Elliott v. Elliott
| Decision Date | 24 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | CA-CV,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 796 P.2d 930,165 Ariz. 128 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Linda M. ELLIOTT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John P. ELLIOTT, Respondent-Appellee. 88-322. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This is an appeal from a decree dissolving the marriage of appellant Linda Elliott (wife) and appellee John Elliott (husband). We consider the following issues:
1) whether the trial court made sufficient findings of fact concerning its awards of child support and spousal maintenance to satisfy a request for findings pursuant to Rule 52(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure;
2) whether wife waived her request for such findings;
3) whether the evidence supports the trial court's awards;
4) whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the Arizona Supreme Court's child support guidelines;
5) whether the trial court made the findings that A.R.S. section 25-319(A) requires in awarding spousal maintenance;
6) whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction to modify its spousal maintenance award; and
7) whether the trial court erred in considering an alleged community debt, husband's malpractice tail-coverage premium, in conjunction with the child support and spousal maintenance awards.
Prior to trial, wife asked the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a). We will discuss those findings and conclusions that are relevant to the child support and spousal maintenance issues on appeal.
The court found that husband was a forty-one-year-old physician and that he was in good health. It further found that the parties had four children, one of whom had almost reached the age of emancipation. It determined that the parties had established a middle class standard of living during their twenty-year marriage. It observed, however, that husband's income and the parties' standard of living had risen dramatically each year since 1983. (In that year, husband left the military, where he had received his medical training, and entered private practice in the area of high risk obstetrics.)
The court noted that husband and his partners had built a prosperous practice and that they enjoyed a national reputation and a large share of the market. In discussing husband's income, the court listed his salary draws for the months of January through September, 1987.
Pursuant to the parties' property settlement agreement, which the court approved, wife was to receive a series of payments representing her share of husband's medical practice and of other property that the parties owned. Wife intended to invest these payments, some of which were designated spousal maintenance for tax purposes. The agreement also provided that husband would make wife's house payments until the parties' youngest child was emancipated. Prior to making formal findings of fact, the court expressed its intention to take the payments and the interest income from the invested portion of the payments into account in determining whether wife was entitled to an award of additional spousal maintenance.
In support of her request for spousal maintenance, wife submitted a figure representing the average monthly expenses that she and the children had incurred during the year in which the parties were separated. The court found that wife's standard of living had risen more dramatically during that year than it had during the last year in which the parties lived together. It therefore stated that in deciding whether to award additional spousal maintenance, it would reduce wife's monthly expenses figure so that the figure more accurately reflected the parties' standard of living during the marriage.
The court said that it would base the reduction on husband's testimony that wife had spent more on certain items while the parties were separated than the parties had spent on the same items before the separation took place. It also intended to consider the amount of money that wife had saved during the separation and the amount that she had spent on nonessential items such as furniture and interior decorating.
The court ultimately awarded wife additional spousal maintenance of $2,000 per month for a period of five years. It also awarded her child support payments of $2,000 per month, with reductions to be made as the children became emancipated.
Arizona Revised Statutes section 25-320(A) sets forth the factors that the trial court must consider in awarding child support. Its counterpart in the area of spousal maintenance is A.R.S. section 25-319(B). On appeal, wife argues that the trial court's findings were insufficient to satisfy Rule 52(a) because they did not address each of the factors listed in the two statutes. 1 She also maintains that the findings were insufficient because they did not reveal any mathematical bases for the child support and spousal maintenance awards. Husband asserts that Rule 52(a) does not require the court to make such findings. We disagree with husband's assertion.
The present case was tried to the court. Rule 52(a) requires the trial court to make findings of fact upon request in such cases so that an appellate court will be able to examine the basis for the trial court's decision. 2 Ellingson v. Fuller, 20 Ariz.App 456, 513 P.2d 1339 (1973). In order to satisfy the rule, the court's findings must encompass all of the "ultimate" facts--that is, those necessary to resolve the disputed issues in the case. See id. at 459, 513 P.2d at 1342.
When the issue of child support or spousal maintenance is resolved, the result is a mathematical figure that represents the amount of the award. As we explained in Reed v. Reed, 154 Ariz. 101, 740 P.2d 963 (App.1987), such a figure does not inform an appellate court of the basis for the trial court's decision. Consequently, it does not enable an appellate court to conduct the type of review that Rule 52(a) requires. See Ellingson, 20 Ariz.App. at 460, 513 P.2d at 1343.
In Reed, the trial court modified a child support award by increasing the husband's monthly support obligation. On appeal, we noted that the trial court's findings did not apprise us of the statutory factors that the court had considered in deciding to modify the award or of the mathematical basis for the modification. We reversed, stating that the findings did not satisfy Rule 52(a).
The child support award in the present case was not accompanied by findings concerning all of the section 25-320(A) factors with respect to which the parties presented evidence. 3 The court's only finding regarding the children was that there were four of them and that one of them would soon reach the age of emancipation. The court did not disclose any mathematical basis for the amount of child support that it awarded.
The court made findings concerning a number of the section 25-319(B) factors in conjunction with its award of spousal maintenance. 4 However, it did not address all of the factors with respect to which the parties presented evidence or set forth the mathematical basis of the spousal maintenance award.
In the absence of the findings in question, we are unable to examine the basis for the trial court's decision. We therefore conclude that the court's findings did not satisfy Rule 52(a).
Husband contends that wife is estopped to challenge the sufficiency of the findings because she requested, prepared, and approved them. This contention is without merit.
After the close of the evidence, the trial court issued a minute entry in which it made findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the dissolution of the parties' marriage. In the same minute entry, it approved the property settlement that the parties had reached and awarded child support and spousal maintenance. Husband subsequently lodged a form of decree, to which wife objected. After a hearing on wife's motion in opposition to the lodging of the form of decree, the trial court issued the following order:
[P]etitioner [wife] shall prepare a proposed form of decree and proposed findings of fact, which may be included in the decree if counsel so desire and submit same to counsel for respondent [husband] by no later than December 18, 1987.
If said proposed decree is not acceptable to counsel for respondent, counsel shall meet on or before December 23, 1987, to resolve the differences and submit an acceptable proposed decree.[ 5
The parties submitted a proposed decree that included findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the trial court signed the decree, wife filed a motion for new trial and to amend the judgment. In her motion, she argued that Reed required the court to make findings concerning each of the factors set forth by sections 25-319(B) and 25-320(A). The trial court denied the motion.
Husband maintains that because wife prepared the proposed findings of fact, she could not subsequently challenge their sufficiency. However, a party who submits proposed findings of fact to the trial court is not precluded from filing a motion to amend the court's findings after judgment has been entered. King Realty, Inc. v. Grantwood Cemeteries, Inc., 4 Ariz.App. 76, 417 P.2d 710 (1966).
Husband also notes that counsel for both parties signed the proposed decree "approved as to form." He asserts that the decree is a consent judgment and that parties cannot challenge the provisions of such a judgment after it has been entered. A consent judgment is one that is entered by stipulation of the parties. Cochise Hotels, Inc. v. Douglas Hotel Operating Co., 83 Ariz. 40, 316 P.2d 290 (1957). As the following passage...
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