Eldridge v. May

• Decision Date: 01 May 1930
• Citation: 150 A. 378
• Parties: ELDRIDGE v. MAY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

150 A. 378

ELDRIDGE

v. MAY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 1, 1930.

On motion from Superior Court, Penobscot County.

Action by Emma J. Eldridge, as administratrix of the estate of Amos L. Eldridge, deceased, against Annie B. May. Judgment for plaintiff. On general motion of defendant for a new trial.

Motion overruled.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, and FARRINGTON, JJ.

Cyrus Small, of Caribou, and Nathaniel Tompkins, of Houlton, for plaintiff.

Adolphus Crawford, Jr., of Houlton, and Hinckley, Hinckley & Shesong, of Portland, for defendant.

STURGIS, J.

General motion for a new trial in action by the plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of her husband, Amos L. Eldridge, late of Ossipee, N. H., to recover moneys in the possession of his sister, the defendant, claimed to have been paid her by the deceased under an agreement for his support and maintenance.

The declaration is in assumpsit for money had and received, with specifications, filed under rule XI, setting out, as matters to be proved, that the plaintiff's intestate, having $8,537.15 on deposit in the savings departments of five banks, withdrew all of the moneys, and the defendant, by undue influence, wrongfully and fraudulently obtained possession of the moneys and appropriated them to her own use.

The defendant pleaded the general issue with a brief statement denying the plaintiff's allegations of undue influence and fraud, and saying that she is the owner of the moneys withdrawn from the banks under a contract for support and maintenance made with her brother on November 6, 1928.

At the trial below. the case turned on the validity of this contract. The moneys in question admittedly came into the defendant's possession. Her rights under this contract are her only defense to this suit. The contract reads:

"This memorandum of an agreement made and entered into this sixth day of November, A. D. 1928, by and between Amos L. Eldridge, formerly of Ossipee in the State of New Hampshire, now of Island Falls in the County of Aroostook in the State of Maine, and Annie B. May of said Island Falls:

"Witnesseth: That whereas the said Eldridge has this day assigned, transferred, granted, set-over, and delivered to the said May all of his personal estate and chattels of any and every name and nature, whatsoever, in the State of Maine, including all deposits of money in any banking institution in said States of Maine and New Hampshire belonging to said Eldridge, to have and to hold to her, the said Annie B. May, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, forever.

"Now, therefore, the said Annie B. May, for and in consideration of the aforesaid grant to her by the said Eldridge, does hereby agree with the said Eldridge, that she and her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, will well and truly support and maintain him, the said Eldridge, in some suitable and proper place to be designated by her, for and during the term of his natural life, and him provide with food, drink, lodging, and clothing, suited to his degree and station in life, also with proper medicine, medical attendance, and nursing whenever required; and that she will treat him at all times with courtesy, kindness, and consideration, and at his death cause him to be decently interred in the cemetery at said Ossipee where his father and mother are buried."

This action for money had and received is equitable in spirit and purpose. It lies for money obtained through fraud, duress, extortion, imposition, or any other taking of undue advantage of the situation of the plaintiff's intestate. If the defendant is proved to have in her possession money which in equity and good conscience she ought to refund, the law will conclusively presume that she has promised to do so. Mayo v. Purington, 113 Me. 452, 94 A. 935. As a general rule, any set of facts which would, in a court of equity, entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the money here in question, if that were the specific relief sought, will entitle her to recover it in an action for money had and received. Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 313, 98 A. 929. This action is governed by equitable principles.

Fraud in equity includes all willful or intentional acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of either legal or equitable duty, a trust or confidence, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken over another. 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (3d Ed.) § 873; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 187.

Undue influence is a species of constructive fraud, and the doctrine of equity concerning it is very broad. Whenever two persons have come into such a relation that confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage, although the transaction could not have been impeached, if no such confidential relation had existed. The principle extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side and a resulting superiority or influence on the other. Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 956.

The term "fiduciary or confidential relation," as used in the law relative to undue influence, is a very broad one. It embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in and relies upon another. The relations and duties involved in it need not be legal, but may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 956; 2 Words and Phrases, Second Series, page 529.

And the rule seems to be that, whenever a fiduciary or confidential relation exists between the parties to a deed, gift, contract, or the like, the law implies a condition of superiority held by one of the parties over the other, so that in every transaction between them, by which the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises a presumption of undue influence, and casts upon that party the burden of proof to show affirmatively his compliance with equitable requisites and of entire fairness on his part and freedom of the other from undue influence. Burnham v. Heselton, 82 Me. 495, 20 A. 80, 9 L. R. A. 90; Connor v. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 14 P. 306, 1 Am. St. Rep. 84; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188; Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91, 31 Am. Rep. 428; Gugel v. Hiscox, 138 App. Div. 61, 122 N. Y. S. 557; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 956; 6 R. C. L. 637.

This rule has been often applied to transactions between brothers and sisters, brothers and brothers, and sisters and sisters. Their relations may be of such reciprocal confidence as to cast upon either the burden of proof to show the exact fairness of a transaction between them by which either is benefited. In such cases where this burden has not been sustained, equity has set the transaction aside. Merriam v. Jones, 126 Me. 130, 136 A. 667; Million v. Taylor, 38 Ark. 428; Gillespie v. Holland, 40 Ark. 28, 48 Am. Rep. 1; More v. More, 133 Cal. 489, 65 P. 1044, 66 P. 76; Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head (Tenn.) 289, 299; Todd v. Grove, supra; Shevlin v. Shevlin, 96 Minn. 398, 105 N. W. 257; Thornton v. Ogden, 32 N. J. Eq. 725; Watkins v. Brant, 46 Wis. 419, 1 N. W. 82.

Even a summary of the evidence must be unduly long. The record is voluminous, and the story of the defendant's relations with her brother must be drawn from a series of events and circumstances covering a somewhat lengthy period. The case comes forward on a motion for a new trial. The single question is whether the jury, upon the evidence presented to them, with an opportunity to measure the credibility of witnesses as they appeared upon the stand, and weigh the conflict of testimony as they heard it, were manifestly wrong in their verdict for the plaintiff. It is only necessary, therefore, to determine whether facts and inferences are disclosed by the evidence which, under the rules of law applicable, justify the verdict. We have read and considered the evidence with care, and are of opinion that the jury were warranted in the following conclusions:

Amos L. Eldridge, the plaintiff's husband and intestate, in 1928, lived with her at Ossipee, N. H. He owned his home, but, outside of that, the moneys here in question represented his entire life's savings. He was 73 years of age, broken in health, and somewhat enfeebled in mind. He had valvular disease of the heart and kidney trouble. Dropsy had set in, and his legs had become swollen and ulcerated. He was at times helpless, and at all times in a serious condition. His physician testifies that it was uncertain whether he would live for a day or for months, and says that he had become childish and fretty, and there was a degeneration of his mental faculties.

The defendant was a younger sister who formerly had lived with her brother at their old home in Ossipee. In those years she was in her brother's closest confidence, writing his letters, handling his moneys, and making his deposits in the bank. They both had married, she moving to Island Falls, Me., to live with her husband, Levi H. May, and he staying in Ossipee with his wife in a new home which he had acquired.

In August, 1928, Mrs. May visited her brother in Ossipee, and, unbeknown to his wife, invited him to come to Maine and live with her, although she was advised by his physician that such a removal was risky and would be detrimental to him. She was then advised as to his condition and the uncertainty of his life.

In October, 1928, Mrs. May secretly arranged a meeting with Mr. Eldridge at the home of an older sister, Julia Wormwood, who lived in Rochester, N. H. Mr. Eldridge was brought to Rochester on October 24th by a neighbor, stating to his wife as he left home that he was going down to...