Elene H. v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 02 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. B039807,B039807
• Citation: 220 Cal.App.3d 1445,269 Cal.Rptr. 783
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ELENE H. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 783

269 Cal.Rptr. 783

220 Cal.App.3d 1445

ELENE H. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B039807.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 2, 1990.

Burge and Strid and Lawrence A. Strid, Fountain Valley, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Morris, Polich & Purdy, Robert S. Wolfe, Steven D. Manning, Douglas J. Collodel, and Beth A. Kahn, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

TAYLOR, ^* Associate Justice.

By first amended complaint, plaintiff Elene H., acting individually and as guardian ad litem for her minor children, Christopher and Jennifer, sought damages under 42 United States Code section 1983, alleging violation of federal civil rights, in connection with a child abuse investigation. ¹

Named as defendants were three employees of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, deputy sheriffs Dan Dohner, Gilbert Callahan and Joyce Homes Jablonsky. ²

The three defendants answered the complaint and sought summary judgment, asserting both absolute and qualified immunities for their conduct. Plaintiff opposed summary judgment. After hearing, the trial court awarded defendants summary judgment on the ground that the defendants were entitled to both absolute and qualified immunity from civil suit.

Judgment was entered on February 10, 1989. Plaintiff filed a premature notice of appeal from the trial court's minute order of January 6, 1989. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2(c), we deem the notice of appeal taken from the subsequently entered judgment and review on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Tuesday, May 7, 1985, nine-year-old Christopher H. was attending Laurel Elementary School in Whittier, California. The child was in the third grade. He had been absent from school on Monday, the previous day, purportedly because he had "overslept." When he appeared on Tuesday, his teacher observed bruises around both of his eyes and on his face. She sent him to the school nurse.

The school nurse, Patricia Lee, examined Christopher's face, concluded there was a possibility of child abuse, and contacted Carmen Navarro, a social worker for Los Angeles County. Navarro also observed Christopher's physical condition and asked Christopher what had caused it. Christopher told her he had been hit by a tennis The social worker called the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, which dispatched two deputies, Dohner and Callahan, to the school. Both the social worker and the school nurse expressed the opinion to the deputies that the child's injuries could be due to child abuse.

ball while playing during the previous weekend.

Each of the deputies talked to Christopher alone. Each of the deputies noted that Christopher had "black eyes," eyes surrounded by colored bruises. In addition, there were lateral bruise lines running from the left eye to the child's temple, as well as scratches on his nose. Christopher told the story about the tennis ball, and then added that he had also been slapped by his sister Jennifer, aged 14 months.

Both deputies noticed that when discussing his bruises, Christopher spoke hesitantly, refusing to make eye contact; in contrast, when discussing school or sports, Christopher was relaxed and talkative.

Deputy Callahan thought Christopher was hiding something or protecting someone; he did not believe that the bruises had been caused by either a tennis ball or by Christopher's infant sister. Christopher expressed to Deputy Callahan his fear of punishment by his mother for the "trouble" he was causing.

The deputies formed the opinion that Christopher was a victim of child abuse and took him and his sister into custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 305, subdivision (a). ³

The children were taken to La Mirada Hospital where they were examined by an emergency room physician, Dr. Vega, who also thought Christopher had been physically abused. Both children were temporarily detained, Christopher in foster care and Jennifer at MacLaren Hall.

On Wednesday, May 9, 1985, Deputy Joyce Jablonsky, who specialized in child abuse investigation, was assigned to the case by the sheriff's department. She reviewed the complaint report prepared by Deputy Callahan and interviewed Christopher at the foster home where she examined his face. Christopher still had purplish bruises around his eyes.

Christopher told Jablonsky his grandmother had put ice on his face after the "tennis ball" incident. Deputy Jablonsky interviewed Christopher's grandmother, who denied any knowledge about the "tennis ball" incident or having treated Christopher with ice. She did state that Christopher might have been injured on Sunday night during an altercation between the child and his mother, which occurred when Christopher refused to help with the dishes.

Deputy Jablonsky also interviewed Christopher's mother, who denied that Christopher had had any facial bruises or marks on Monday, when he was home from school. Christopher's mother said she knew nothing about the "tennis ball" incident, but conceded that the child might have sustained slight injury from her Sunday night dispute with him.

Deputy Jablonsky talked to the school nurse, Patricia Lee. Ms. Lee told the deputy she did not believe that Christopher's injuries had been caused by a tennis ball.

Deputy Jablonsky was particularly concerned that Christopher had received no medical attention for his eyes until he returned to school. She believed that it was unlikely that two adults, Christopher's mother and grandmother, with whom he and Jennifer lived, would have seen him for over 24 hours and not noticed the injuries to his face; Christopher's mother and grandmother both denied that the boy had black eyes. Deputy Jablonsky was of the The children were in protective custody for eight days and were released home to their mother. Thereafter, the mother brought this action on behalf of herself and the children against the three deputy sheriffs involved in the investigation. As indicated, the trial court held that the deputy sheriffs' conduct was immunized and awarded them summary judgment.

opinion that there was sufficient legal cause to recommend the commencement of juvenile dependency proceedings for both children, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 (operative until Jan. 1, 1989), subdivision (d) and 305, subdivision (a), and so informed the appropriate child welfare officers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment procedure is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense thereto.... The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.... The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

As the California Supreme Court explained in Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35-36, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134, "[t]he summary judgment procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution. [Citation.] Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no issue of fact to be tried. [Citation.] 'The moving party bears the burden of furnishing supporting documents that establish that the claims of the adverse party are entirely without merit on any legal theory.' [Citation.] 'The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion.' [Citation.] ... '[I]ssue finding rather than issue determination is the pivot upon which the summary judgment law turns.' [Citation.]"

Both the trial court and a reviewing court are guided by the principles of summary judgment procedure set forth above, but the reviewing court conducts independent review of the trial court's resolution of questions of law. The instant case turns on resolving such questions; since it involves a federally-derived cause of action and the asserted immunity of local law enforcement officials, federal law governs. (Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481; see particularly, fn. 8.)

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs contend that the materials presented to the trial court showed that the level of Christopher's injuries when taken into protective custody was in dispute, and thus there was a triable issue of fact which should have precluded summary judgment. In addition, plaintiffs point out that there was also a factual dispute about the contents of the interview that Deputy Sheriff Jablonsky had with Christopher's grandmother and that this too raised a factual issue about the reasonableness of the deputy sheriffs' conduct during this investigation.

Defendants contend that their conduct was totally immunized and, if not totally immunized, was within the range of qualified immunity for law enforcement officers recognized by federal law. (Malley v. Briggs (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271; Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523.)

We address these issues, dealing with the asserted immunity of the deputies first.

DISCUSSION

I.

The defendants claim absolute immunity, citing the recent case of Jenkins v. County It is true in California that state law confers not only the mandatory duty to report possible child abuse on certain individuals but imposes criminal sanctions against them if they do not discharge that duty. (Pen.Code, §§ 11166, 111...