Eley v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 22 August 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11-309 (BAH)
• Citation: 201 F.Supp.3d 150
• Parties: Wilma ELEY, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

201 F.Supp.3d 150

Wilma ELEY, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11-309 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed August 22, 2016

Douglas Tyrka, Tyrka & Associates, LLC, McLean, VA, for Plaintiff.

Aaron Josiah Finkhousen, Laura George, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, Chief Judge

This case returns to the Court for reconsideration of the reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs the plaintiff, Wilma Eley, is entitled to recover after prevailing on her claim that the District of Columbia denied her child a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. After vacating the original fee award approved by this Court, and clarifying the plaintiff's burden in demonstrating that the reimbursement rates she proposes are reasonable, the D.C. Circuit remanded the present action to allow the Court to consider whether the plaintiff has met this burden. As a result, again pending before the Court is the plaintiff's request for reimbursement of the fees and costs she incurred in litigating both her initial complaint and her present fee request. Pl.'s Mot. Fees & Costs ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECF No. 26. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural history underlying the present dispute is fully set out in this Court's prior Memorandum Opinion addressing the plaintiff's fee request, as well as the D.C. Circuit's reversal of that decision, see Eley v. District of Columbia ("Eley I "), 999 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C.2013), vacated and remanded , 793 F.3d 97 (D.C.Cir.2015), and will be summarized here only briefly.

After the District failed to identify a public school placement capable of providing her child with the special education services he required during the 2010–2011 school year, the plaintiff enrolled her child in a private school and filed an IDEA administrative due process complaint seeking reimbursement of the cost of tuition at that school. Id. at 143. In August 2012, this Court found that the District violated the IDEA by denying the plaintiff's child a FAPE, and ordered the District to reimburse the plaintiff for the tuition costs she incurred in securing an alternative private placement. Id. at 143–44.

Having prevailed on her administrative due process complaint, the plaintiff sought reimbursement of attorneys' fees and costs she incurred in pursuing her successful claim. Pl.'s Mot. Specifically, the plaintiff sought reimbursement for her attorneys' time at rates provided by a version of the familiar Laffey fee matrix that is updated using the Legal Services Index ("LSI") component of the nationwide Consumer Price Index, a matrix commonly referred to as the "Salazar /LSI Matrix." Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. Fees & Costs at 8 ("Pl.'s Mem."), ECF No. 26.¹ In total, the plaintiff initially sought reimbursement of $62,225.00 in fees and costs incurred as of January 18, 2013, which total was comprised of: (1) $60,937.50 in attorneys' fees, including 91.75 hours billed in connection with her underlying administrative action and 5.75 hours billed in connection with the preparation of her initial fee petition, at an hourly rate of $625.00; (2) $937.50 for three hours of her attorneys' travel time, for which the plaintiff sought reimbursement at an hourly rate of $312.50; and (3) $350 in litigation costs. In support of her requested reimbursement rate, the plaintiff presented the following evidence to demonstrate that her requested reimbursement rate was reasonable: (1) a declaration from her attorney describing his experience litigating IDEA cases and his practice of charging paying clients at rates comparable to those set out in the Salazar /LSI Matrix; and (2) a declaration from the economist who developed the Salazar /LSI Matrix and identified four cases in which this Court and another federal court used that matrix to calculate reasonable fee awards. Eley I , 999 F.Supp.2d at 150, 156.

In response, the District argued that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of no more than $749.25, reflecting both a reduction in the total number of hours billed by the plaintiff's attorney and a proposed hourly reimbursement rate of $90, which corresponds to the rate awarded to attorneys appointed by the D.C. Superior Court to represent "indigent client[ ]s in Family Court matters" under D.C. law. See Def.'s Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. Fees & Costs ("Def.'s Opp'n") at 13, 15–16, ECF No. 27. With the District contesting both the number of hours billed by the plaintiff's attorney, as well as the rate at which the plaintiff would be reimbursed for that time, the dispute was referred to a Magistrate Judge for initial resolution of the plaintiff's motion. See Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 32.

On August 29, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") granting in part and denying in part the plaintiff's motion. See R&R, ECF No. 34. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the plaintiff be fully reimbursed for the hours billed by her attorney at a rate equivalent to seventy-five percent of the hourly rate provided by the USAO Laffey Matrix. Id. at 10. After both parties timely objected, Pl.'s Obj. R&R, ECF No. 35; Def.'s Obj. R&R, ECF No. 36, this Court sustained the plaintiff's objections and granted the plaintiff's motion in full. Eley I , 999 F.Supp.2d at 166. Concluding that the plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to justify her requested fee award, the Court held that both the number of hours billed by the plaintiff's attorney and the plaintiff's request for reimbursement based on the Salazar /LSI Matrix were reasonable and ordered the defendant to pay all of the attorneys' fees and litigation costs sought by the plaintiff in her initial fee petition. Id.

The District timely appealed this final award on December 19, 2013. Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 44. Before the D.C. Circuit, the District abandoned all but one of its challenges to the plaintiff's motion, leaving as "its sole objection on appeal" the contention that the plaintiff failed to justify her request for reimbursement using the Salazar /LSI Matrix. Eley , 793 F.3d at 99. Thus, the Circuit set about to determine whether the plaintiff sustained her burden of justifying her requested reimbursement rate. Id. The Circuit began by broadly reiterating the two-step burden-shifting analysis first laid out in Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995). Under this framework, "the 'fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates,' and the opposing party remains 'free to rebut a fee claim.' " Eley , 793 F.3d at 100 (Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107–08 ).

Focusing on the first of these two steps, the Circuit began by explaining that fee matrices serve as a " 'useful starting point' in calculating the prevailing market rate" in a particular jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109 ). The Circuit emphasized, however, that a fee applicant must "produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to her attorney's own affidavits—that [her] requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ). Beyond a fee matrix, such evidence may include, inter alia , "surveys to update [the matrix]; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases; and evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable qualifications handling similar cases." Id. at 101 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109 ).

Under this standard, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiff did not meet her burden, emphasizing that she failed to present "evidence that her 'requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services,' i.e., IDEA litigation." Id. at 104 (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109 ). Specifically, the Circuit explained that the "prevailing market evidence proffered by both sides (save for the competing Laffey Matrices and [the plaintiff's] lawyer's billing information) consist[ed] solely of awards made by other district courts." Id. at 104 n. 5. Reviewing these submissions, the Circuit observed that none of the prior fee awards cited by the plaintiff arose from an IDEA proceeding. Id. at 104. By contrast, the Circuit explained that the District identified more than forty IDEA cases in this jurisdiction in which prevailing plaintiffs were reimbursed at hourly rates below those supplied by the Salazar /LSI Matrix. Id. Thus, the Circuit concluded that, on the record then before it, the plaintiff "ha[d] not met her burden of 'justifying the reasonableness of the rates,' " id. (quoting Covington , 57 F.3d at 1107 ), and this Court erred in "relieving [the plaintiff] of [that] burden," id. at 105.

Having concluded that the plaintiff failed in her initial fee application to demonstrate that her requested reimbursement rate was reasonable, the Circuit vacated this Court's original fee award and remanded this action for further proceedings. Id. In so doing, however, the Eley Court expressly declined to decide whether, as a matter of law, successful IDEA claimants may receive reimbursement at rates provided under the Salazar /LSI Matrix, the less-generous USAO Laffey Matrix or at some other rate altogether. Id. Nevertheless, in a brief concurrence, one Judge on the Eley panel expressed his view that the USAO Laffey Matrix "is appropriate for IDEA cases." Id. (Kavanaugh, J.,...