Elden v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 28 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. B105924,B105924 |
| Citation | 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 322,53 Cal.App.4th 1497 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2397, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4221 David A. ELDEN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Paula ELDEN, Real Party in Interest. |
Law Offices of Robert C. Brandt, Robert C. Brandt and Suzanne Rosentswieg, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
David S. Karton, Beverly Hills, Trope and Trope and Thomas Paine Dunlap, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner, David A. Elden, seeks a writ of mandate directing the superior court to set aside its order denying his petition to confirm an arbitration award. In performing our review, we must consider the application of Family Code provisions that require parties in a marital dissolution to serve preliminary and final declarations of disclosure on each other. (Fam.Code, § 2100 et seq.) 1
Petitioner (hereafter Husband) and Real Party in Interest, Paula Elden (hereafter Wife), are attorneys. Both are members of the State Bar of California. Each has practiced only in the area of criminal defense. They were married on November 17, 1978, and separated in either 1988 or 1989. 2
On August 11, 1994, Husband, in pro per, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. By stipulation, the matter was bifurcated and judgment of dissolution (status only) was entered on March 9, 1995.
Husband and Wife entered into a stipulation agreeing that "[t]his matter shall be tried to a final conclusion at an arbitration proceeding pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure [section] 1280, et seq." Husband and Wife also agreed that "[t]he award of the arbitrator shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal, or attacked or set aside other than as provided in California Code of Civil Procedure [section] 1286.2." Attorney Jeffrey Weiner was appointed by the parties to conduct the arbitration. Although Weiner is licensed in Florida, he is not licensed to practice law in California. The stipulation, which was filed with the superior court, is undated.
On November 28, 1995, Weiner issued a document entitled "Decision and Award." It is clear from the content of the decision that Weiner believed that sometime after the parties separated they entered into an agreement in early 1989, which resolved all of their property issues with the exception of the disposition of the family residence, and that the agreement had been "fully performed." 3 Weiner set forth what he believed he had been asked to arbitrate. He noted that the residence had been sold in 1994 and that Husband had promised to give Wife $75,000 as her share of the proceeds from the sale. Weiner indicated he had been asked to determine "whether [Wife] is owed the sum of $75,000, or another amount, from [Husband] ... or whether [Husband] is entitled to reimbursement and/or credit as a result of [Wife's] continued use of retail store and other credit cards in both the [Husband's] name as well as the [Wife's] name." Weiner also noted that he had been "given an alternative option with respect to resolution" of the issue involving the $75,000. Weiner noted that he had elected to "forego using the 'alternative option' and instead [would] render the Decision and Award based on the evidence presented as to each issue and beginning with the $75,000 being owed by [Husband] to [Wife] as the starting point."
Weiner then made a determination as to the "debits" and "credits" and made the following award with respect to the family residence issue:
Also contained within the award is the following language: "Although both parties have repeatedly indicated that they were fully aware of each other's finances, it is hereby ordered that within seven (7) days of the filing of this Arbitration Decision and Award, that both parties submit to each other by registered mail, with a copy to the undersigned arbitrator, financial statements sufficient under California law to satisfy each other that they are fully knowledgeable in the matters contained therein."
Husband claims that on November 29, 1995, Weiner mail-served the award on the parties by Federal Express. Wife denies this, but concedes she received a copy of the award either on or shortly after the November 29, 1995, date.
On February 7, 1996, Husband filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award. On that same date, he served on Wife his final declaration of disclosure and income and expense declaration, under section 2105, and he served and filed his declaration regarding service of final declaration of disclosure and income and expense declaration pursuant to section 2106. 4
Wife concedes she did not serve a declaration of disclosure. Husband claims he demanded service of Wife's disclosure declaration. Wife claims that no such demand was made.
On August 12, 1996, Wife filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 seeking relief from the statutory time limitations for opposing the petition to confirm and for seeking vacation of the award, and seeking to vacate the award. Wife claimed, among other things, that she had been "coerced into signing a written agreement to arbitrate." She claimed that "[a]s a result of [Husband's] improper conduct, [Wife] only signed the 'Stipulation' under duress and undue influence," and that her "mental state was such that she was in no position to effectively secure representation or otherwise protect her rights during the so-called arbitration process." Wife also claimed that the arbitrator "exceeded his power," because "the entire issue of credit card balances was not to be considered," and that her rights were "substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrator to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause to hear evidence."
On August 28, 1996, the superior court denied Husband's motion to confirm the arbitration award on the basis that the parties' failure to comply with the requirements of Family Code section 2105 precluded entry of judgment. The court ruled that Wife's section 473 motion was moot. 5 Husband then filed this mandamus petition.
Husband contends that the denial of his petition to confirm the arbitration award was in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction and was a prejudicial abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (1) the "procedural disclosure provisions of ... sections 2105 and 2106 do not apply to private arbitrations held under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1280 et seq.," (2) application of the "procedural disclosure provisions to private arbitrations defeats the purposes and provisions of [Code of Civil Procedure] section[ ] 1280 et seq.," and (3) the award is "final, cannot be vacated, and must be confirmed and have judgment entered thereon." 6
Wife contends that the "superior court correctly determined that the mandatory disclosure requirements of [sections 2105 and 2106] prohibit entry of judgment after arbitration."
Wife contends an order denying a petition to confirm an arbitration award is appealable, and that writ review is therefore inappropriate. Regardless of whether the order is appealable, writ review is permissible here since the petition raises a novel issue of law. (See Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 781, 136 Cal.Rptr. 821.)
Statutory interpretation requires a three-step process. First, a court should examine the actual language of the statute, giving the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning. (Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298.) If the meaning is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, then the language controls, and there is nothing to "interpret" or "construe." (Id. at p. 1239, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298.) It is only when the meaning of the words is not clear that courts are required to take a second step and refer to the legislative history. (Ibid.) The final step--which is required to be taken only when the first two steps have failed to reveal clear meaning--is to apply reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand. If possible, the words should be interpreted to make them workable and reasonable, in accord with common sense and justice, and to avoid an absurd result. (Ibid.)
The Family Code embodies public policy designed to foster full disclosure and cooperative discovery concerning marital community and quasi-community assets and liabilities. 7 Section 2104 requires that "each party shall serve on the other party a preliminary declaration of disclosure, executed under penalty of perjury" (emphasis added) within 60 days of the filing of a petition for dissolution. 8 Section 2105 requires that "each party shall serve on the other party a final declaration of disclosure and a current income and expense declaration, executed under penalty of perjury" (emphasis added) when the parties enter into a property or support agreement or no later than 45 days before the first assigned trial date (if the case goes to trial). 9 The statutes provide for the content of these declarations and specify that they be on forms prescribed by the Judicial Council.
However, "[t]he parties may stipulate to a mutual waiver of [final declarations] by execution of a waiver in a marital settlement...
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