Eldridge v. City of Binghamton

• Decision Date: 29 April 1890
• Parties: ELDRIDGE v. CITY OF BINGHAMTON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

120 N.Y. 309

24 N.E. 462

ELDRIDGE

v.CITY OF BINGHAMTON.

Court of Appeals of New York,

Second Division.

April 29, 1890.

Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the supreme court in the fourth judicial department, affirming a judgment entered upon a verdict directed by the court, and also affirming an order denying a motion for a new trial.

This is an action of ejectment to recover the possession of a parcel of land in the city of Binghamton that formerly constituted a part of the Chenango canal. The plaintiff's claim of title is based upon various conveyances running back to Lewis Squires and Joseph B. Abbott, who, on September 1, 1836, conveyed the premises in question, with other lands, to Hiram and Ausburn Birdsell, ‘subject to the rights of the state of New York for the purposes of the Chenango canal.’ This conveyance, as the record states, was ‘made after the state took possession of the premises in controversy for canal purposes.’ It was conceded on the trial that the usual and regular steps were taken by the state to condemn the land, and that on the 7th of September, 1838, said Squires and Abbott ‘came before the appraisers, and presented their claim (of $2,000) for damages occasioned by the appropriation of their land * * * for the construction of the Chenango canal.’ By the award of the canal appraisers the claimants' damages were appraised at the sum of $2,500, but the benefits conferred upon them, as the owners of the residue of the property, were estimated as in excess of this amount, so that no damages over and above benefits were awarded. The appraisement so made was duly recorded as required by law. The state continued in possession until January 1, 1880, when the defendant, pursuant to chapter 391 of the Laws of 1878, took possession of the premises, and laid them out as a street, without exercising the right of eminent domain, and without taking any title except such as was released by said statute. All of the lands involved are within the limits of said street as laid out and recorded, under the name of ‘State Street,’ and since January 1, 1880, they have been in the possession of the city ‘claiming to hold them for a public street, and succeeding the state in possession.’ Neither the plaintiff nor any of his predecessors have been in actual occupancy since the state took possession and appropriated the land. The plaintiff was not shown to have any title except such as was conveyed by Squires and Abbott to Hiram and Ausburn Birdsell in 1836, ‘subject to the rights of the state.’ At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict for the defendants.

George Whitney, for appellant.

George B. Curtis, for respondent.

VANN, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

By chapter 32 of the Laws of 1833, entitled ‘An act for the construction of the Chenango canal,’ the canal commissioners were directed to ‘proceed with all reasonable diligence to construct and complete a canal from Binghamton, in the county of Broome, up the valley of the Chenango river, to its head-waters, and thence, by the most advantageous route, to the Erie canal.’ The Revised Statutes, in force at that time, provided that, when any lands appropriated by the canal commissioners to the use of the public shall not be given or granted to the state, it shall be the duty of the canal appraisers to make a just and equitable estimate and appraisement of the damages and benefits resulting to the persons interested in the premises so appropriated from the construction of the work for the purpose of making which such premises shall have been taken. 1 Rev. St. (8th Ed.) p. 731, § 46. According to a subsequent section, ‘the fee-simple of all premises so appropriated, in relation to which such estimate and appraisement shall have been made and recorded, shall be vested in the people of this state.’ Id. p. 732, § 52. Pursuant to the powers thus conferred, the lands in question were appropriated, but the plaintiff insists that, when the state takes the land in fee, even for a canal, the constitutional requirement as to just compensation can be satisfied only by a payment in money, as the state may subsequently abandon the canal, sell the land to a stranger, and thus deprive the owner both of the part taken and also of the benefits to the remainder. The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the proposition that, where land is so taken by the state, or by one of its political divisions pursuant to its authority, for public use, the benefits may be set off not only against the damages to the remainder, but also against the value of the part taken. Livingston v. Mayor, etc., 8 Wend. 85;Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308;Granger v. City of Syracuse, 38 How. Pr. 308;Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. Rep. 777; Betts v. City of Williamsburgh, 15 Barb. 255;Birdsall v. Cary, 66 How. Pr. 358.

It may be that as, according to the constitution in force when this land was appropriated, the state had no power to sell or dispose of any of its canals, the fee could be taken without making pecuniary compensation, even if the rule is otherwise in those cases where no restriction has been placed upon the power to sell. Const. 1821, art. 7, § 10. The benefits conferred would thus be subject only to the right of the people to amend the constitution, and all property interests are subject to that right, unless they are specially...