate offshoot of the underlying pending action, that is not the test for determining whether this Court has jurisdiction. Where an attorney fees order is issued prior to final judgment, the proper method for immediately appealing such...
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