Elliott, In re

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROSELLINI; FINLEY; HALE; WEAVER; In my extracurricular reading, I stumbled across a quotation, gleaned from the dissent of Clarkson; HALE
• Citation: Elliott, In re, 446 P.2d 347, 74 Wn.2d 600 (Wash. 1968)
• Decision Date: 10 October 1968
• Docket Number: No. 39278
• Parties: In the Matter of Eddy W. (Wilbur) ELLIOTT, a Bankrupt (Certification from Federal Court.)

Page 600

74 Wn.2d 600

446 P.2d 347

In the Matter of Eddy W. (Wilbur) ELLIOTT, a Bankrupt (Certification from Federal Court.)

No. 39278.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Oct. 10, 1968.

Howe, Davis, Riese & Jones, Michael R. Green, Seattle, for appellant.

Alfred J. Westberg, Hubert Travaille, Seattle, for respondent.

Charles Horowitz, Seattle, amicus curiae.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

The 39th legislature enacted Laws of 1965, ch. 99, p. 1302 (RCW 2.60), called the Federal Court Local Law Certificate Procedure Act, which provides a procedure whereby the federal district courts may certify questions of law to this court. Proceeding under the authority of this law, the District Court of the United States for Western District of Washington, by order of Judge William J. Lindberg, presiding in a bankruptcy case, has certified to this court a question pertaining to the interpretation of Section 48.18.410 of the Revised Code of Washington, which concerns the disposition of life insurance proceeds in insolvency proceedings.

At the outset the question is raised whether the legislative act providing for the certification procedure is constitutional. Before attacking this question, we think it would be well to summarize the background of the law.

Prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts were not required to apply state law in the disposition of diversity cases or controversies pending before them, but were free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the state was or should be.

Since Erie, federal courts have been required to follow local law as expounded by state courts. This has not been a problem where there is a state decision or rule on the question. However, where the state law is not clear, either because of the absence of state decisions or conflicting decisions in the same state, federal courts have been in a quandary. ¹

A federal court, confronted with the necessity of ascertaining and applying local law, has been compelled to either (1) guess at the law and risk laying down a rule which may later prove to be out of harmony with state decisions, since state courts are not bound by federal court interpretations of state statutes, or (2) abstain from deciding the case until the state courts pass upon the point of law involved.

The great burden created by the abstention doctrine is the matter of delay. If the doctrine is invoked, the parties may appeal to the United States District Courts of Appeal and possibly to the United States Supreme Court. If the case is stayed or dismissed, the litigant must bring the case in the state courts. The parties Must obtain a decision from the highest state court.

The delay and expense give advantage to a financially-endowed litigant, and he may be able to control the forum. He can intentionally choose federal adjudication in a case reasonably certain to be sent back to the state court. In this way the adversary who is less able financially may be forced to settle or abandon his suit.

Thus the legislature, in enacting Laws of 1965, ch. 99, sought to afford a procedure whereby litigants in federal court actions might obtain answers, in an expeditious manner, to questions of state law which controlled the disposition of their cases. The procedure is a shortcut, eliminating the necessity of instituting a declaratory judgment action in the superior court and taking an appeal to this court. The statute is not designed to increase the work load of this court, but rather to simplify the procedure for obtaining decisions on state questions which are relevant in federal court suits.

It is suggested that the enactment of RCW 2.60 was not within the power of the state legislature because it requires of the court a function which it cannot constitutionally perform. Const. art. 4, § 1, provides: 'The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.' Const. art. 4, § 4, provides:

The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings, excepting that its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, ($200) unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute. The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. Each of the judges shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the state upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself, or before the supreme court, or before any superior court of the state or any judge thereof.

RCW 2.60.020, the operative section under which the question has been certified, states:

When in the opinion of any federal court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in order to dispose of such proceeding and the local law has not been clearly determined, such federal court may certify to the supreme court for answer the question of local law involved and the supreme court shall render its opinion in answer thereto.

It must be remembered that the state constitution is a limitation upon the actions and powers of the legislature, instead of a grant of power. So far as the power of the legislature is not limited by the constitution, it is unrestrained. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 94 Wash. 291, 307, 162 P. 558 (1917); Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash.2d 425, 443, 353 P.2d 941 (1960).

This court has recognized that the legislature can confer jurisdiction on the courts or provide for statutory procedures for the exercise of jurisdiction by the court, provided the court exercises only judicial power. Such a limitation would be read into the statute in the absence of an express provision to the contrary. Thus the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (RCW 7.24) does not expressly forbid the rendering of advisory opinions. The court has simply construed the statute as inapplicable where such an opinion is sought. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wash.2d 553, 413 P.2d 972 (1966). And it has upheld the Declaratory Judgments Act as constitutional. Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341, 114 A.L.R. 1345 (1937).

This court in State ex rel. Kurtz v. Pratt, 45 Wash.2d 151, 273 P.2d 516 (1954), recognized again the power of the legislature to increase its jurisdiction. In an original proceeding in the supreme court, the county auditor was restrained from placing the names of three candidates for justice of the peace on the ballot. This was done by authority of RCW 29.04.030, which gives any judge of the supreme court the power to act where error or omission of any clerk or auditor appears in an election. Const. art. 4, § 4, reads as follows: 'The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers * * *.' Thus RCW 29.04.030 expands the original jurisdiction of the court.

We said, at 157, 273 P.2d at 520:

If we should refuse to act in the instant matter, we would be remiss in our duty as members of the court of last resort of this state, in that we would disregard the responsibility relative to the protection and orderly conduct of elections tendered to us by the legislature in its enactment of Rem.Rev.Stat., § 5202. (cf. RCW 29.04.030)

The reasoning of Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla., 1961), supports the constitutionality of RCW 2.60. The provisions of the Florida Constitution are substantially similar to article 4, section 4 of the Washington Constitution. ² The Supreme Court of Florida in Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, supra, dealt with the basic constitutional issue raised by the Florida Certificate Procedure Act (Fla.Stat. F.S.A. § 25.031) saying, at 741:

The real question here is whether § 4 of Revised Article V of our Constitution, adopted in 1956, which delineates the appellate jurisdiction of this court and provides for the issuance by it of named writs, should be construed as prohibiting this court from exercising any judicial powers other than those expressly provided for therein. * * *

The court considered the nature of Article V, § 4 and held that this provision of the Florida Constitution was only a restriction upon state power, rather than a grant (just as is our similar provision), and that, accordingly, the legislature could enlarge the jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court where such enlargement was not forbidden by the constitution. The court said, at 742--743:

We have concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly or by necessary implication limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to those matters expressly conferred upon it, And in the absence of a constitutional provision expressly conferring upon another court jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power which is the subject matter of § 25.031 and Rule 4.61, and in the light of the well settled rule that all sovereign power, including the judicial power, 'not limited by a state constitution inheres to the people of (the) state,' such power may be granted to this court by statute if it is deemed to be a substantive matter, or by a rule of this court if it is deemed to be a matter of 'practice and procedure,' cf. State v. Furen, supra, Fla., 118 So.2d 6, 11. It follows that this court, having in the background derived authority both by statute prior to 1956 and by rule of court subsequent to the...