Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 80-5732
Citation | 681 F.2d 1243 |
Decision Date | 23 July 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 80-5732,80-5732 |
Parties | 82-2 USTC P 9641 ELLWEST STEREO THEATRES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul WENNER, Individually and as the treasurer of the City of Phoenix, Lawrence Wetzel, individually and as the chief of police of the City of Phoenix, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Richard J. Hertzberg, Phoenix, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.
Sandra K. McGee, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before CHAMBERS, KENNEDY and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Ellwest Stereo Theatres ("Ellwest") operates a Phoenix, Arizona movie arcade in which members of the public pay to view sexually explicit films in booths. Ellwest brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a City of Phoenix ordinance requiring that the viewing areas of booths in which coin operated viewing devices are located be visible from a continuous main aisle. On the basis of stipulated facts, the district court held that the ordinance was a reasonable regulation of the operation of theaters not based upon the content of the films shown, and entered judgment in favor of the City. We affirm.
Chapter VII of the Phoenix City Code requires, inter alia, that anyone engaged in running a "video center" obtain a license from the city. Section 7-3(a) (a) defines a "video center" as "(a)ny establishment open to the public wherein are operated any film or videotape viewing device (sic)." Section 7-30(a)(6) provides as follows:
(6) Position of film or video viewing device in video center.
(a) Definition for purposes of this section.
(1) Viewing area-area where patron or customer would ordinarily be positioned while watching a film or video viewing device.
(b) All viewing areas must be visible from a continuous main aisle and must not be obscured by any curtain, door, wall, or other enclosure.
(c) All persons regulated pursuant to this Chapter must comply with Section 7-30(a)(6) within 30 days of the effective date of the ordinance.
Ellwest is a "video center" within the meaning of the ordinance and thus is required to obtain a license. Ellwest applied for a license without complying with § 7-30(a)(6) as set forth above. The application was denied on the ground that the viewing areas of the booths were not visible from a continuous main aisle.
The City alleges that the ordinance was passed as a response to complaints that the display of adult films in the arcades was causing sex-related criminal activity. The parties stipulated that "(s)ome customers in the booths viewing the films will, on occasion, take the opportunity to fondle themselves or masturbate." The parties further stipulated that in the two years preceding this lawsuit, 1
The sole issue presented, as framed by Ellwest in its appellate brief, is whether the ordinance "requiring open booths in motion picture arcades is unconstitutional on its face as violative of the Free Speech and Privacy provisions of the United States Constitution."
First, Ellwest argues that its own exercise of first amendment rights is limited by the ordinance. Second, Ellwest asserts infringement of the constitutional rights of its customers under the first and fourteenth amendments. Each of these contentions will be analyzed in turn.
We begin with the proposition that Ellwest has a constitutional right to exhibit its films. It is settled that obscene materials are not protected speech within the meaning of the first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1278, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152, 80 S.Ct. 215, 218, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The City does not contend, however, that the films are obscene, or that their content is undeserving of first amendment protection for any other reason. See New York v. Ferber, --- U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358, 72 L.Ed.2d ---- (1982). Thus, we must assume their dissemination by Ellwest is protected by the first amendment. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952).
Ellwest does not nor could it successfully contend that the Phoenix ordinance regulates speech on the basis of content. 2 The ordinance does not prohibit the showing of any film whatever. Ellwest may still exhibit any film it wishes, and its discretion in selecting those films is unbridled by the ordinance. "There is no claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, conversely, that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). This is not an ordinance which prohibits the showing of any constitutionally protected film. We thus are not faced with the considerations which recently led us to hold that a prohibition on all topless entertainment was unconstitutional on its face as overbroad. Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975).
The ordinance does regulate the manner in which films chosen by Ellwest may be shown. Regulations of the time, place, or manner of protected speech will be upheld if necessary to further significant governmental interests. Requiring such a showing insures that expression protected by the first amendment will not be unduly inhibited by regulation of its form.
Reasonable regulations of the time, place, and manner of protected speech, where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests, are permitted by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513) ( ); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487) ( ); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222) ( ).
Ellwest contends that the ordinance is not justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of protected speech. It needs no extended discussion, however, to uphold the open booth requirement against this line of attack. The ordinance, as the parties have stipulated, is aimed at curtailing public sexual criminal offenses and as such it clearly seeks to further significant state interests. 3 In this respect we agree with the conclusion of the California court of appeal upholding the ordinance upon which the Phoenix City Council patterned its own enactment. That court explained the problem giving rise to the prohibition of enclosed booths and concluded that the ordinance furthered significant interests of the city.
The City has a substantial interest in preventing the kind of dangerous or unlawful conduct, as well as the health and safety problems, which may be anticipated in a picture arcade where the booths are concealed or enclosed. The prohibition of such booths furthers the City's interest in deterring and detecting the use of the premises for such unlawful activity.
EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal.App.3d 179, 189-90, 158 Cal.Rptr. 579 585 (1979), quoting People v. Perrine, 47 Cal.App.3d 252, 258, 120 Cal.Rptr. 640, 643-44 (1975). See also DeMott v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 122 Cal.App.3d 296, 175 Cal.Rptr. 879 (1981).
We similarly hold that the ordinance does not impermissibly infringe upon Ellwest's first amendment rights.
Ellwest argues alternatively that the ordinance impermissibly impinges upon the first amendment and privacy rights of the patrons of its establishment.
We observe initially that the Supreme Court has never held that an owner of a theater has standing to assert the constitutional rights of its customers. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2639, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), the Court assumed for purposes of argument that the owner had such vicarious standing, and we do the same here.
The considerations discussed with respect to the owner's right to exhibit the films apply with equal force to the alleged interference with the first amendment rights of patrons to view the films. The ordinance is a reasonable regulation of the manner in...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Chez Sez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz
...596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Wall Distribs., Inc. v. City of Newport News, 782 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir.1986); Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.1982); Grunberg v. Town of East Hartford, Conn., 736 F.Supp. 430 (D.Conn.1989), aff'd, 901 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.1990); Suburba......
-
Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, CASE NO. C16–0538JLR
...and "spying" did not threaten a theater's privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, but rather "the interests of its patrons." Ellwest , 681 F.2d at 1248. The Court held that because "Fourth [A]mendment rights are personal rights ... which may not be vicariously asserted," "Ellwest ha[d......
-
U.S. v. McConney
...of law such mixed questions as the reasonableness of certain restrictions on first amendment rights, Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.1982); whether there was a "search" in an INS sweep of a factory, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 ......
-
Dumas v. City of Dallas
...within view of management "falls within the broad general limits of the police power" and satisfies O'Brien); Ellwest Stereo Theatres v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1982) (same); EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal.App.3d 179, 158 Cal.Rptr. 579 (1979) (same); Purple Onion, In......
-
Privacy, property, and public sex.
...establishments leave viewing booths completely open on a side open to a public room); Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding ordinance requiring booths in adult movie theaters to be observable from the outside of these booths); Stadium Book & V......