Ellena v. State of California

• Decision Date: 22 April 1977
• Citation: 69 Cal.App.3d 245,138 Cal.Rptr. 110
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: John B. ELLENA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 17150.

Page 110

138 Cal.Rptr. 110

69 Cal.App.3d 245

John B. ELLENA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 17150.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

April 22, 1977.

Hearing Denied July 6, 1977.

Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, Ralph Golub, San Francisco, Keith S. Humpherys and Ronald E. Stewart, Chico, and Thomas A. Seaton, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant

Harry S. Fenton, Chief Counsel, Sacramento, Joseph A. Montoya, Deputy Chief Counsel, Robert L. Meyer, Robert W. Vidor, Los Angeles, and Jack M. Miller, La Habra, for defendant and respondent.

OPINION

TAMURA, Associate Justice.

By a 1967 stipulated judgment in condemnation, the State of California acquired parcels of land across plaintiff's property for the construction of a segment of a freeway. During a prolonged 1969 rainstorm, plaintiff's property suffered considerable flood damage; the freeway fill acted as a dam and the accumulated surface waters discharged through the freeway drainage system outletting on plaintiff's remaining property caused substantial erosion and channeling. Plaintiff ¹ brought the instant action for damages alleging two causes of action: The first charged that the flood damage was caused by the design, construction and maintenance of the freeway improvements and the second alleged that the damages were the proximate result of the negligent design, construction and maintenance of the public improvements. The state interposed a number of defenses, including the defense that the stipulated judgment in the eminent domain action was res judicata and precluded plaintiff from recovering on his complaint.

The trial was bifurcated and the res judicata defense was tried first to the court without a jury. Following an extended evidentiary hearing, the trial judge rendered a memorandum of intended decision holding that 'the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel' precluded plaintiff from recovering for the flood damage to his land. The court directed counsel for the state to prepare the judgment unless findings were requested. Findings were not requested and the court signed and entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment.

The central issue on this appeal is whether the prior stipulated judgment in condemnation precluded plaintiff from maintaining the instant action. We have concluded that the trial judge's determination that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded plaintiff from recovering on his complaint must be upheld.

FACTS

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, as we must, the facts may be summarized as follows:

Property In The Before Condition

Plaintiff's property is on an alluvial fan which lies between Cajon Creek and Lytle Creek at the base of the foothills of the San Gabriel Mountains. The configuration of the property may be roughly visualized as the letter 'A' imposed above the letter 'U', with the apex of the A pointing in a northwesterly direction and the external lines of the A and U as representing the base of the surrounding foothills. ² The crossbar of the A represents the approximate location of the freeway segment crossing plaintiff's property. Generally the area within the letter A drains from west to east and the area represented by the U from east to west. Where the two areas join, the drainage is generally from north to south into the Lytle Creek wash area. The property has been used for many years as a vineyard.

The surface waters flowing across the alluvial fan represented by the letter A are not confined to definite water courses but flow along shifting, tangled veins varying in location, depth and width from storm to storm.

The Public Improvements And The Condemnation Action

In 1963 the state made a hydrological study to define the water shed area above the proposed freeway and thereafter prepared detailed plans for the freeway and appurtenant improvements. The plans provided for an elevated freeway across plaintiff's property accomplished by cuts and fills and included four drainage structures to convey surface waters under the freeway and onto plaintiff's remaining property. From south to north along the freeway segment across plaintiff's property, the drainage structures consisted of the following: A 30-inch CMP, a 54-inch CMP, a 24-inch CMP, and a 12 by 6 foot RCB. ³

In the spring of 1966 a state right of way agent met with Mr. Ellena and showed him the right of way maps, the location of the freeway cut and fill areas, and advised him of the proposed drainage facilities.

In August 1966 the state filed its eminent domain action (People v. Swertfeger, S.B. Superior Court No. 132939) to acquire lands from plaintiff and others for the construction of the freeway. The right of way maps attached to the complaint showed the location and size of the proposed freeway drainage facilities. Plaintiff filed an answer to the complaint in which he claimed $178,000 as the value of the land taken and $376,000 as severance damages.

In March 1967 the state commenced construction of the freeway and the last drainage structure was completed in October 1967. On December 20, 1967, a stipulated judgment in condemnation was entered adjudging 'that the just compensation to be paid for the taking of (plaintiff's property) is the sum of $155,765' together with interest. On the same day the state deposited the award with the court and obtained a final order of condemnation.

The 1969 Flood Damage

In January and February 1969 there was an unusually heavy and prolonged rainstorm in the area which saturated the soil and resulted in heavy runoffs from the surrounding hillsides. The concentrated flow through the freeway drainage facilities caused considerable erosion and channeling on plaintiff's property below the drainage outlets. In addition, a wing of the 12 by 6 foot RCB was damaged, some of the smaller drainage pipes were blocked by silt, and a portion of Devore Road which had been relocated by the state and which traversed plaintiff's property to the northwest of the freeway was washed out.

The state presented expert witnesses who testified that the damage to plaintiff's property by reason of the construction of the freeway and drainage facilities as proposed was reasonably foreseeable in 1967 when the parties entered into a stipulated judgment.

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff urges: (1) Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude him from maintaining his action because the claimed damages (a) resulted from the failure of the public improvements to operate in the manner proposed and (b) were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the stipulated judgment was entered and (2) the court erroneously excluded extrinsic evidence offered to show that the parties intended to stipulate only as to the value of the land taken but not as to severance damages. ⁴ From the ensuing discussion we have concluded that plaintiff's attacks upon the judgment must fail.

I

At the outset we review some of the legal principles involved in this appeal.

There are two aspects to the res judicata effect of a final judgment on the merits: (1) The judgment bars the parties (or those in privity with them) from litigating the same cause of action in a subsequent proceeding and (2) the parties (or those in privity with them) are collaterally estopped from litigating in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any issue actually litigated and determined in the former proceedings. (In re Russell, 12 Cal.3d 229, 233, 115 Cal.Rptr. 511, 524 P.2d 1295; Busick v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 7 Cal.3d 967, 972--973, 104 Cal.Rptr. 42, 500 P.2d 1386; Martin v. Martin, 2 Cal.3d 752, 758, 87 Cal.Rptr. 526, 470 P.2d 662; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892; Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.App.3d 442, 447--448, 94 Cal.Rptr. 127. Rest., Judgment com. to § 68, pp. 293--295.) To the extent that the instant action seeks to recover damages resulting from the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed in the eminent domain case, it involves the same cause of action and plaintiff is precluded from litigating issues which were or could have been litigated in the former action. (Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39 58, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345.) To the extent that plaintiff's claim for damages involves a different cause of action, he is collaterally estopped from litigating those issues which were actually litigated and determined in the eminent domain action.

A condemnation award must once and for all fix the damages that will reasonably occur by reason of the construction of the public improvements in the manner proposed. (People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604, 621--622, 46 Cal.Rptr. 260; East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal.App. 740, 762, 8 P.2d 532.) Where property has been taken by condemnation or acquired by deed, it must be assumed that the owner has been compensated for all reasonably foreseeable damage to his property resulting from the acquisition and the construction of the proposed public improvements. (See Reinking v. County of Orange, 9 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1030, 88 Cal.Rptr. 695.) Consequently, whether the property be acquired by condemnation or by consent, the landowner is estopped 'from afterward prosecuting any action for the past, present, or future damages that may have occurred, or Reasonably be expected to occur, by reason of the necessary, natural, and ordinary use' of the property for the public purpose for which it was acquired. (Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal.App. 737, 743, 216 P. 66, 69, emphasis supplied; Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.2d 250, 265--266, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 408.)

The validity of the res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses in the instant case...