Ekwunife v. City of Phila.

• Decision Date: 24 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 16–0148
• Citation: 245 F.Supp.3d 660
• Parties: Sylvester EKWUNIFE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

245 F.Supp.3d 660

Sylvester EKWUNIFE, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16–0148

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 24, 2017

Warren R. Hamilton, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Michael Robert Scalera, Brock Atkins, City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

This action arises from the alleged arrest and subsequent three-year detention of Plaintiff Sylvester Ekwunife ("Plaintiff") on sexual assault charges that were later dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that the affidavit of probable cause submitted by the Philadelphia Police Department in support of its application for his arrest warrant contained multiple misstatements and omissions, resulting in his false arrest and false imprisonment. Plaintiff also alleges that after the sole victim recanted her accusation against Plaintiff, the prosecutor continued to pursue her case against Plaintiff and attempted to use the recanted testimony to coerce a guilty plea from Plaintiff, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, as well as various state law claims, against the City of Philadelphia ("the City"); Detective Laura Hammond of the Philadelphia Police Department's Special Victims Unit ("Detective Hammond"), in her individual and official capacities; Philadelphia Police Officer Joseph T. Carter ("Officer Carter," and collectively with the City and Detective Hammond, "the City Defendants"), in his individual and official capacities; Philadelphia District Attorney R. Seth Williams ("DA Williams"), in his official capacity; and former Assistant District Attorney Heba Gore ("Former ADA Gore"), in her individual and official capacities (together with DA Williams, "the DA Defendants").

Following the June 24, 2016, dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff's pro se Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed a second and then a third amended complaint—this time represented by counsel—bringing claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, failure to train and supervise, and conspiracy. On October 17, 2016, following a hearing, the Court granted the City Defendants' and DA Defendants' motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint yet again, in accordance with the guidance the Court provided at the hearing. Plaintiff has now filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, and the City and DA Defendants have each filed separate motions to dismiss.¹ Plaintiff opposes the DA Defendants' motion, but has not filed a response to the City Defendants' motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant both motions to dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts, all of which are presumed to be true for purposes of resolving the motions to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges he and his wife allowed Sharon McFayden ("McFayden"), the mother of Plaintiff's wife's granddaughter, to live with her children at a house Plaintiff owned, with the understanding that McFayden would pay the mortgage on the property. See Fourth Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 15, ECF No. 32. After McFayden failed to pay the mortgage, Plaintiff asked her to move out of the home so that it could be rented. See id. McFayden moved out of the home, but "started plotting against Plaintiff." Id. She kept Plaintiff from receiving notices from the bank regarding the mortgage, and later arranged with the bank to forfeit the property. Id.

According to Plaintiff, McFayden has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder

and schizophrenia. Id. As a result, Plaintiff's wife's son, Danny Rosario ("Rosario"), wanted custody of Karizma, the daughter of Rosario and McFayden. Id. at ¶ 16. Before the custody battle began, however, McFayden contacted Philadelphia's Department of Human Services ("DHS") and reported that Plaintiff had sexually abused Karizma. Id. at ¶ 17. DHS case workers then visited the home to investigate the complaint. Id. at ¶ 18. During the home visit, Plaintiff's wife and Rosario both informed the DHS case workers that Karizma "was known for fabricating things," and that her mother "was mentally ill, and had a motive to lie against [P]laintiff." Id. The case workers did not allow Plaintiff, or anyone else in the household, to tell them Plaintiff's side of the story. Id. at ¶ 19.

On February 18, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested and detained on sexual assault charges. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that the Philadelphia Police Department obtained a warrant to arrest him on the basis of an affidavit of probable cause prepared and filed by Detective Hammond. Id. at ¶ 44. According to Plaintiff, Detective Hammond provided "false information" in her affidavit, including (1) incorrectly identifying Plaintiff as a white man; (2) listing the alleged victim as 11 years old, whereas she was between 3 and 4 years old at the time of the incident; and (3) listing the incorrect address where the incident allegedly occurred. See id.

Plaintiff alleges that at some point after his arrest, the Court of Common Pleas held a hearing at which "the Judge found that there was no ‘digital penetration’ " in the sexual assault case. Id. at ¶ 21. At some unspecified later point, Karizma "recanted her story" to the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting the case, Heba Gore. Id. Despite the victim's recantation, Plaintiff claims, the DA's Office "left [P]laintiff in custody while continuing to try to extort a guilty plea from him with a real threat of a 50–year sentence." Id. at ¶ 22. In January 2015, nearly three years after Plaintiff was arrested, the DA's Office requested a dismissal of the case against him without explanation. Id. at ¶ 23. On May 1, 2015, the state court expunged Plaintiff's arrest record. Id. at ¶ 24.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions, he was humiliated and beaten by "other inmates who perceived him to be a child molester, and had to be taken to the hospital multiple times." Id. at ¶ 60. Plaintiff also alleges that he was "publicly shamed, ridiculed, [and] humiliated," and he lost the opportunity to care for his special-needs son. Id. at ¶¶ 59, 61.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an initial pro se complaint on January 21, 2016, asserting claims against the City and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. ECF No. 3. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), explaining that (1) a district attorney's office is not an "entity" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore is not susceptible to suit, and (2) the doctrine of absolute immunity shields prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. ECF No. 2.

Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint on February 10, 2016. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brought only one claim, violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, and named only three defendants: the City of Philadelphia, Former ADA Gore, individually and as an official, and Detective Hammond, individually and as an official. See id. On March 1, 2016, the Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Former ADA Gore pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) under the doctrine of absolute immunity. ECF No. 5.

On May 11, 2016, the City filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 9. The City argued that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because Plaintiff (1) failed to identify a municipal policymaker, (2) failed to allege facts regarding a municipal policy or custom that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (3) failed to identify specific instances of prior police misconduct caused by the City's policies or practices. See id. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion.

On June 7, 2016, Plaintiff retained counsel. See ECF No. 12. On June 24, 2016, the Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 15. At the hearing, the Court stated that Plaintiff's allegations regarding a policy, practice, or procedure relating to the alleged failure to train were conclusory, and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice, allowing Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. See Hr'g Tr. at 15, Jun. 24, 2016, ECF No. 29. During a discussion regarding Plaintiff's failure to properly allege a policymaker, the Court noted that absolute immunity does not apply to the District Attorney's Office to the extent the office is acting in an administrative capacity instead of a prosecutorial capacity. See id. at 8–9. The Court suggested that Plaintiff add the District Attorney's Office as a defendant if Plaintiff intended to allege that the District Attorney's Office is the policymaker for purposes of his § 1983 claim and that the office was acting in an administrative capacity. See id. at 13–15.

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on July 18, 2016, ECF No. 18, followed by a Third Amended Complaint on July 19, 2016, ECF No. 19. The Third Amended Complaint added Officer Carter and DA Williams as defendants, and re-added Former ADA Gore. ECF No. 19. The DA Defendants and City Defendants each filed separate motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 22, 25, which Plaintiff opposed, ECF Nos. 27, 28. On October 17, 2016, following a hearing, the Court granted both motions to dismiss, dismissing the claims against the City and the DA Defendants in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. At the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff to make the following changes in the Fourth Amended Complaint: (1) identify each of the defendants and the claims Plaintiff is making against each defendant; (2) identify the facts supporting each claim against each defendant, including sufficient facts to make the claim plausible under Twombly and Iqbal ,...