Ellison v. Trailite, Inc., B2041
Decision Date | 28 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. B2041,B2041 |
Citation | 580 S.W.2d 614 |
Parties | Katie M. ELLISON, Appellant, v. TRAILITE, INC., et al., Appellees. (14th Dist.) |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Charles Morgan, Houston, for appellant.
Barham Bratton, Clark, Thomas, Winters & Shapiro, Joseph V. Crawford, Wofford Denius, Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder, Austin, for appellees.
Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C. J., and COULSON and CIRE, JJ.
ON MOTION TO REFORM
Katie M. Ellison appeals from summary judgments rendered in favor of Trailite, Inc. and Janie S. Langston. The suit grew out of an alleged assault and battery by Janie S. Langston upon appellant after a disagreement between them on the premises of Trailite, Inc., and after appellant had resigned or was fired from her employment at Trailite. Appellant filed a personal injury action against Langston and against Trailite, Langston's employer, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Appellees moved for summary judgments on the ground that appellant had been injured in the course and scope of her employment and was covered by a policy of workmen's compensation issued by Texas Employers' Insurance Association. Separate summary judgments were rendered for each appellee that appellant take nothing. This appeal followed.
While there is some dispute as to the actual occurrence of the events alleged by appellant, there is no genuine dispute between the parties as to the time sequence of the alleged events, if they occurred. This sequence of events was as follows: a disagreement arose between appellant and appellee Langston; appellant either resigned or was fired from her position; appellant remained on the premises of Trailite while her severance check was prepared; a further altercation ensued during the course of which appellant was struck by a thrown object and injured. Appellees argue that in remaining on the premises to pick up her check appellant was serving Trailite's purposes and performing her last act as an employee. They urge that she was therefore injured in the scope of employment and has an exclusive remedy under the workmen's compensation statute. Appellant argues that once she resigned or was fired she was no longer in the scope of employment and so was not covered by compensation.
This case presents a question apparently not heretofore faced by Texas courts. We hold that once employment is terminated by resignation or by the employee's being fired, no injury thereafter incurred is received within the course of his employment, for purposes of workmen's compensation law. This rule is limited to those cases where the resignation or firing occurs in a place of safety and the parties are not subject to the inherent hazards arising from the employment itself.
In the case before us, then, appellant, after resigning or having been fired, as a matter...
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Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Center, Inc.
...is not within the scope of Workmen's Compensation regardless of the temporal and proximal circumstances. Ellison v. Trailite, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 614, 615-616 (Tex.Civ.App.1979). (Injury occurring after termination of employment while remaining on employer's premises for severance pay held not......
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Sanders v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
...occurs in a place of safety and the employee is not subject to the inherent hazards arising from the employment itself. Ellison v. Trailite, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 614 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ). An exception to this rule occurs when the employee is required, or reasonably......
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Bryant v. INA of Texas
...for a limited purpose where the employee, though terminated, is instructed to return to pick up his pay. Appellee cites Ellison v. Trailite, 580 S.W.2d 614 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th] 1979, no writ) as authority for its argument that once employment is terminated by resignation or by the ......