Ellis v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York
| Decision Date | 09 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | 14706. |
| Parties | ELLIS v. METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INS. CO. OF NEW YORK. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Jasper County; E. C Dennis, Judge.
Action by W. D. Ellis against the Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York to recover on an automobile liability policy. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
W Marshall Bridges, of Florence, for appellant.
Y. C Weathersbee and H. Klugh Purdy, both of Ridgeland, for respondent.
On April 10, 1937, the appellant, through W. C. Preacher, its local agent at Ridgeland, issued to the respondent a standard automobile insurance policy, insuring him against liability for damages, and including damages for care, maintenance and loss of services, because of bodily injury, including death sustained by any person or persons, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, and use of the motor vehicle described.
But by a subsequent clause of the contract, under the head of "Exclusions," the policy excluded any obligation of the Company for bodily injury suffered by any employee of the assured while engaged in the business of the assured, other than domestic employment.
The case at bar involves the application of the doctrine of waiver or estoppel, and arose out of the following facts, as to which the respondent and the appellant are in substantial agreement:
On April 12, 1937, one Alex Pinckney, an employee of the respondent, but not engaged in domestic employment, while riding on a Chevrolet truck of the respondent, which was described in the policy contract, fell from the truck, breaking his leg.
The accident occurred about two o'clock on the afternoon of April 12, 1937, and the injured man was immediately taken to the local hospital at Ridgeland. Later in the afternoon of the same day the respondent learned of the accident to his employee, and was informed that Pinckney had been taken to the hospital for emergency treatment, and that the hospital authorities were awaiting his arrival for further instructions. Upon learning this, the respondent immediately reported the accident to Mr. Preacher, the local agent of the appellant, and told him that the injured man was in the hospital for emergency treatment, and that the accident would result in a claim against the appellant. The agent instructed him to obtain all the facts with reference to the accident, so that he (the agent) could forward a report of it to the appellant on the mail leaving Ridgeland that afternoon. The facts were obtained, and the report was mailed that afternoon. Neither the respondent nor Mr. Preacher, the agent, recalled definitely whether it appeared in that report that the injured man was actually an employee of the respondent, but both of them believed at that time that the risk was covered by the policy, and that the appellant was liable. The respondent testified that when the policy was issued to him by the local agent he made the statement to Mr. Preacher, "that it did not matter so much to me if my truck was destroyed, but if it did injure any one I wanted protection, then Mr. Preacher referred to that paragraph which refers to bodily injury, where it says I was protected for bodily injury to any person or persons whoever may be hurt."
When the report was received at the Columbia office of the appellant, Mr. Preacher was called on the telephone by that office and asked if Pinckney was an employee of the respondent. Apparently Mr. Preacher was uncertain himself of this fact, and he immediately made inquiry at the respondent's place of business, and learned from an employee there that the injured man was an employee of the respondent. He thereupon transmitted this information to the Columbia office, together with the further fact that the injured man was in the hospital, and he expressed the belief that an agent of appellant from the Columbia office came to Ridgeland, and that he and this agent went to see the respondent, but he could not recall the circumstances.
Later it became necessary to amputate Pinckney's leg, and it was suggested by his family that a surgeon be called from Savannah to assist the local surgeon in this operation. The respondent discussed this with Mr. Preacher, and asked him who was going to pay the expense. Mr. Preacher approved of the entire procedure, suggested the name of a Savannah surgeon, and stated in substance that efficient treatment of the injured man would result in reducing the ultimate claim against the appellant.
The respondent was not advised until three weeks had...
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