Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co.

• Citation: 59 A.2d 313,190 Md. 528
• Decision Date: 20 May 1948
• Docket Number: 172.
• Parties: EISENHOWER v. BALTIMORE TRANSIT CO.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

59 A.2d 313

190 Md. 528

EISENHOWER v. BALTIMORE TRANSIT CO.

No. 172.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 20, 1948

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Emory H. Niles, Judge.

Action by Alberta Eisenhower against the Sun Cab Company, Inc., and the Baltimore Transit Company to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff when a taxicab, owned by the Sun Cab Company, Inc., and in which the plaintiff was riding, was struck by a street car of the Baltimore Transit Company. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against both defendants. From a judgment for the Baltimore Transit Company notwithstanding the verdict, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Bernard M. Goldstein, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Benjamin C. Howard of Baltimore (Philip S. Ball, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, and HENDERSON, JJ., and BAILEY, Circuit Judge, Specially assigned.

BAILEY Circuit Judge, specially assigned.

This suit was instituted by Alberta Eisenhower against Sun Cab Company, Inc. and The Baltimore Transit Company to recover for personal injuries which she sustained when a taxicab, owned by Sun Cab Company, Inc. and driven by one Metcalf, in which she was riding as a passenger for hire, was struck by a street car of The Baltimore Transit Company, operated by one Keller. The jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City rendered a verdict in her favor against both defendants in the amount of $5000.00. Sun Cab Company, Inc. filed a motion for a new trial which was granted. The motion of Baltimore Transit Company was for a judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative, for a new trial. Acting under the authority given by Rule 8, Part III, subd. 3, Trials, of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1945, the Court directed the entry of a judgment n.o.v. for costs in favor of the defendant, The Baltimore Transit Company, without ruling upon its motion for a new trial. The plaintiff has appealed from this judgment.

The accident occurred about one o'clock in the afternoon of July 5, 1946, at a five street intersection in Baltimore. The streets here intersecting are Eutaw Street, Madison Street, Hamilton Terrace, Madison Avenue and St. Mary's Street. Eutaw Street runs north and south and in the block immediately north of the intersection it is called Hamilton Terrace. Madison Street runs east and west and its western terminus is at the intersection. Madison Avenue begins at the intersection and runs therefrom in a northwesterly direction. St. Mary's Street is a narrow street which runs into the intersection from the southwest and ends there. There are double street car tracks on Eutaw Street and Madison Avenue, curving from one street into the other. There is one traffic signal at the location which controls the movement of traffic on all five of the streets entering the intersection. It is on a pylon in the bed of Eutaw Street about 14 feet east of the east rail of the northbound car track and about 60 feet north of the south curb line of Madison Street. The north curb line of Madison Street does not extend in a straight line to Eutaw Street, but turns to the northwest about 70 feet from Eutaw Street and is then, in effect, a prolongation of the northeast curb line of Madison Avenue. The width of Madison Street, between curbs, is 40.3 feet, so that the pylon stands about 20 feet north of a westerly prolongation of the north curb line of Madison Street. There are two supplementary traffic lights, one at the corner of St. Mary's and Eutaw Streets, and the other at the corner of St. Mary's Street and Madison Avenue, but the manner of their operation is not material in the instant case.

It is stipulated in the record that when the light on the pylon showed green for southbound traffic on Hamilton Terrace it showed red for all other traffic; that when it showed green for northbound traffic on Eutaw Street, it showed red for southbound traffic on Hamilton Terrace; that the amber light showed only at the end of the green light; that the light changed from red to green without the intervening amber; and that the amber light showed for the final three seconds of the green light and that for said final three seconds both the amber and green lights showed together. It is further stipulated that the weather was clear and the streets were dry. The taxicab was southbound on Hamilton Terrace and the street car was northbound on Eutaw Street.

The Court, in deciding whether to grant demurrer prayers or motions for judgments n.o.v. resolves all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff and assumes the truth of all evidence and such inferences as may naturally and legitimately be deduced therefrom which tend to support the plaintiff's right of recovery. Armiger v. Baltimore Transit Co., 173 Md. 416, 196 A. 111; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, Md., 52 A.2d 249; Beck v. Baltimore Transit Co., Md., 58 A.2d 909. The evidence in this case must, therefore, be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. But it is also true that in an action to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that there was a neglect of duty by the defendant and that the injury sustained was the direct consequence of such neglect of duty. Where it is manifest to the court upon the plaintiff's own showing and the uncontradicted evidence in the case that there is no rational ground upon which a verdict can be based for the plaintiff, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant, or, as in this case, grant a motion for a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the defendant. State, to use of Bacon v. Baltimore & Potomac R. Co., 58 Md. 482; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. State, to use of Schroeder, 69 Md. 551, 16 A. 212; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young, Md., 56 A.2d 140.

In the instant case there is no question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The question is as to the primary negligence of the defendant, The Baltimore Transit Company. This is not a case where the mere happening of the accident raises any presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant, but the burden is upon the plaintiff to show negligence. Speculation as to how or from what cause the accident occurred cannot be allowed to stand for proof. There must be evidence upon which the jury can reasonably and properly conclude that the injury was produced by some negligence or wrongful act of the defendant. Barker v. Whitter, 166 Md. 33, 170 A. 578; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. State, Use of Abbott, 75 Md. 152, 23 A. 310, 32 Am.St.Rep. 372.

The acts of negligence charged against this defendant are that its agent disregarded and went through a red light at said intersection, operated the street car at a high and improper rate of speed, failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to have the street car under proper control. All the evidence relating to the happening of the accident was produced by the plaintiff. In addition to her own testimony, there was offered the testimony of Keller, the operator of the street car, and of Metcalf, the driver of the taxicab. The evidence of the motorman, Keller, which was undisputed, was to the effect that he was operating the street car at a proper rate of speed, between 10 and 15 miles per hour, that he was keeping a proper lookout and 'had noticed the cab sitting over on Hamilton Terrace', and that he had the street car under proper control. Theretofore, if there was any act of negligence imputable to this defendant, it must have been that the motorman entered the intersection on a red light.

The motor vehicle laws of the State are now codified as Article 66 1/2 of the Annotated Code, 1947 Cumulative Supplement. Section 141 of said Article deals with traffic control signals and provides under subsection (a) when the signal is green alone or 'Go', '(1) Vehicles facing the signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. All vehicles shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.' It is further provided by subsection (e) of Section 141 that 'the operator of any street car or trackless trolley shall obey the above signals as applicable to vehicles.' In discussing the said provisions in the case of Caryl v Baltimore Transit Co., Md., 58 A.2d 239, 242 the Court states that the last sentence in sub-section (a)(1), quoted above, announces no new principle of law, but that 'It has always been the law that a pedestrian or a vehicle starting across an intersection with a favorable signal has the right to complete the trip, even if the light changes in the middle of the passage. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, at page 29, 190 A. 768.' If Keller, the motorman, entered the intersection on a green light, he had the right to continue through the intersection and proceed in a northwesterly direction on Madison Avenue, with the right-of-way over Metcalf, the driver of the taxicab, entering the intersection from Hamilton Terrace, even though Metcalf entered on a green light. The proper decision of the question of primary negligence on the part of this defendant depends, therefore, upon whether there was any evidence in this case legally sufficient to prove that Keller, the motorman, entered the intersection on a red light. If there was not, the court was correct in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v. State, Use of Foy v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co., 47 Md. 76. However, this Court has held repeatedly that a case will not be withdrawn from the jury for the want of legally sufficient evidence if there is any...