Elmore County Com'n v. Ragona

• Decision Date: 12 April 1990
• Citation: 561 So.2d 1092
• Parties: ELMORE COUNTY COMMISSION, et al. v. Barbara RAGONA, individually, and as mother and next friend of Thomas James Ragona, a minor. 89-243.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1092

561 So.2d 1092

ELMORE COUNTY COMMISSION, et al. v. Barbara RAGONA, individually, and as mother and next friend of Thomas James Ragona, a minor.

89-243.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 12, 1990.

G. Houston Howard II of Howard, Dunn, Howard & Howard, Wetumpka, for appellants.

Robert D. Segall, Lee H. Copeland and Gregory L. Davis of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, for appellee.

HOUSTON, Justice.

This is the second time that the parties in this personal injury action have been before this Court. See Elmore County Comm'n v. Ragona, 540 So.2d 720 (Ala.1989), where the Court affirmed the $136,750 judgment that had been entered in favor of Ms. Ragona against Elmore County, the Elmore County Commission, Melvin Curlee, and Elzie Mehearg, in their official capacities as Elmore County Commissioners, and Richard Joiner. ¹ The Court also noted that "the verdict and judgment will support a recovery by Ms. Ragona against the County defendants only in the amount of $100,000." See 540 So.2d at 727. Thereafter, the county defendants ("the County") paid $100,000 into the trial court to satisfy the judgment. Ms. Ragona filed a motion to have the $100,000 released to her and to have post-judgment interest set under Ala.Code 1975, § 8-8-10. The County filed a response to that motion, asserting that $100,000 was the maximum amount that was recoverable from it under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-93-2, and Elmore County Comm'n v. Ragona.

The trial court released the $100,000 to Ms. Ragona and awarded her post-judgment interest in the amount of $32,317.81. The trial court's order reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"[I]t is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:

"1. That the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County immediately pay to Plaintiff's attorneys the $100,000.00 placed on deposit with the Clerk by Defendant Elmore County without the necessity of Plaintiff's satisfying the judgment entered in her favor against Elmore County on October 16, 1986.

"2. That Plaintiff Barbara Ragona have and recover of Defendant Elmore County the sum of $32,317.81, which constitutes interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum on $100,000.00, through June 27, 1989."

The County appealed. We affirm.

The following issues are presented for our review:

1) Whether post-judgment interest is recoverable by Ms. Ragona; and

2) If post-judgment interest is recoverable, whether the trial court erred in computing that interest.

With regard to the first issue, the County contends that § 11-93-2 and Elmore County Comm'n v. Ragona restrict the maximum amount that is recoverable from it to $100,000 and, therefore, that the trial court erred in its determination that post-judgment interest was recoverable by Ms. Ragona in this case. It also contends that the trial court's determination was erroneous under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-722. Ms. Ragona argues, on the other hand, that the trial court had the authority under § 8-8-10 to award her interest on the judgment and that neither § 11-93-2, this Court's previous decision in this case, nor § 6-6-722, prohibits her from recovering that interest. We agree.

Section 8-8-10 reads as follows:

"Judgments for the payment of money, other than costs, if based upon a contract action, bear interest from the day of the cause of action, at the same rate of interest as stated in said contract; all other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum, the provisions of section 8-8-1 to the contrary notwithstanding; provided, that fees allowed a trustee, executor, administrator or attorney and taxed as a part of the cost of the proceeding shall bear interest at a like rate from the day of entry."

(Emphasis added.)

Section 11-93-2 provides:

"The recovery of damages under any judgment against a governmental entity shall be limited to $100,000.00 for bodily injury or death for one person in any single occurrence. Recovery of damages under any judgment or judgments against a governmental entity shall be limited to $300,000.00 in the aggregate where more than two persons have claims or judgments on account of bodily injury or death arising out of any single occurrence. Recovery of damages under any judgment against a governmental entity shall be limited to $100,000.00 for damage or loss of property arising out of any single occurrence. No governmental entity shall settle or compromise any claim for bodily injury, death or property damage in excess of the amounts hereinabove set forth."

(Emphasis added.)

Section 8-8-10 authorizes the payment of post-judgment interest as compensation for the loss of use of money as a result of the nonpayment of a liquidated sum for which liability has already been determined. The County does not argue that this section is inapplicable to judgments against a county. See Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 235 Ala. 199, 178 So. 226 (1938). It takes the position, however, that it has already paid into the trial court the maximum amount that is recoverable from it under § 11-93-2 (i.e., $100,000). Section 11-93-2 limits the recovery of damages against a county to $100,000 for, inter alia, "bodily injury or death." By placing a cap on the recovery of damages for "bodily injury or death," did the Legislature intend to prohibit the recovery of interest on a judgment, when the recovery of that interest would allow a total recovery under the judgment to exceed $100,000? After carefully examining §§ 8-8-10 and 11-93-2, as well as the public policies behind the Legislature's providing for the payment of post-judgment interest under § 8-8-10, and its limiting the liability of local governmental entities under § 11-93-2, we answer this question in the negative.

Section 8-8-10 clearly states that judgments, such as the one obtained by Ms. Ragona, "shall bear interest." As previously noted, this section provides for the payment of post-judgment interest as compensation for the loss of use of money as a result of the nonpayment of a liquidated sum for which liability has already been determined. Section 11-93-2 places a monetary cap on the amount of damages that are recoverable as compensation for the injury or death giving rise to liability. We see nothing in the language of § 11-93-2 to indicate that the Legislature intended to prohibit a judgment creditor of a county from recovering interest on his judgment, even when such a recovery, together with the recovery of damages for bodily injury or death, would exceed $100,000. Had the Legislature wanted to limit the effect of § 8-8-10, it could have easily done so in § 11-93-2. Instead, it appears to us that the Legislature carefully drafted § 11-93-2 with an eye toward balancing the need to maintain the financial pressure imposed on counties by § 8-8-10, which encourages counties, as well as private citizens, to avoid unnecessary litigation and to pay judgments promptly, against the need to protect the counties against devastatingly high judgments that could jeopardize the funding of necessary governmental services or otherwise disrupt fiscal planning, see Ex parte Stanton, 545 So.2d 58 (Ala.1989) (where this Court held that the disallowance of interest on workmen's compensation judgments would encourage providers of benefits to initiate long delays and frivolous appeals, because the provider might thereby have the benefit of the money for several years without having to pay any interest on it to the claimant once the provider finally did pay the judgment). See, also, Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So.2d 836, 841 (Ala.1984), where this Court, quoting with approval the rationale advanced by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 842, 280 N.W.2d 711, 719 (1979), stated:

" 'We are unwilling to say that the legislature has no rational basis to fear that full monetary responsibility entails the risk of insolvency or intolerable tax burdens. Funds must be available in the public treasury to pay for essential governmental services; taxes must be kept at reasonable levels; it is for the legislature to choose how limited public funds will be spent. It is within the legitimate power of the legislature to take steps to preserve sufficient public funds to ensure that the government will be able to continue to provide those services which it believes benefit the citizenry. We conclude that the legislature's specification of a dollar limitation on damages recoverable allows for fiscal planning and avoids the risk of devastatingly high judgments while permitting victims of public tortfeasors to recover their losses up to that limit.' "

In Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.1988), the Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced with a similar issue. In that case, Lienhard sued the State of Minnesota for damages for injuries that he had sustained in a motorcycle accident. A jury returned a verdict in his favor, assessing damages against the state in the amount of $100,000. Lienhard sought to compel payment of the $100,000, plus post-judgment interest. The pertinent portions of the statute sued under, Minn.Stat. § 3.736, were quoted in the Minnesota court's opinion, as follows:

"The state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant.

"....

"The total liability of the state and its employees acting within the scope of their employment on any tort claim shall not exceed:

"(a) $100,000 when the claim is one for death by wrongful act or omission and $100,000 to any claimant in any other case.

"(b) $500,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence."

431 N.W.2d at 863. (Emphasis added.) The trial court ruled that the state was not liable for post-judgment interest. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, stating in pertinent...