Ellis v. Ellis
| Decision Date | 11 April 1988 |
| Citation | 748 S.W.2d 424 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
| Parties | Josephine Payne ELLIS, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Hubert Chester ELLIS, Defendant/Appellant. |
Clyde W. Richert, III, Springfield, for defendant/appellant.
George W. Yost, Springfield, for plaintiff/appellee.
In this divorce action the plaintiff wife was granted a divorce and the court made a division of marital property, real and personal, pursuant to T.C.A. Sec. 36-4-121. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of the divorce but disagreed with the trial court's disposition of the marital property and substantially modified the trial court's decree in that respect and made a much more liberal division of the property in favor of the wife. We granted review at the instance of the husband.
The parties have been married since June 1948, but have no children. The husband worked as a farmer until 1965 when he went to work for the Acme Boot Company and from which he retired in 1983. The wife has also been an employee of Acme Boot Company for several years and was so employed at the time of the trial in this cause. At the time of their marriage the parties lived in a house owned by the wife's uncle which was located on approximately 40 acres of land which has been referred to in the record as "the big house." In 1952 the parties built a small house, referred to in the records as "the little house," on another piece of land owned by the wife's uncle. Later, the wife's uncle executed a deed to these parties for the little house and the lot on which it was located. Most of the funds employed to build the little house came from the husband's earnings and savings.
Later, the wife sought a bank loan, using a mortgage on the little house as security, but husband refused to sign the promissory note. However, the husband finally conveyed his interest in the little house to the wife. She alone then signed the note, but both she and her husband executed a deed of trust as collateral.
In 1972 the wife inherited from her uncle the big house, along with the 39 acres on which it was located. Thereafter the parties moved into the big house and resided therein until their separation in July 1982, at which time the wife moved back into the little house.
In making a proper division of the property owned by the parties, the trial court found that they had cash on hand of $14,910, that the little house and three hundredths of an acre of land had a value of $18,500, stipulated, and that the big house and 38.5 acres of land on which it was located had a stipulated value of $66,700. The trial judge also had before him the inheritance tax return filed by the wife's uncle, which placed a value on the big house and the land on which it was located at $15,000 and, thus, he found that there had been an appreciation in value of the big house during the marriage of the parties in the amount of $51,700 and although the big house was separate property of the wife, that the appreciation of $51,700 in that property during the marriage constituted marital property under T.C.A. Sec. 36-4-121 which in paragraph (b)(1), in pertinent part, provides:
"Marital property" means all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the marriage and presently owned by either or both spouses; including income from, and any increase in value during the marriage, of property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (2) of this subsection if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation ... (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that the big house property was "separate property in accordance with subdivision (2)." Accordingly, this increase in value of the big house property during the marriage was considered by the trial court to be one of the items of marital property to be equitably divided as provided by T.C.A. Sec. 36-4-121, and that both the husband and wife had "substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation." The evidence does not preponderate against those findings. The Court of Appeals also found that the husband's checks introduced into evidence...
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Cohen v. Cohen
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...not rendered inequitable simply because it is not precisely equal, see Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn.1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn.1988), or because each party did not receive a share of every piece of marital property. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 ......
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Edmisten v. Edmisten
...does not require an equal division of marital property but an equitable division. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); see Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988). When practical, therefore, a trial court should consider awarding more assets to an economically disadvantaged spouse to ......
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Pearson v. Pearson, No. E2007-02154-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 10/27/2008)
...rendered inequitable simply because it is not mathematically equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988), or each party did not receive a share of every item of marital property. Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d [163] at 168. . . . In ......
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§ 7.04 Characterizing Improvements
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