Eldridge v. Fell Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 April 1913 |
| Docket Number | 312 |
| Citation | 87 A. 966,240 Pa. 321 |
| Parties | Eldridge, Appellant, v. Fell Manufacturing Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 22, 1913
Appeal, No. 312, Jan. T., 1912, by plaintiffs, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Philadelphia Co., June T., 1909, No. 2556 refusing to take off nonsuit in case of Albert C. Eldridge and William C. Eldridge v. Fell Manufacturing Company. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before WILLSON P.J.
Plaintiff had his right hand injured on September 25, 1907, by the fall of a knife on a machine at which he was working in defendant company's factory.
When plaintiffs' witness, Herman H. Nast, was on the stand, he was asked:
Q. I notice in that statement you say something about a man named Katz operating this machine in addition to Eldridge, was there any complaint made to you, or did you hear of the machine having repeated with Katz while you were in the employ of the Fell Manufacturing Company as superintendent, prior to the happening of this accident?
Objected to. Objection sustained. Exception noted for plaintiff by direction of the court.
Q. Did Katz, who operated this machine, complain to you while you were employed by the Fell Manufacturing Company as superintendent, before the happening of this accident to Eldridge, that the machine had repeated on him?
Objected to. Objection sustained. Exception noted for plaintiff by direction of the court. (3)
When plaintiffs' witness, Joseph Koeschick, was on the stand he was asked:
Q. Had you heard a complaint made to Mr. Nast, while he was superintendent for the E.C. Fell Manufacturing Company, before the happening of this accident, that the machine had repeated?
Objected to. Objection sustained. Exception noted for plaintiff by direction of the court. (4)
The court directed a nonsuit which it subsequently, on motion, refused to take off.
Errors assigned were (1) refusal to remove nonsuit; (3, 4) rulings on evidence as above.
The first, third, and fourth assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed with a procedendo.
John R. K. Scott and William T. Connor, for appellants. -- The case was for the jury: Baker v. Allegheny Valley Ry. Co., 95 Pa. 211; Rapho v. Moore, 68 Pa. 404; Bier v. Standard Mfg. Co., 130 Pa. 446; McGuigan v. Beatty, 186 Pa. 329; Honifius v. Chambersburg Engineering Co., 196 Pa. 47; Dyer v. Bridge Co., 198 Pa. 182; Newton v. Vulcan Iron Co., 199 Pa. 646; Sharpley v. Wright, 205 Pa. 253.
Maurice W. Sloan, for appellee.
Before FELL, C.J., MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
We think the court erred in excluding the testimony which is the subject of the third and fourth assignments of error and, therefore, those assignments must be sustained. The evidence was not offered to prove that the spring was defective but to bring home notice to the defendant company of the defect in the machine. It was incumbent on the plaintiff to show not only that the spring was defective and caused the injuries of which he complained, but also that the defendant company had notice of the defect or that by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence the company could have discovered it. It was for the purpose of showing such notice that the excluded testimony was offered. Nast was a vice-principal and his knowledge was the knowledge of the company. The testimony offered tended to show not only that the machine was defective but that the defect was in the spring, the part of the machine which the plaintiff alleges was defective and caused his injuries. If we understand the offers they were for the purpose of showing by the vice-principal himself that prior to the accident complaint was made to him that the knife had "repeated" or fallen on former occasions; and by another witness that he had heard the same complaint made to the vice-principal. The plaintiff, Albert C. Eldridge, a boy of nineteen years of age, was, at the time of the accident, operating an automatic paper cutting machine. The knife, when elevated above the table, was held in place by a spring. By the agency of a lever on the right hand side of the machine the knife was brought down and cut the paper. It then went back automatically to its elevated position and was held there by the spring until the operator again brought it down by the use of the lever. Whether it remained suspended or not depended upon the spring. If the spring was in good condition and strong enough to perform its duty, the knife remained suspended. If, for any reason, the spring became weak or was out of order in any way and failed to perform its function, the knife would drop and endanger the person operating the machine. The plaintiff claims that his injuries were caused by the defendant allowing the machine to be in a dangerous, insecure, and unsafe condition "in that the catch or device holding the knife was allowed to be out of order."
From the evidence it appeared that the spring of which the plaintiff complains had been in use at least four years. Nast was in the service of the company for about four years prior to the accident. He was the plaintiff's superior and had charge of the work. It was his duty to see that the machine was kept in proper repair. He testified that there had been no inspection of the machine or of the spring during the time he was in the employ of the company, that on one occasion the knife had "repeated" or fallen twice, that the day after the accident he examined the spring and found it in a weak condition, that it was the condition of the spring that caused the accident, and that the knife would not "repeat" or fall so long as the spring was strong enough to hold the mechanism in place. He further testified that when the machine was in good condition or good repair the knife would not drop down the second time or "repeat." After this evidence had been introduced the plaintiff made the offers to show that complaint was made to the defendant's superintendent that the spring was weak and the knife had been "repeating." The evidence was certainly competent for the purpose for which it was offered. The information brought to the superintendent put him on notice of the condition of the spring and it was his duty, representing the company, to make an inspection of the machine. The employer is required not only to furnish his employee reasonably safe...
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