Einstein v. Gay

• Decision Date: 31 October 1869
• Citation: 45 Mo. 62
• Parties: WILLIAM EINSTEIN, Appellant, v. EDWARD J. GAY et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

45 Mo. 62

WILLIAM EINSTEIN, Appellant,

v.EDWARD J. GAY et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1869.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Hill & Jewett, for appellant.

Glover & Shepley, for respondents.

CURRIER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment. The plaintiff claims under a tax collector's deed. The court below held the title bad, and rendered judgment accordingly. The plaintiff brings the case here by appeal.

In disposing of this cause, we do not feel called upon to indulge in any general discussion of the subject of tax titles, or to go into an examination of the points raised upon the various acts and proceedings antecedent to the execution and delivery of the deed upon which the plaintiff relies as evidence of his title. The defectiveness of this deed relieves us of that duty. It purports to convey to the plaintiff “all the right, title, and estate” of the State of Missouri, of, in, and to “the premises in question;” and it purports to convey nothing other, different, or more. But the State had no title-- nothing but a tax lien. This is admitted, and the case shows the fact to be so. Therefore, no title passed by the deed. This is the necessary conclusion, unless construction is employed to give the deed an effect beyond the broadest scope of its terms, thereby making it effectual to convey the title of Bennett, the tax debtor, when it purports to convey merely the title of the State. We are referred to no precedent countenancing such a proceeding in this class of cases, and we are not inclined to make one.

The authority of the decision in the Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 577, does not meet the exigency of the present case. The objection to the deed there was that it was not executed in the name of the people of the State, according to the direction of the statute, which had long been in force. The objection was overruled on the ground that, although the deed was informal, it nevertheless had the sanction of long usage and great names--that custom had interpreted the statute, and that “thousands of titles” were dependent on conveyances executed in the same form. The intimation of the court is that but for these considerations the deed was subject to the objection taken. There are no such considerations to urge here; besides, there is no parallel between the two cases. The question here is, not as to the sufficiency of the deed in its formal parts, but whether it shall be...