Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) and No. 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control

Decision Date23 October 1995
Docket NumberNos. 940105,940197,s. 940105
Citation905 P.2d 1189
PartiesELKS LODGES NO. 719 (OGDEN) AND NO. 2021 (MOAB), Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, Respondent. MOOSE LODGES # 259 (SALT LAKE CITY) AND # 2031 (TOOELE), Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, Respondent.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

P. Keith Nelson, Christian W. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for the Elks.

Harold G. Christensen, Richard A. Van Wagoner, Salt Lake City, for the Moose.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Frank D. Mylar, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Earl F. Dorius, for Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.

DURHAM, Justice:

This case is a consolidation of separate petitions filed by two Elks lodges and by two Moose lodges, both seeking review of orders of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. Because petitioners raise identical claims, we consider them together. Differences between petitioners will be discussed in the analysis portion of this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE BELOW

On August 19, 1993, the Commission of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC) served notice on twelve Elks lodges, two Moose lodges, and two other private clubs that the organizations, each of which possessed a private club liquor license issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-101 to -108, would be subject to formal DABC action for failing to comply with agency directives prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender. These directives provided that clubs discriminating in their membership policies would not be allowed to maintain state liquor licenses. The DABC issued these directives to clubs which it believed to be practicing illegal discrimination after this Court's decision in Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513 (Utah 1993). In Beynon, we held that the Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (UCRA), proscribing discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin, applied to the St. George-Dixie Elks Lodge notwithstanding its status as a "private" club. Id. at 518.

Upon receiving notice from the DABC of forthcoming hearings, two clubs summarily amended their bylaws and signed statements that the clubs would not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or gender in their membership policies. Formal hearings were scheduled to investigate whether the other clubs were in violation of DABC policy, specifically, whether the clubs complied with the UCRA.

A formal evidentiary hearing was held before the DABC on October 22, 1993, to determine whether the Elks clubs violated DABC directives to end the above-described discrimination. At or before this hearing, three Elks lodges voluntarily surrendered their private club liquor licenses to the DABC and began leasing a portion of their premises to newly formed clubs which do not discriminate in their membership policies, with the understanding that these clubs would apply for state liquor licenses. At the hearing, the DABC determined that the remaining nine Elks lodges were in violation of DABC directives to end discriminatory membership policies. On November 19, 1993, the DABC signed a final order suspending the liquor licenses of the nine Elks lodges. Seven of the nine Elks lodges eventually surrendered their liquor licenses, while the remaining two, the Elks petitioners in this case, lodged a petition for a writ of review with the Utah Court of Appeals.

The DABC also conducted formal hearings in January 1994 to determine whether the Moose lodges in question were in compliance with DABC directives. Following the formal hearings, the DABC entered an order suspending the liquor licenses of both Moose lodges on January 28, 1994, on the basis that the membership practices of the Moose were discriminatory. On February 25, 1994, the Moose lodges filed a review request with the Utah Court of Appeals. These petitions have been transferred to this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(b) of the Utah Code.

Petitioners in both cases are private, nonprofit fraternal organizations. The Elks and Moose lodges involved in this proceeding are units of national orders of Elks and Moose clubs. As such, they are required by club charter to abide by the rules and bylaws of the national organizations. The Elks and Moose lodges prohibit women from membership in their organizations. However, they do allow women to become members of auxiliary units of the lodges, known respectively as Ladies of the Elks and Women of the Moose. Ladies of the Elks is an auxiliary comprised of female relatives of local Elks lodge members. Women of the Moose is broken into two separate groups: The Home Chapter of Women of the Moose, members of which are not related to Moose members, and Women of the Moose, members of which may or may not be related to Moose members. Pursuant to club charters and bylaws, women may not vote or participate in the governance of the Elks and Moose lodges or in the governance of the private liquor clubs established within these lodges.

Each of the petitioning lodges has been issued private-club liquor licenses pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-101 to -108. These licenses are held by lodge units which prohibit female members. Therefore, these lodges prohibit women from becoming members of their respective private liquor clubs; even women who are auxiliary unit members are considered guests of the liquor club. For instance, the Rules and Regulations for Private Club Operation promulgated by the general House Committee of the Loyal Order of Moose state that a "qualified guest" of the private club is defined, inter alia, as "a member of good standing of the Women of the Moose." Those rules also indicate that women who are family members of Moose members or the "ladyfriend" of a Moose member must leave the club (as must all prospective male Moose members) when the sponsoring Moose member leaves. However, at each lodge, women who are deemed "qualified guests" are allowed access to the social quarters where liquor is sold and are allowed to purchase liquor.

A. Complaints

The Elks and Moose lodges seek review on several grounds of the DABC's decision to suspend their liquor licenses. First, petitioners attack the constitutionality of both the UCRA and the various alcoholic beverage control acts on the ground that they facially violate petitioners' freedom of association by purporting to regulate private organizations. They next argue that these acts are unconstitutional as applied to petitioners because they condition the grant of a state-endowed privilege (a liquor license) upon the voluntary relinquishment of petitioners' constitutional rights (the right of free association). They also argue that the acts involved are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Finally, they argue that the DABC's finding that petitioners discriminated against women is clearly erroneous because no woman has either applied for or subsequently been denied membership in their specific lodges. They also argue that because women are allowed to purchase liquor at their clubs, there has been no act of discrimination to warrant the DABC's decision to suspend their licenses.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because this court is asked to review the decision of a state administrative agency, the standard by which we review the decision is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22. Regardless of the standard of review the court uses, UAPA requires that no decision of an administrative agency be altered by an appellate court unless the party seeking review has been "substantially prejudiced" by the agency's actions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). Apprised of that threshold, we review agency decisions based on the following model:

In reviewing an agency's factual findings, we will affirm them only if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); see also Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Such findings "will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). We have defined "substantial evidence" as the "quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).

Challenging an agency's findings of fact, then, imposes a marshaling burden on the petitioner. A party seeking to overturn a commission's factual findings must marshal all of the evidence supporting those findings and demonstrate that despite such evidence, those factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence from the record. Kennecott, 858 P.2d at 1385.

This court applies differing standards of review to an agency's legal interpretations. First, where the legislature has explicitly or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate deference standard of review is applied. See Zissi v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 & n. 2 (Utah 1992). And second, where there is no explicit delegation of discretion and the issues are questions of constitutional law and statutory construction, we review the agency's decision for correctness. Id.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Freedom of Association

Petitioners argue that the DABC's decision to suspend their liquor licenses for failure to allow women full membership rights in their organizations violates their right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and under article I, sections 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution. 1 This court has already held that a private club's liquor license may be suspended for discriminating against women without encroaching upon the club members' rights of association. In Beynon v. St....

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