Eldridge v. Eldridge

• Decision Date: 08 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. W2000-00730-COA-R3-CV.,W2000-00730-COA-R3-CV.
• Citation: 137 S.W.3d 1
• Parties: Huntington ELDRIDGE, Jr. v. Deborah Marie West ELDRIDGE.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

137 S.W.3d 1

Huntington ELDRIDGE, Jr. v. Deborah Marie West ELDRIDGE.

No. W2000-00730-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Jackson.

May 21, 2002 Session.

August 8, 2002.

Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court March 10, 2003.

Kay Farese Turner, Melissa C. Berry, and Sam B. Blair, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Deborah Marie West Eldridge.

Wanda B. Shea, Lisa E. Circeo, and George Lawrence Rice, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Huntington Eldridge, Jr.

OPINION

DAVID R. FARMER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, J. and FRANKLIN MURCHISON, Sp. J., joined.

Husband filed for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Wife countersued on the same grounds. After a lengthy trial, the court awarded Husband the divorce. Wife appeals several aspects of the court's decision, including the distribution and classification of the parties' property, child support, and alimony. Wife also contends that the court was biased against her and created an appearance of impropriety. Husband also raises issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Huntington Eldridge, Jr. (Husband) and Deborah Marie West Eldridge (Wife) were married on June 11, 1983. At the time of the marriage, Wife owned a business in Chicago, Illinois. Husband worked for Ducks Unlimited and owned a substantial amount of separate assets. The couple had two minor children at the time of the divorce.

In 1993, the parties moved to Memphis in conjunction with Husband's employment. The couple's marriage, which had been stormy from the outset, began to suffer increasing difficulties. Husband and Wife separated, and thereafter, Husband filed for a divorce. In his complaint, Husband alleged that Wife was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and alleged that irreconcilable differences existed between the parties. Wife alleged the same grounds in her counter-complaint. Each party sought custody of the minor children.

The matter came to trial on October 25, 1999 and lasted until December 6, 1999. The court granted Husband the divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. After the court's ruling, the parties filed several post trial motions contesting various aspects of the court's decision. The court handed down its final post trial ruling on March 3, 2001. This appeal followed.

Wife raises several issues for our review. Within many of these issues, Wife lists other sub-issues. We will list Wife's central issues and address the sub-issues in turn. These issues, as stated by Wife, are as follows:

I. Whether the conduct of the Trial Court demonstrated by the evidentiary, procedural and ethical errors constituted bias against Wife and created the appearance of impropriety that tainted the Trial Court's rulings on each issue in this case and to the extent to require reversal and reassignment of [the] case to another trial court in [the] event of remand....

II. Whether the Trial Court erred in the division of marital property and marital debt....

III. Whether the Trial Court erred in the calculation and award of child support, both direct and indirect, for the parties' two minor children....

IV. Whether the Trial Court failed to make the proper award of alimony and order Husband to secure a life insurance policy to guarantee his alimony obligation.

V. Whether the Trial Court failed to properly weigh each party's relative fault in the breakup of the marriage and erred in granting the divorce to Husband on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct.

VI. Whether the Trial Court erred in assessing all of Wife's attorney fees and all court costs in the case against Wife when Wife stipulated on the record that both parties were entitled to a divorce on grounds but Husband refused to so stipulate and proceeded with four weeks' worth of cumulative evidence at trial on Wife's fault calculated for Wife's harassment, embarrassment and financial ruin.

VII. Whether the Trial Court erred by its failure to rule that the Order of Pendente Lite Support should have remained in effect until [the] entry of the Final Decree of Divorce on June 26, 2000.

To the extent these issues involve questions of fact, our review of the trial court's ruling is de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R.App.P. 13(d); e.g., Berryhill v. Rhodes, 21 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tenn.2000). We may not reverse the trial court's factual findings unless they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Id. With respect to the court's legal conclusions, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn.2000). Further, we give great weight to the factual findings of the trial court which rest on determinations of witness credibility. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn.1996). Accordingly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we will not re-evaluate a trial judge's assessment of witness credibility. Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn.1999).

The Conduct of the Trial Court

In Wife's first issue, she contends that the trial court was biased against her and that the case should be reversed due to the trial court's appearance of impropriety. Wife supports her argument by raising numerous sub-issues regarding various events, actions and decisions that took place during the trial of this matter.

At the outset, we restate one of the core principles of our jurisprudence: "all litigants have a right to have their cases heard by fair and impartial judges." Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). A trial judge must not only be impartial in fact, but must also be perceived to be impartial. Id. Accordingly, even if a trial judge believes that he or she can hear a case fairly and impartially, the judge is vested with the responsibility to recuse "himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Tenn. S.Ct. R. 10, Canon 3(E)(1); Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228.

Initially, the judge has the duty to determine whether recusal is warranted in a particular case. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228. These decisions are discretionary, unless otherwise mandated by the Tennessee Constitution or by statute. Id. See Tenn. Const. Art 6 § 11; Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (1994). A judge must be objective when making his or her determination. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228. Thus, when parties challenge a judge's impartiality, they "must come forward with some evidence that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Davis v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 23 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999).

The "objective view" of a judge's conduct is characterized by two important limitations. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). In order to disqualify a judge, the bias or prejudice must come from an extrajudicial source and not result from the judge's impressions during trial. Id. If this were not the case, a judge who makes a ruling adverse to one of the parties would be subject to charges of bias and prejudice. Id. Indeed, "adverse rulings by a trial court are not usually sufficient grounds to establish bias. Rulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification." Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821-22 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (citations omitted); But see Hoalcraft v. Smithson, No. M2000-01347-COAR10CV, 2001 WL 775602, *16, 2001 Tenn.App. LEXIS 489, at *50-54 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 10, 2001) (no perm. app. filed) (stating that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's "repeated misapplication of fundamental, rudimentary legal principles in ways that favored Mr. Smithson substantively and procedurally" prompts an objective concern regarding the judge's impartiality).

The other limitation concerns the judge's background experience. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d at 562. Disqualification is not warranted when the judge's impersonal prejudice arises from the judge's background experience. Id. Judges will generally have strong feelings about certain conduct and behavior. Id. "When the judge perceives that one party or the other has engaged in that conduct, the party should not be surprised that he/she has incurred the judge's wrath." Id.

Parties may lose the right to challenge a judge's impartiality if they do not file recusal motions soon after the facts forming the basis of the motion become known. Id. The frequently cited rule that "a party must complain and seek relief immediately after the occurrence of a prejudicial event and may not silently preserve the event as an `ace in the hole' to be used in the event of an adverse decision," applies in cases where a party challenges a judge's impartiality. Gotwald v. Gotwald, 768 S.W.2d 689, 694 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988); see also Davis, 23 S.W.3d at 313; Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228. Accordingly, the failure of a party to seek the recusal of a judge in a timely manner results in a waiver of the issue. Davis, 23 S.W.3d at 313.

Before addressing the merits of Wife's first issue, we must first address the timeliness of Wife's concerns regarding the trial judge's alleged bias and appearance of impropriety. Wife failed to question the trial judge's impartiality by filing a motion to recuse during the trial of this matter. The first time Wife raised the issue is in this appeal. After reviewing Wife's various allegations in support of her issue, it is clear that Wife was aware of the events that she alleges took place at trial before she filed her final notice of appeal on March 7, 2001. This compels the conclusion that Wife "purposely decided to use the impartiality issue as [her] `ace-in-the-hole' in the event that [she] lost the [trial] on the merits." Davis, 23 S.W.3d at 313. As we have previously stated, "[c]ourts frown upon the...