Elva M. Goodman v. Ancient Order United
| Decision Date | 31 October 1941 |
| Docket Number | 32,899. |
| Citation | 300 N.W. 624,211 Minn. 181 |
| Parties | Elva M. Goodman v. Ancient Order Of United Workmen And Others; Frances Sexton, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by Frances Sexton as special administratrix of the estate of defendant Joseph M. Wandok, deceased incompetent, from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Lars O. Rue Judge, denying her motion to vacate, modify, and set aside certain orders of the district court in receivership proceedings insofar as said orders are claimed to affect the interests of decedent's estate. Affirmed.
Earl H A. Isensee, for appellant.
Oscar Hallam, for respondent Ancient Order of United Workmen.
Loring & Anderson, for respondent L. J. Aspaas as receiver.
C. O Lundquist, for respondent L. J. Aspaas as guardian of estate of Joseph Wandok, incompetent.
Mark J Woolley, for respondents Apartment Owners Holding Company, The Tompaine Company, and A. R. Bakke.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Olson
Court -- acquiring jurisdiction -- service of process.
1. It is the fact of service of process and not the proof thereof that gives the court jurisdiction.
Court -- exercise of jurisdiction -- presumptions and burden of proof.
2. The general rule is that where a court of general jurisdiction has exercised its powers it is presumed, unless the contrary appears as matter of record, that it had jurisdiction both of the subject matter of the action and the parties, since it is the first duty of all courts to keep strictly within the limits of their jurisdiction; and any affirmative act on the part of the court implies that it has ascertained and determined that it had authority to act. Hence the party asserting want of jurisdiction has the burden of showing such want.
Court -- want of jurisdiction -- burden of proof.
3. Upon facts summarized in opinion, held that appellant failed to show want of jurisdiction.
Attorney and client -- presumption of authority to act for client.
4. There is a firmly established presumption in favor of an attorney's authority to act for any client whom he professes to represent.
This is a suit involving an apartment building in Minneapolis, a receiver of the property having been appointed who is acting in that capacity. One of the defendants was Joseph Wandok, an incompetent person, of whose estate the defendant Aspaas was the duly appointed and qualified guardian. During pendency of the suit Wandok died, and Frances Sexton, the appellant, was appointed special administratrix of his estate. Claiming that Wandok never had been served with summons in the main action although his guardian had been duly served and appeared generally therein, she moved for an order "modifying or setting aside the previous orders of the court" appointing a receiver of the property, including several orders subsequently made relating to the receivership, "insofar as said orders, and all of them, affect the interest" of said decedent's estate. The motion has for its basis that there never had been "any service" of process upon Wandok nor had "any proper appearance made by him or in his behalf." hence that "the court was without jurisdiction to make any of the orders * * * affecting * * * his interests" in the property. The only showing made by appellant in support of the motion was the following statement in an affidavit made by one of decedent's sons -- "that during the entire month of June, 1939, Joseph Wandok, the above named defendant, was a resident of the state of Minnesota and was personally present in the state * * * and spent practically all of his time in either Delano, * * * or Minneapolis."
Upon the hearing of the motion, proof was offered and received that the summons and complaint had been duly served upon Wandok's guardian; that Wandok took a copy "of said summons and complaint" to the office of his guardian that the guardian instructed Wandok to deliver the papers to his attorney; that thereafter the attorney to whom Wandok was directed to go appeared generally in the cause as his attorney and joined in making a stipulation consenting to the appointment of the receiver; that subsequent to such appointment Wandok "through the guardianship estate," received and accepted the beneficial results of the receivership through application of income from the property in receivership to its needed maintenance and...
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