Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 April 1985 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Marcelino MINGACHOS, Administrator (ESTATE OF Frank MINGACHOS) v. CBS, INC., et al. |
Dennis G. Eveleigh, Stamford, with whom were Nathan C. Nasser, and, on brief, Keith A. Rubenstein, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
J. Kevin Golger, Fairfield, with whom, on brief, was George L. Holmes, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellees (defendants).
Before HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and BIELUCH, JJ.
This appeal calls into issue the exclusivity of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes §§ 31-275 through 31-355.
On October 30, 1979, Frank Mingachos (the decedent) sustained injuries from an explosion while working on the Danbury premises of his employer, the named defendant, CBS, Inc. (CBS). On November 29, 1979, he died as a result of those injuries. On June 3, 1981, the plaintiff, Marcelino Mingachos, as administrator of the decedent's estate, instituted an action in three counts seeking compensatory and punitive damages against CBS and several individual fellow employees of the decedent, Rocco Pennozza, Charles Joseph and Andrew Dodd. 1
The first two counts were directed to CBS. They alleged, in substance, that the explosion and the decedent's injuries and death were caused by CBS' "violations" of certain enumerated Connecticut "statutory regulations" and federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act (OSHA) regulations, that the violations were "willful" and "reckless," and that "the natural and probable consequence reasonably to be anticipated ... would be death or serious injury." The third count was directed to Pennozza, Joseph and Dodd. It also alleged in substance that the explosion and the decedent's injuries and death "were caused by and were the direct result" of the individual defendants' violation of the same Connecticut "statutory regulations" and federal OSHA regulations as alleged in the two earlier counts, that the violations were "willful," and again that "[t]he natural and probable consequence reasonably to be anticipated ... [therefrom] would be death or serious injury." The defendant CBS' answer to the first and second counts included the special defense of the Workers' Compensation Act (the act) and asserted the exclusivity of the act as a bar. 2 The special defense of the act was also interposed to the third count, with the individual defendants asserting its exclusivity because the case did not fall within the exceptions of § 31-293a 3 of the act. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed his motion to strike the special defenses to all three counts "for the reason that said allegations do not constitute special defenses to an action for willful and intentional torts." The court, Sullivan, J., denied the motion as to the first two counts and granted it as to the third count. 4
Thereafter, a three count amended complaint was filed. The first two counts, as amended, now alleged that the explosion and the decedent's injuries and death were caused by "CBS's violations and actions ..." of certain enumerated Connecticut statutory regulations and OSHA regulations, that "[s]aid actions and violations" were, as to the first count, "wilful and intentional, and created a hazardous condition" and that they were, as to the second count, "reckless, and created a hazardous condition." As to each of these two counts, it was now alleged that despite "CBS' knowledge that such hazardous violations and conditions existed," it failed to correct them, it failed to warn its employees, and it failed to report them to certain governmental agencies as required by law. It was further alleged that this failure to correct, warn and report was, on the part of CBS, "intentional, malicious, and in willful and wanton disregard of the health of the plaintiff's decedent and caused his injuries and consequent death." 5
The defendants thereafter filed their motion for summary judgment 6 in which they asserted that the plaintiff's claim was "barred by law." The motion also alleged that "[a]ll three counts ... are based on the violations of the defendants of certain OSHA rules and regulations and are barred by Connecticut General Statutes Section 31-369(b) and 29 United States Code Section 653(b)(4)." 7 The court, Maiocco, J., granted the summary judgment motion as to all three counts. This appeal followed. 8
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred: (1) in overruling his motion to strike the special defenses to the first and second counts of the original complaint and (2) in granting summary judgment for the defendants on all three counts of his amended complaint.
The basic issue in this appeal is whether an employer has immunity from suit under General Statutes § 31-284 of the Workers' Compensation Act when the employer is sued in intentional tort. The manner, however, in which the case was presented and argued to two judges in the trial court, one who decided the plaintiff's motion to strike special defenses to the original complaint and one who rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the later filed amended complaint, requires individual treatment. 9 "We review this case on the theory upon which it was tried and upon which the trial court decided [each motion]." (Citations omitted.) Fuessenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144, 151, 487 A.2d 514 (1985). The basic issue does, however, permeate both motions which the parties have briefed separately although both with some overlapping. Accordingly, our discussion of the act will likewise permeate our determination of both motions.
We first address the plaintiff's claims against the defendant employer. To do so we must necessarily examine the scope of General Statutes § 31-284, the "exclusivity" provision of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act.
"The purpose of the workmen's compensation statute is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer." (Citation omitted.) Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 217, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979). The act is to be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of providing compensation "for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault." Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 (1968); Stapf v. Savin, 125 Conn. 563, 565, 7 A.2d 226 (1939). Under typical workers' compensation statutes, employers are barred from presenting certain defenses to the claim for compensation, the employee's burden of proof is relatively light, and recovery should be expeditious. In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation. See Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering Ltd., 143 Cal.App.3d 219, 191 Cal.Rptr. 696 (1983); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation § 2 (1976); see generally Larson, "The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation," 37 Cornell L.Q. 206 (1952). The purposes of the act itself are best served by allowing the remedial legislation a reasonable sphere of operation considering those purposes. See Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 117, 411 A.2d 924 (1979). 10
Under General Statutes § 31-284(a) an "employer" within the scope of the act is not liable in "any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his [or her] employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained...." (Emphasis added.) The act mandates that the term "[p]ersonal injury ... shall be construed to include, in addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment, and occupational disease as herein defined." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-275(8); see Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 669-70, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). State v. Freedom of Information Commission, 184 Conn. 102, 107, 441 A.2d 53 (1981). We have recognized that "courts do not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for it...." Heffernan v. Slapin, 182 Conn. 40, 46, 438 A.2d 1 (1980).
Under the act, "in addition to accidental injury," the definition of "personal injury" or "injury" clearly encompasses any other specified injuries "causally connected" with employment. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-275(8). The act's coverage is necessarily broad in scope, encompassing more than merely injuries resulting from "accidents," giving that word its plain meaning. See General Statutes § 1-1; Rivera v. I.S. Spencer's Sons, Inc., 154 Conn. 162, 164, 223 A.2d 808 (1966); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation § 29, p. 725 (1976).
We have recently recognized a narrow exception to the exclusivity of the act. In Jett v. Dunlap, supra, we held that an employee's action claiming intentional assault by another employee "identified as the alter ego" of the employer would not be barred by § 31-284. Id., 179 Conn. 219, 425 A.2d 1263. This "alter ego" exception may be applicable in instances in which "the assailant is of such rank in the corporation that he may be deemed the alter ego of the corporation under the standards governing disregard of the corporate entity." Id. 11 Jett, which involved an assault upon an employee by his work supervisor, does not, however, avail the plaintiff in this case.
The plaintiff would have us construe § 31-284 so that this provision would not bar actions at law against employers in cases...
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